Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ABUJA1472
2004-08-27 12:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:
NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO MEETS WITH SENATOR
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001472
SIPDIS
NOFORN
AF AND H PASS TO SENATOR HAGEL
USEUCOM FOR GENERAL WALD FROM AMBASSADOR CAMPBELL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO MEETS WITH SENATOR
HAGEL
REF: A. ABUJA 017
B. ABUJA 1307 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001472
SIPDIS
NOFORN
AF AND H PASS TO SENATOR HAGEL
USEUCOM FOR GENERAL WALD FROM AMBASSADOR CAMPBELL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO MEETS WITH SENATOR
HAGEL
REF: A. ABUJA 017
B. ABUJA 1307 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) Summary. At a meeting with Senator Chuck Hagel of
Nebraska, President Olusegun Obasanjo described a regional
security initiative, the Gulf of Guinea Commission. Obasanjo
also described negotiations with the Cameroonian President
over the Bakassi peninsula without mentioning a previous
commitment to withdraw Nigerian forces from Bakassi by
September 15. He assessed the risk of Islamic fundamentalism
in Nigeria as low, and linked a Darfur settlement with
reduced terrorist risk in Africa. Obasanjo took a completely
unambiguous stance on Charles Taylor, stressing that Taylor
would be handed over only to a democratically elected
government in Liberia. As expected, he also suggested debt
relief for Nigeria. End Summary.
2. (U) President Obasanjo was accompanied by the following:
--Major-General Abdullahi Mohammed (Ret.),Chief of Staff to
the President
--Prof. Julius Ihonvbere, Special Advisor, Policy &
Programmes Monitoring
--Mrs. Remi Oyo, Senior Special Assistant, Media & Publicity
--Mr. B. S. Ilochi, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
--Mr. E. A. Balogun, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
--Mr. Onochie Ben Amobi, Deputy Chief of Protocol, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
--Mr. Kabiru Garba, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
to the President
3. (U) Present with Senator Hagel were the following:
--The Ambassador
--General Chuck Wald, Deputy US European Commander, EUCOM
--Major-General Jonathan "Scott" Gration, Director, Plans and
Policy, EUCOM
--Mr. Terry Snell, Political Advisor, EUCOM
--Dr. Andrew Parasiliti, Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator
Hagel
--Capt. Randel Zeller, USN (Ret.),National Security Advisor
to Senator Hagel
--Poloff (notetaker)
4. (U) President Obasanjo opened by welcoming Senator Hagel,
and he noted the Senator's interest in international trade.
Referring to the Darfur peace talks, which he was opening
later in the morning, Obasanjo noted that strife-torn parts
of Africa--including the Niger Delta, Liberia and
Darfur--would need trade to restore genuine stability once
security has been re-established.
-------------- --------------
Security in the Gulf of Guinea: a Regional Commission
-------------- --------------
5. (C) In response to comments from Sen. Hagel and Gen.
Wald, Obasanjo observed that Gulf of Guinea security and
stability had been a pre-occupation ever since he became
president in 1999. His first step was to consult with other
national leaders in the region. Out of those initial
conversations, he "spearheaded" the establishment of a Gulf
of Guinea commission. His goal was an organization that
would ensure peace and security, a "virile, strong
organization" that would ward off threats from outside the
region. He noted with pride the Gulf of Guinea Treaty to
establish such an organization. When the treaty has been
ratified by five different nations in the region, the
organization would be launched. (Three have ratified so far,
he said.) As recently as a month ago, he continued, he met
with four heads of state in Brazzaville to discuss such a
possible regional organization based on the treaty. Nigeria,
he said, is not asking for the headquarters of such an
organization, nor would Nigeria foresee providing the
Secretary-General. He speculated that the Secretary-General
SIPDIS
might come from Sao Tome, and the headquarters might be
located in Gabon. Ghana, he concluded, had already indicated
interest in joining the Gulf of Guinea initiative, as well as
Senegal and possibly South Africa, some day.
6. (C) General Wald offered to help Nigeria "any way we can"
on Gulf of Guinea security. Obasanjo said he'd "keep (the
USG) informed." As "friends and partners," the USG and GON
need have no secrets, he said; "our interests are parallel."
Gen. Wald raised the possibility of U.S. observer status.
Obasanjo responded that he would need to talk to the other
heads of state of partner nations. "We need Gulf of Guinea
security more than you do."
7. (C) On the Delta, Obasanjo said trouble dated from the
period after the civil war, after the discovery of marketable
oil. "We haven't solved it," but "we are dealing with it."
He said that his government was doing a study of the Delta,
to try to find a way forward. He anticipated the study being
completed by October 1, and said that he hoped the U.S. and
the U.K. would be able to assist in carrying out the study's
recommendations.
-------------- --------------
Bakassi Handover Progressing, but Withdrawal Delayed
-------------- --------------
8. (C) Obasanjo noted that when he came to office, Nigeria
"had problems" with three countries in the Gulf of Guinea
region. Issues with Sao Tome have been resolved. Good
progress has been made with respect to Equatorial Guinea.
With Cameroon, he said that both he and President Biya are
"personally satisfied" with the status of the Bakassi
handover. Obasanjo said he hoped Biya would be re-elected in
October so that the two of them can finish what they have
started. Notwithstanding a previous commitment made by
Nigeria to withdraw from the disputed territory by September
15, Obasanjo noted that "small concessions" that might be
necessary for a settlement could not easily be made on either
side before Cameroon's October elections. In the meantime,
he continued, he believed that Cameroon and Nigeria should
work to implement the least controversial parts of the
International Court of Justice decision defining the
Nigerian-Cameroonian border. Then the two states could move
on to more difficult areas, such as the maritime demarcation.
His goal, he continued, is a solution that has "no losers"
and promotes good neighborly relations. He said that at
their most recent meeting in Cameroon, he and President Biya
also agreed to additional confidence building measures,
including road construction. He said that next meeting of
the Nigeria/Cameroon joint commission will take place in
November.
--------------
Darfur Peace Talks: Setting the Bar Low
--------------
9. (C) In response to a question from Senator Hagel,
Obasanjo discussed possible outcomes from the Darfur peace
talks to be started in Abuja later in the day. A best-case
scenario would have delegates with clear mandates meeting and
agreeing to a political settlement, while a worst-case
scenario would have the meetings end inconclusively, with one
or more of the parties saying that were not "empowered" to
reach agreement. Obasanjo predicted that in the short term,
the results would be somewhere between these two
possibilities. His minimum goal, he continued, would be
agreement by all parties on an agenda, and agreement on the
goal of a negotiated settlement. If he could achieve that,
then "thank God for small mercies," said Obasanjo.
-------------- --------------
Terrorist Threat Level: Not a Problem for Nigeria
-------------- --------------
10. (C) When Senator Hagel asked Obasanjo to assess the
terrorist threat in Nigeria, particularly in the North,
Obasanjo answered that while he could not say Nigeria is
"absolutely devoid of fundamentalists," he does not see
Islamic fundamentalism as a problem. To show how
insignificant it is, he cited two examples of Islamic
fundamentalism in Nigeria. First, a man in Kebbi State
claimed he created "Mecca in Nigeria," declared himself chief
of his sect, and demanded that all brides spend 48 hours with
him before marriage. Obasanjo, laughing, said that the GON
"of course, had to remove the chief." Second, a cult in Yobe
State claimed to be in solidarity with the Taliban (reftel
A). Obasanjo explained that understanding of Islam in the
North is low, and "these people can be used."
11. (C) Obasanjo observed that he needed to watch Nigeria's
own elite. In Plateau, he continued, if he had not declared
a state of emergency (reftel B),the result would have been
the growth of fundamentalism among both Christians and
Muslims. He said that he had just visited the scene of the
violence in Plateau State, and visitors "wouldn't believe
there had been violence three months earlier." (Note. In a
visit to the same place in late June, Emboffs observed that
the town was devastated, nearly a ghost town. End Note.)
12. (C) Obasanjo observed that there is a "possibility" that
organizations such as Al Qaeda or Taliban could try to
establish themselves in northern Nigeria "if they are pushed
out elsewhere." Conditions in the Sahel would have a major
impact on whether or not terrorists groups tried to establish
themselves. That is why, he continued, it is so important to
establish peace in the Sudan, and why information sharing
amongst all countries involved--including the U.S.--is so
important. He said that the Nigerian State Security Service
is convening this week an "All-Africa" security meeting to
exchange information. Gen. Wald said that the U.S. would
like to attend as an observer. President Obasanjo said he
would need to consult with other participants.
--------------
Genesis of the Dream Team
--------------
13. (C) In response to Senator Hagel's question about
Nigeria's economic progress, Obasanjo launched into a long
story in which he spoke about his military and political
career. He's a strong believer in democracy, he said, and
with over 350 languages spoken in Nigeria, a strong federal
government is the only way to keep Nigeria together. Some
may say Nigeria is copying the U.S., but Obasanjo said "you
should copy what works." He spoke of his imprisonment under
the Abacha regime ("because I couldn't keep my mouth shut"),
his release, and his 1999 election with a two-thirds majority
of voters. When he was re-elected in 2003, he said he
decided to focus on economic-social issues, and decided some
critical areas needed technocrats. But, he stressed, he
formed the economic dream team, and he is the boss of the
team.
14. (C) In developing Nigeria's economic plan, Obasanjo said
that the World Bank and IMF were consulted. But it was
important to present the overall strategy, the National
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS),to the
Nigerian public as "our own thing."
15. (C) Obasanjo then made another not-so-veiled plea for
debt relief. In return for Nigeria's following the spirit of
the Bretton-Woods institutions, he suggested, "Give us a
reward." Like anywhere else, he explained, people resist the
withdrawal of subsidies, so wealthy nations should do
something to ease the pain of Nigerian economic reforms.
--------------
Extraditing Charles Taylor: No Ambiguity
--------------
16. (C) Senator Hagel thanked Obasanjo for his "leadership
and courage" in easing tensions in Liberia, then asked the
President what are his intentions regarding Taylor. Obasanjo
was firm and uncategorical in repeating the GON's position:
Taylor will be extradited only at the request of a
"democratically elected government in Liberia," and whatever
that government chooses to do with Taylor is up to them.
--------------
Comment
--------------
17. (C/NF) Obasanjo vigorously engaged with Senator Hagel.
He was shrewd and articulate throughout. He clearly sees his
Gulf of Guinea initiative as an African solution to an
African security issue--though he acknowledges that the
states of the region would need some unspecified help from
the U.S. Similarly, he believes that Nigeria can resolve
security problems in the Delta, though he raised the
likelihood of a request for U.S. and U.K. assistance in
carrying out the recommendations of the study he has
commissioned. On the possibility of terrorism in the North,
he was sanguine and optimistic, assessing the risk as
"minimal," while at the same time emphasizing the importance
of the sharing of relevant information among the states
affected, including the U.S. Moreover, his linkage of a
settlement in Sudan to inoculating Nigeria against terrorism
was the first such rationale we have heard. On Bakassi, he
seemed to reaffirm the traditional Nigerian approach, "a
win/win" solution with his regional neighbors, but he did not
repeat his previous commitment to have all Nigerian forces
withdrawn from the disputed territory by September 15. His
musings on his own presidency indicated his growing
preoccupations with his "legacy," which includes his economic
reform package.
18. (C) When Gen. Wald requested observer status at the
regional meetings concerning security issues, President
Obasanjo made no commitment. We note that he has thus far
excluded foreign observers from the Darfur talks in Abuja,
except for the opening ceremony on August 23. This policy of
exclusion seems to reflect the "African solutions to African
problems" theme.
19. (C) On the Charles Taylor situation, we note that
Obasanjo was uncategorical in terms of the circumstances
surrounding Taylor's extradition. There was no room for
interpretation.
20. (U) Senator Hagel has cleared this cable.
CAMPBELL
SIPDIS
NOFORN
AF AND H PASS TO SENATOR HAGEL
USEUCOM FOR GENERAL WALD FROM AMBASSADOR CAMPBELL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO MEETS WITH SENATOR
HAGEL
REF: A. ABUJA 017
B. ABUJA 1307 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) Summary. At a meeting with Senator Chuck Hagel of
Nebraska, President Olusegun Obasanjo described a regional
security initiative, the Gulf of Guinea Commission. Obasanjo
also described negotiations with the Cameroonian President
over the Bakassi peninsula without mentioning a previous
commitment to withdraw Nigerian forces from Bakassi by
September 15. He assessed the risk of Islamic fundamentalism
in Nigeria as low, and linked a Darfur settlement with
reduced terrorist risk in Africa. Obasanjo took a completely
unambiguous stance on Charles Taylor, stressing that Taylor
would be handed over only to a democratically elected
government in Liberia. As expected, he also suggested debt
relief for Nigeria. End Summary.
2. (U) President Obasanjo was accompanied by the following:
--Major-General Abdullahi Mohammed (Ret.),Chief of Staff to
the President
--Prof. Julius Ihonvbere, Special Advisor, Policy &
Programmes Monitoring
--Mrs. Remi Oyo, Senior Special Assistant, Media & Publicity
--Mr. B. S. Ilochi, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
--Mr. E. A. Balogun, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
--Mr. Onochie Ben Amobi, Deputy Chief of Protocol, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
--Mr. Kabiru Garba, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
to the President
3. (U) Present with Senator Hagel were the following:
--The Ambassador
--General Chuck Wald, Deputy US European Commander, EUCOM
--Major-General Jonathan "Scott" Gration, Director, Plans and
Policy, EUCOM
--Mr. Terry Snell, Political Advisor, EUCOM
--Dr. Andrew Parasiliti, Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator
Hagel
--Capt. Randel Zeller, USN (Ret.),National Security Advisor
to Senator Hagel
--Poloff (notetaker)
4. (U) President Obasanjo opened by welcoming Senator Hagel,
and he noted the Senator's interest in international trade.
Referring to the Darfur peace talks, which he was opening
later in the morning, Obasanjo noted that strife-torn parts
of Africa--including the Niger Delta, Liberia and
Darfur--would need trade to restore genuine stability once
security has been re-established.
-------------- --------------
Security in the Gulf of Guinea: a Regional Commission
-------------- --------------
5. (C) In response to comments from Sen. Hagel and Gen.
Wald, Obasanjo observed that Gulf of Guinea security and
stability had been a pre-occupation ever since he became
president in 1999. His first step was to consult with other
national leaders in the region. Out of those initial
conversations, he "spearheaded" the establishment of a Gulf
of Guinea commission. His goal was an organization that
would ensure peace and security, a "virile, strong
organization" that would ward off threats from outside the
region. He noted with pride the Gulf of Guinea Treaty to
establish such an organization. When the treaty has been
ratified by five different nations in the region, the
organization would be launched. (Three have ratified so far,
he said.) As recently as a month ago, he continued, he met
with four heads of state in Brazzaville to discuss such a
possible regional organization based on the treaty. Nigeria,
he said, is not asking for the headquarters of such an
organization, nor would Nigeria foresee providing the
Secretary-General. He speculated that the Secretary-General
SIPDIS
might come from Sao Tome, and the headquarters might be
located in Gabon. Ghana, he concluded, had already indicated
interest in joining the Gulf of Guinea initiative, as well as
Senegal and possibly South Africa, some day.
6. (C) General Wald offered to help Nigeria "any way we can"
on Gulf of Guinea security. Obasanjo said he'd "keep (the
USG) informed." As "friends and partners," the USG and GON
need have no secrets, he said; "our interests are parallel."
Gen. Wald raised the possibility of U.S. observer status.
Obasanjo responded that he would need to talk to the other
heads of state of partner nations. "We need Gulf of Guinea
security more than you do."
7. (C) On the Delta, Obasanjo said trouble dated from the
period after the civil war, after the discovery of marketable
oil. "We haven't solved it," but "we are dealing with it."
He said that his government was doing a study of the Delta,
to try to find a way forward. He anticipated the study being
completed by October 1, and said that he hoped the U.S. and
the U.K. would be able to assist in carrying out the study's
recommendations.
-------------- --------------
Bakassi Handover Progressing, but Withdrawal Delayed
-------------- --------------
8. (C) Obasanjo noted that when he came to office, Nigeria
"had problems" with three countries in the Gulf of Guinea
region. Issues with Sao Tome have been resolved. Good
progress has been made with respect to Equatorial Guinea.
With Cameroon, he said that both he and President Biya are
"personally satisfied" with the status of the Bakassi
handover. Obasanjo said he hoped Biya would be re-elected in
October so that the two of them can finish what they have
started. Notwithstanding a previous commitment made by
Nigeria to withdraw from the disputed territory by September
15, Obasanjo noted that "small concessions" that might be
necessary for a settlement could not easily be made on either
side before Cameroon's October elections. In the meantime,
he continued, he believed that Cameroon and Nigeria should
work to implement the least controversial parts of the
International Court of Justice decision defining the
Nigerian-Cameroonian border. Then the two states could move
on to more difficult areas, such as the maritime demarcation.
His goal, he continued, is a solution that has "no losers"
and promotes good neighborly relations. He said that at
their most recent meeting in Cameroon, he and President Biya
also agreed to additional confidence building measures,
including road construction. He said that next meeting of
the Nigeria/Cameroon joint commission will take place in
November.
--------------
Darfur Peace Talks: Setting the Bar Low
--------------
9. (C) In response to a question from Senator Hagel,
Obasanjo discussed possible outcomes from the Darfur peace
talks to be started in Abuja later in the day. A best-case
scenario would have delegates with clear mandates meeting and
agreeing to a political settlement, while a worst-case
scenario would have the meetings end inconclusively, with one
or more of the parties saying that were not "empowered" to
reach agreement. Obasanjo predicted that in the short term,
the results would be somewhere between these two
possibilities. His minimum goal, he continued, would be
agreement by all parties on an agenda, and agreement on the
goal of a negotiated settlement. If he could achieve that,
then "thank God for small mercies," said Obasanjo.
-------------- --------------
Terrorist Threat Level: Not a Problem for Nigeria
-------------- --------------
10. (C) When Senator Hagel asked Obasanjo to assess the
terrorist threat in Nigeria, particularly in the North,
Obasanjo answered that while he could not say Nigeria is
"absolutely devoid of fundamentalists," he does not see
Islamic fundamentalism as a problem. To show how
insignificant it is, he cited two examples of Islamic
fundamentalism in Nigeria. First, a man in Kebbi State
claimed he created "Mecca in Nigeria," declared himself chief
of his sect, and demanded that all brides spend 48 hours with
him before marriage. Obasanjo, laughing, said that the GON
"of course, had to remove the chief." Second, a cult in Yobe
State claimed to be in solidarity with the Taliban (reftel
A). Obasanjo explained that understanding of Islam in the
North is low, and "these people can be used."
11. (C) Obasanjo observed that he needed to watch Nigeria's
own elite. In Plateau, he continued, if he had not declared
a state of emergency (reftel B),the result would have been
the growth of fundamentalism among both Christians and
Muslims. He said that he had just visited the scene of the
violence in Plateau State, and visitors "wouldn't believe
there had been violence three months earlier." (Note. In a
visit to the same place in late June, Emboffs observed that
the town was devastated, nearly a ghost town. End Note.)
12. (C) Obasanjo observed that there is a "possibility" that
organizations such as Al Qaeda or Taliban could try to
establish themselves in northern Nigeria "if they are pushed
out elsewhere." Conditions in the Sahel would have a major
impact on whether or not terrorists groups tried to establish
themselves. That is why, he continued, it is so important to
establish peace in the Sudan, and why information sharing
amongst all countries involved--including the U.S.--is so
important. He said that the Nigerian State Security Service
is convening this week an "All-Africa" security meeting to
exchange information. Gen. Wald said that the U.S. would
like to attend as an observer. President Obasanjo said he
would need to consult with other participants.
--------------
Genesis of the Dream Team
--------------
13. (C) In response to Senator Hagel's question about
Nigeria's economic progress, Obasanjo launched into a long
story in which he spoke about his military and political
career. He's a strong believer in democracy, he said, and
with over 350 languages spoken in Nigeria, a strong federal
government is the only way to keep Nigeria together. Some
may say Nigeria is copying the U.S., but Obasanjo said "you
should copy what works." He spoke of his imprisonment under
the Abacha regime ("because I couldn't keep my mouth shut"),
his release, and his 1999 election with a two-thirds majority
of voters. When he was re-elected in 2003, he said he
decided to focus on economic-social issues, and decided some
critical areas needed technocrats. But, he stressed, he
formed the economic dream team, and he is the boss of the
team.
14. (C) In developing Nigeria's economic plan, Obasanjo said
that the World Bank and IMF were consulted. But it was
important to present the overall strategy, the National
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS),to the
Nigerian public as "our own thing."
15. (C) Obasanjo then made another not-so-veiled plea for
debt relief. In return for Nigeria's following the spirit of
the Bretton-Woods institutions, he suggested, "Give us a
reward." Like anywhere else, he explained, people resist the
withdrawal of subsidies, so wealthy nations should do
something to ease the pain of Nigerian economic reforms.
--------------
Extraditing Charles Taylor: No Ambiguity
--------------
16. (C) Senator Hagel thanked Obasanjo for his "leadership
and courage" in easing tensions in Liberia, then asked the
President what are his intentions regarding Taylor. Obasanjo
was firm and uncategorical in repeating the GON's position:
Taylor will be extradited only at the request of a
"democratically elected government in Liberia," and whatever
that government chooses to do with Taylor is up to them.
--------------
Comment
--------------
17. (C/NF) Obasanjo vigorously engaged with Senator Hagel.
He was shrewd and articulate throughout. He clearly sees his
Gulf of Guinea initiative as an African solution to an
African security issue--though he acknowledges that the
states of the region would need some unspecified help from
the U.S. Similarly, he believes that Nigeria can resolve
security problems in the Delta, though he raised the
likelihood of a request for U.S. and U.K. assistance in
carrying out the recommendations of the study he has
commissioned. On the possibility of terrorism in the North,
he was sanguine and optimistic, assessing the risk as
"minimal," while at the same time emphasizing the importance
of the sharing of relevant information among the states
affected, including the U.S. Moreover, his linkage of a
settlement in Sudan to inoculating Nigeria against terrorism
was the first such rationale we have heard. On Bakassi, he
seemed to reaffirm the traditional Nigerian approach, "a
win/win" solution with his regional neighbors, but he did not
repeat his previous commitment to have all Nigerian forces
withdrawn from the disputed territory by September 15. His
musings on his own presidency indicated his growing
preoccupations with his "legacy," which includes his economic
reform package.
18. (C) When Gen. Wald requested observer status at the
regional meetings concerning security issues, President
Obasanjo made no commitment. We note that he has thus far
excluded foreign observers from the Darfur talks in Abuja,
except for the opening ceremony on August 23. This policy of
exclusion seems to reflect the "African solutions to African
problems" theme.
19. (C) On the Charles Taylor situation, we note that
Obasanjo was uncategorical in terms of the circumstances
surrounding Taylor's extradition. There was no room for
interpretation.
20. (U) Senator Hagel has cleared this cable.
CAMPBELL