CENTCOM CDR VISITS UAE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004411

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF IR IZ SA SY TC
SUBJECT: CENTCOM CDR VISITS UAE

Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison. Reasons 1.5 (a)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During his November 28-30 visit to UAE,
Commander USCENTCOM General Abizaid met Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince/UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mohammed bin Zayed
(MbZ) and Dubai Crown Prince/UAE MinDef Shaikh Mohammed bin
Rashid (MbR); toured Jebel Ali port and Al Dhafra and Minhad
Air Bases; and visited aboard the USS Essex. General
Abizaid's discussions focused on UAE's important role as a
stable and successful model for the region, Iraq, and U.S.
military expansion efforts at key UAE installations. End
Summary.

UAE Succession, Stability
--------------


2. (C) CENTCOM Commander Abizaid visited Dubai the evening of
November 28 to dine with Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed
bin Rashid Al Maktoum. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh
Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) joined MbR, along with Interior
Minister Sheikh Saif and Dubai SSD Director Mohammed Al
Qamzi. General Abizaid opened the conversation by offering
his condolences on the death of late President Zayed. MbR
noted that according to the UAE constitution, his brother
Maktoum (titular UAE Prime Minister) was to have served as
acting UAE President for 30 days. He and Maktoum had
discussed this, however, and had agreed that it would make
more sense to avoid an interim period. When this idea was
put to Sheikh Khalifa, MbR reported, Khalifa initially
rejected it, insisting that Maktoum remain the acting
President until the rulers of the seven emirates could agree
upon a new President. MbR then spoke up in the presence of
the other rulers, and said "We rulers have already all
decided that you should become President, and now." In
reality, MbR told Abizaid, he had not actually discussed this
in advance with the others, but once he had made the
announcement, they could not contradict him. Khalifa
accepted the Presidency, thereby avoiding a period of
uncertainty.


3. (U) General Abizaid congratulated the UAE on the smooth
and peaceful transition. He also expressed admiration for
the UAE's market-oriented growth strategy and economic
diversification. MbR and MbZ welcomed General Abizaid's
description of the UAE as a model for other economies in the
region, especially those struggling with violence and
extremism.

Iraq
--------------


4. (S/NF) During the dinner hosted by MbR on 11/28, and at
his dinner with MbZ on 11/29, General Abizaid thanked the
Emirati leaders for UAE's support for U.S. and Coalition
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He expressed appreciation
for U.S. access to Al Dhafra Air Base and logistical support,
and cited the ongoing training at the Gulf Air Warfare Center
as a key example of bilateral cooperation. On Iraq, General
Abizaid emphasized several times that recent operations in
Fallujah had revealed surprising information about the
identity of those who were providing financial support for
the terrorists there. It was important to crack down on
those who had been sending money to Fallujah. It was not a
case of charity going astray, but a case of people giving
money directly to the insurgents. Those donors were as
guilty as the insurgents themselves. The U.S. would be
providing names to the UAE soon. MbZ and MbR indicated that
they shared Abizaid's perspective. MbR reported that his
State Security Directorate had recently uncovered a network
of people, one of whom headed a company in Dubai, that was
providing transportation assistance to fighters headed to
Fallujah and safe havens to terrorists fleeing Fallujah.
(Additional information on this development passed septel.)


5. (C) MbZ mentioned to General Abizaid that he had
first-hand information that to him suggested a clear link
between Saddam and Al Qaeda: his personnel in Afghanistan had
seen land mines originally provided by the Italians to Saddam
that had been used (presumably by the Taliban) in
Afghanistan. MbR expressed irritation that Al-Jazeerah and
other Arab satellite TV stations didn't show US troops
"eating and fighting" alongside Iraqis. But at the following
evening's dinner, MbZ and his brother, nformation Minister
Sheikh Abdullah, voiced disdain of Al-Jazeera for its
broadcast of the latest Ayman al-Zawahiri videotape.


6. (C) MbZ said he was impressed by the positive coverage
shown on Fox News of what the U.S. was doing in Iraq --
building schools and hospitals. MbZ urged the U.S. not to
allow captured prisoners to appear on TV unless they had
first been "roughed up for a day" by Iraqi security forces.
"When you put them on TV in nice clothes, with no bruises and
their noses still straight," he said, it sent a message to
other potential fighters that "if you go to be a martyr, this
is how you will be treated." The U.S. needed to avoid sending
the message that people who attacked us would be treated well.


7. (C) MbR urged the U.S. to find "peaceful Sunnis" to run in
the Iraqi elections so that "the Shi'a don't take it all." It
was also important to work quickly to improve the economic
situation. MbZ asked whether the elections could be delayed.
His concern was not the likely lack of Sunni participation;
they could participate in the next elections. What worried
him was the strong Iranian influence. Yes, most Shi'a Arabs
would vote first as Arabs, but many had been in Iran for many
years and their votes will reflect that. Abizaid responded
that any delay in the elections would be a political
decision, but that in his opinion it was best to move
forward. MbZ asked about SISTANI: he liked the man; saw him
as a force for stability who quieted people, but wondered why
he still had an Iranian passport. Why couldn't he apply for
an Iraqi one?


8. (C) The following evening, MbZ again expressed great
concern about the potential of a post-election Iraq heavily
influenced by Tehran. General Abizaid observed that a stable
Iraq was also in Iran's interest and it was not helpful for
Iran or Syria or any other nation to interfere with the
process of stability in Iraq. It was important for the U.S.
signal that our goal was to ensure stability and to fight
extremism. Extremists would, given the opportunity, attack
any government in the region. It was not in Iran --or Syria's
-- interest for such extremists to succeed. MbZ told General
Abizaid that his brother, Sheikh Abdullah, had a "strong"
relationship with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. MbZ
suggested that Abdullah should make a visit to Damascus soon
to underline to Bashar that Saudi and other extremists
represented a threat to him and his country. If Syria was a
hub for Al Qaeda and Ansar al Islam to move extremists into
Iraq, then Bashar's sophisticated security services should be
aware of this activity, MbZ and Abdullah averred. Perhaps
Bashar was not well-served by his subordinates, or perhaps
some of them were being paid off.

Saudi Arabia
--------------


9. (C) General Abizaid asked MbZ and MbR how they saw the
situation in Saudi Arabia. Was the country moving in the
right direction internally? MbR responded that, whereas
leaders like he and MbZ "looked out 100 kilometers," the
Saudi leadership looked out "only 2 kilometers." With no
long-term vision they had allowed extremists to become
powerful, and now the region was suffering. MbZ added that
the Saudi leadership was "too old."

Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------


10. (S) General Abizaid told MbZ and MbR that UAE troops in
Afghanistan were doing a good job; President Karzai was very
grateful. MbZ responded that the UAE was likewise very
satisfied with its special forces' efforts in Afghanistan.
Abizaid said the U.S. was in general pleased with the
progress in Afghanistan. The U.S. had recently killed seven
Al Qaeda there, and the information on their computers had
revealed that they had been there since August, but had been
unable to carry out any operations. Next door, Musharraf was
doing a very good job. MbZ agreed that Musharraf was an
important player, and urged the U.S. to support him.

Dubai Port Visit
--------------


11. (C) General Abizaid toured the Jebel Ali Port and Free
Zone on 11/29, receiving a briefing on ambitious expansion
plans by Managing Director Jamal Al-Majid. Al-Majid
emphasized that expansion was necessary because it was clear
the region was going to need greater capacity, particularly
as Iraq emerged as a strong market. The Iraqis moved quickly
when they spotted an opportunity; for example, the number of
used cars being shipped from Dubai to Iraq had recently
skyrocketed. Likewise, business with China was up
dramatically. Business with Iran was strong and steady;
activity at Bandar Abbas port had recently grown by 25-30
percent, but the capacity at that port was now maxed out,
with no room for further increases. Noting
that there had been some 630 US Navy ship visits to UAE ports
Dubai and Fujairah in the previous year, General Abizaid
expressed appreciation for the excellent support from Jebel
Ali.

USS Essex, Minhad AFB
--------------


12. (C) Following lunch on board the USS Essex and a tour of
"Shed 66" (the Navy's warehousing facility in the port),
General Abizaid boarded a helicopter for a trip to the UAE
military's Minhad Air Base, where the UAE recently completed,
at a cost of $20 million, a large warehouse and ramp facility
that will facilitate provision of supplies to U.S. Navy ships
in the Gulf. The facilities were completed in late September
2004, but remain unused pending further discussions between
USG and UAEG. (Note: The UAE has asked for a single
government-to-government agreement covering U.S. tenancy at
all UAE military facilities rather than NAVCENT and CENTAF
efforts to obtain separate agreements for their respective
initiatives at Minhad and Al Dhafra. Action on this UAEG
request has stalled due to Defense Cooperation Agreement
concerns. Although the DCA was signed in 1994 by MbZ, the
UAE contends that the agreement was never ratified by the UAE
Supreme Council -- Rulers of the seven Emirates and is
therefore non-binding.)


13. (C) During his 11/29 dinner with MbZ, General Abizaid
broached the issue of Al Minhad Air Base and asked what could
be done to move forward. After reminding the General that
the UAE had paid for the Minhad facilities, MbZ stated that
the U.S. and the UAE need to negotiate a basing agreement.
General Abizaid responded that the U.S.-UAE relationship,
built on mutual trust and respect, was one of the most
important relationships in his AOR. He undertook
to follow up on the basing issue with SECDEF.


14. (U) This cable was jointly drafted by ConGen Dubai and
Embassy Abu Dhabi.


15. (U) This message was cleared by Commander USCENTCOM
General Abizaid.

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