CENTCOM COMMANDER DISCUSSES IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, REGIONAL THREATS WITH SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 002508



SIPDIS



NOFORN



STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, AND NEA/NGA



E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2014

TAGS: PREL, PTER, AF, SY, IZ, PK, TC

SUBJECT: CENTCOM COMMANDER DISCUSSES IRAQ,

AFGHANISTAN, REGIONAL THREATS WITH SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN

ZAYED



Classified by Charge d'Affaires Richard A. Albright,

reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).



1. (S) Summary: CENTCOM Commander General John

Abizaid on July 24 discussed regional security issues

with Abu Dhabi Deputy Crown Prince and UAE Armed

Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Shaykh Mohammed bin

Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) in Abu Dhabi. Abizaid thanked

MbZ for the UAE's strong support for coalition

operations in Afghanistan. They discussed political

developments and military operations in Iraq and

counter terrorism efforts in Saudi Arabia, Syria and

UAE/Oman. MbZ apologized for canceling the Seeker II

deployment to Afghanistan on short notice, and

reiterated his requirement for an armed Predator UAV,

saying that he must make a decision on acquiring a

foreign UAV system by February 2005 if the U.S. could

not release an armed Predator to the UAE. Abizaid and

MbZ shared security and public opinion viewpoints,

including potential problems following the release of

Guantanamo detainees. End Summary.



2. (U) MbZ was accompanied by his half brother, Maj.

Gen. Shaykh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Director General

of Abu Dhabi Police and U/S of the Ministry of

Interior, and by UAE Armed Forces Deputy Chief of

Staff Maj. Gen. Hamad Thani Al Rumaithy, and Advisor

Yousuf Al Otaiba. Charge, RADM Robb (J5),Brig. Gen.

Custer (J2),Executive Officer Col. Reynes, USLO, and

Poloff (notetaker) joined General Abizaid.



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AFGHANISTAN

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3. (S) Abizaid thanked MbZ for the UAE's strong

support for coalition operations in Afghanistan,

singling out the UAE special operations deployment for

special praise. Both agreed that the drug trade,

corruption, and warlords posed greater threats to

Afghanistan's stability over the coming year than Al

Qaeda and Taliban remnants. Good cooperation with

Pakistan and Uzbekistan is putting the Al Qaeda threat

to rest in Afghanistan, according to Abizaid, and

several extremist leaders have faded from the picture

due to the pressure. Abizaid was encouraged by the

positive turnout of Afghan citizens registering to

vote. Almost eight million Afghans have already

registered, well exceeding the prediction of six

million voters or less. Abizaid said that the

remarkable success in registering voters indicated a

strong desire among Afghans for a normal state. A

strong turn-out at the polls would convey legitimacy

to the Afghan government. MbZ asked if coalition

forces were finding Arabs in Afghanistan. Abizaid

said no. MbZ responded that this was both good and

bad - good because Arab extremists shouldn't be there,

bad because we don't know where they are going and

what they are doing instead. MbZ expressed his view

that the Pakistanis were starting to do a better job

in controlling extremists.



4. (S) MbZ apologized for canceling the Seeker II

deployment to Afghanistan on short notice, stating

that border security requirements mandated deploying

the Seekers at home. (NOTE: The commander of the UAE

Special Operations Command briefed USLO Chief July 17

on the cancellation of plans to deploy its squadron of

Seeker II UAVs to Bagram, scheduled for late summer.

In a very cordial meeting, Brig. Gen. Juma Ahmed Al

Bawardi expressed regret at the cancellation and also

cited "operational requirements" for border security

as the reason for the change. On July 19, the

commander of UAE Land Forces - Artillery told USLO

officers that the Seeker II was now being deployed in

patrols along UAE'S western border with Saudi Arabia.

END NOTE.)



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IRAQ

--------------



5. (C) Abizaid and MbZ discussed political changes in

Iraq since their March 2004 meeting. They agreed that

while the security situation remains extremely

dangerous, Iraq's security forces have improved, since

they are more motivated to fight for an Iraqi-led

government than for the coalition. Abizaid expressed

cautious optimism about the immediate future of the

region's security, emphasizing that the key to

stabilizing the region was to ensure that the upcoming

national elections in Afghanistan and Iraq occurred as

planned. Abizaid thanked MbZ for the UAEG's effective

support, in particular for funding the transfer of

Jordanian APCs to Iraq, in cooperation with King

Abdullah of Jordan.



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SYRIA

--------------



6. (C) Asked by MbZ which Arab country was causing the

greatest problems for Iraq, Abizaid replied Syria.

Abizaid told MbZ that Syrian President Bashar had

promised Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi to increase

border control efforts. But terrorists, including

suicide bombers, are still regularly getting through.

Abizaid said that he believes Syria is aware of the

problem but is not doing all it can to stop the

incursions. Abizaid also told MbZ that Damascus

appears to be home to a number of former regime

elements who may be supporting the insurgency and that

the Syrian government is aware of these activities.



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SAUDI ARABIA

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7. (C) MbZ informed Abizaid that the UAE is watching

its border with Saudi Arabia very carefully. He

credited Saudi efforts to arrest terrorists, but

expressed concern that the more effectively the Saudis

clamp down, the greater the potential for the

extremists to collect in neighboring countries. MbZ

cited Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain as likely

destinations. Abizaid recalled MbZ's characterization

of this in an earlier conversation when MbZ compared

the Saudi's moves to "squeezing water" - extremists

find cracks and collect elsewhere.



8. (S) Abizaid contrasted his latest trip to Saudi

Arabia with a visit several months ago. In July,

Saudi officials appeared much more confident about

their ability to combat terrorism. The amnesty was

proving effective, and raids have unraveled several

cells.



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OMAN/UAE ARRESTS

--------------



9. (S) MbZ briefed Abizaid on the recent joint

UAE/Oman operation, based on U.S. information, that

resulted in the arrest of 13 members of an Omani

terrorist cell. Those arrested included several

Afghans and one Emirati woman. MbZ claimed that the

cell was planning an "event," and expressed his

satisfaction at the cooperation between the Omani and

UAE services.



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SECURITY CONCERNS

--------------



10. (S) Abizaid told MbZ that he sees intelligence

patterns emerging that indicate one of three very

serious incidents potentially occurring before the

November U.S. elections:



--A strike against one or more European allies to

force their retreat from Iraq, similar to the pullouts

of Spain and the Philippines. Abizaid listed Italy,

Japan, Bulgaria and the U.K. as potential targets.



--Another major strike on U.S. soil, as damaging as

9/11 or more so. However, rather than retreating,

Abizaid predicted that this would cause an "extreme"

U.S. retaliatory reaction.



--A major hit against the oil manufacturing

infrastructure in one or more moderate countries in

the region. The economic impact could be global, and,

like any of the above incidents, the effects could be

intended to influence U.S. elections.



11. (C) MbZ agreed with Abizaid's concerns,

particularly related to the oil industry. MbZ sharply

criticized the decision by the Philippines to withdraw

its contingent in Iraq to gain the release of a

kidnapped citizen. This would embolden the terrorists

to kidnap others. He said that the UAE had received

chatter about potential terrorist activity, noting

that much of it originates in the U.S. He shared the

concern about the potential for an al Qaeda attack on

regional oil infrastructure, noting that it would be

relatively easy to destroy a refinery.



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MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION

--------------



12. (C) On several occasions, Abizaid stated

frustration that the U.S. is losing the "perception

war" in Iraq and Afghanistan, due in large part to bad

media coverage. He stressed that the coalition has

suffered no military losses in Iraq, even at the

platoon level, yet the media, particularly Arab media,

focuses on perceived U.S. failures. MbZ agreed that

the Arab media will discredit anything favorable to

the U.S. He said that the U.S. needs to present its

side of the story more effectively. Citing the recent

Fallujah bombings, MbZ said that Al Jazeera aired an

old woman in front of a bombed house saying that she

and her family were innocent civilians and that the US

had killed her sheep, goats and cows. This is very

hard to counter to an Arab audience. The only way to

do so was to present the evidence and explain why U.S.

forces attacked and what they achieved. Let the

people see that terrorists have been killed. He also

urged the U.S. to better publicize the positive

changes the U.S. is bringing about. Abizaid said that

Iraqi services and facilities, including schools, are

better now than they have been for 30 years. However,

these success stories are not getting out. MbZ agreed

that this is the story that the U.S. must tell to

change the world's perception of the U.S. role in

Iraq. MbZ's special assistant recommended that CENTCOM

let the Iraqis talk as much as possible. They will

have more credibility to an Arab audience.



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GUANTANAMO

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13. (C) MbZ commented that the release of the

Guantanamo detainees had the potential to cause

problems. Citing the appearances of a released

Jordanian detainee named Rami on Arab talk shows, he

said that these people are becoming heroes. In the

future, some of them could be running mosques with

thousands of followers, plaguing the region for years

to come. Saying that this person, who was arrested by

U.S. forces in Tora Bora, had certainly not been there

as a tourist, MbZ stated that it would have been

preferable for these people to have been killed in

action.



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PREDATOR

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14. (S) Referring to General Yagi's visit, Abizaid

asked MbZ for his views on Predator. MbZ said that he

is seeking an armed Predator from the U.S. and

expressed disappointment that the U.S. appeared ready

to offer only an unarmed version. MbZ confirmed that,

while he strongly preferred the Predator, he was

looking at co-developing in the UAE alternative UAV

systems available from other countries. He said that

the UAE required armed UAVs to control its long land

and maritime borders and pointed out that they have

been using UAVs since the first Gulf War. He stressed

the benefits of sharing information through a common

security system with the U.S. and other allies.

Abizaid said that he wanted to work with MbZ, and

asked for some time to explore options and get back to

him. MbZ said that he could wait for a few months to

hear from Abizaid before committing to another system.

But he said that he planned to make a decision by the

International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) to be held in

Abu Dhabi in mid-February 2005. Both agreed that the

Predator issue would not damage the strong U.S./UAE

relationship.



15. (C) In closing, MbZ reaffirmed the strategic value

of the relationship and expressed his commitment not

to let disagreements on some issues detract from close

and effective bilateral cooperation. General Abizaid

agreed.

16. (U) General Abizaid cleared this cable.



ALBRIGHT