Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ABUDHABI4624
2004-12-18 12:36:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

MTAG: IMMINENT MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER BY A UAE

Tags:  PARM MTCRE ETTC PREL MNUC IR TC 
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Diana T Fritz 12/19/2006 04:39:38 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 04624

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: ECON
 INFO: ICE FCS P/M DCM POL AMB

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:RALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: ECON:OJOHN
CLEARED: NONE

VZCZCADI637
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #4624 3531236
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181236Z DEC 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7309
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 004624 

SIPDIS

INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2014
TAGS: PARM MTCRE ETTC PREL MNUC IR TC
SUBJECT: MTAG: IMMINENT MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER BY A UAE
FIRM TO IRAN (C)

REF: A. DECEMBER 18 E-MAIL THORNE-ALBRIGHT

B. STATE 267982

C. ABU DHABI 3642


(U) Classified by CDA Richard Albright for reasons 1.4 (b),
(d),and (h).

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 004624 SIPDIS INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME PRIORITY AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM, NEA/ARP E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2014 TAGS: PARM MTCRE ETTC PREL MNUC IR TC SUBJECT: MTAG: IMMINENT MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER BY A UAE FIRM TO IRAN (C) REF: A. DECEMBER 18 E-MAIL THORNE-ALBRIGHT ¶B. STATE 267982 ¶C. ABU DHABI 3642 (U) Classified by CDA Richard Albright for reasons 1.4 (b), (d),and (h). ¶1. (S) Charge delivered reftel points on a missile related transfer to MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al-Noaimi on December 18. Charge stressed the concern that this equipment would be used to support Iran's ballistic missile program. He explained that the Embassy had already passed on the relevant information to the Dubai State Security Organization, which would be inspecting the container on December 18. Charge added that, if our suspicions about the item proved accurate, we would work with the government of the country of origin to determine whether the export violated its export control law. If so, we would expect that government to request return of the item from the UAEG. ¶2. (S) Al-Noaimi thanked Charge for the information, saying the UAEG was comfortable proceeding on this basis, as it had on another case involving China. He asked whether the Western Continent General Trading was on the list of companies that the UAE had passed on as part of its "watch list." (ref C) Charge replied that it was not, but noted that the managing director of this company had a history of diversion. (Note: Western Continent is not on the UAE's list of companies, however, another company with the same managing director, "Noor Al-Fath General Trading Company" is on the list. Noor Al-Fath is under Department of Commerce investigation for diversion of licensed police items to Iran.) ¶3. (S) Al-Noaimi said that he would check to see whether Dubai Customs would require additional authorization to hold the shipment for longer than "a normal transshipment time." He explained that the UAEG could hold the item for a while to investigate the shipment based on this demarche, but would eventually need "an official request" from the country of origin requesting the UAEG to continue to hold or to return the item. ALBRIGHT

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