Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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03ZAGREB1937 | 2003-09-05 13:47:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Zagreb |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 001937 |
1. (C) The DCM met September 3 with President Mesic,s new Foreign Policy Advisor, Ambassador Ivica Mastruko. Mastruko said there had been no discussion of military-related projects during President Mesic,s recent trip to Libya. President Mesic has washed his hands of any personal efforts to facilitate the surrender of Croatian ICTY indictee Gotovina to The Hague. Although Mesic,s upcoming first official visit to Belgrade would be heavy on protocol events, Mesic would likely meet with Croatian-Serb refugees and urge them to return home. Mastruko said work was underway on an Article 98 proposal that Picula would present in the U.S. this month. Finally, Mesic would neither promote nor criticize the GOC,s proposal to send a military contingent to Iraq. End summary. 2. (C) In our first ever meeting on September 2 with Ambassador Mastruko (see paras 10-11 for bio information) since he took over as President Mesic,s foreign policy advisor late last month, Mastruko emphasized the importance of the Croatian relationship with the U.S. and his strong desire to consult closely, frequently and candidly with the U.S. Embassy. The DCM explained that newly arrived Ambassador Frank had established informal relationships with senior GOC officials to promote good communication and a better understanding of each country,s points of view. Libya -------------------------- 3. (C) Mastruko understood U.S. sensitivities regarding Croatia,s warming relations with Libya and explained that President Mesic,s only objective was to gain commercial projects for Croatian firms. He made clear that there were no representatives of military-related firms on Mesic,s trip to Libya last month and there were no discussions of any military projects with the Libyans ) nothing on military ships, nothing on aircraft (contradicting reftel allegations from Yugoimport). He did say that the Libyans expressed interest in using Croatian shipyards to overhaul old commercial vessels. 4. (C) Mastruko said that Mesic had even acted on behalf of other countries in the region in promoting specific commercial projects such as the sale of Macedonian steel and Bosnian road building capabilities. 5. (C) However, Mastruko ended this discussion by noting that although Croatia would never do so, he was aware that Serbia and Montenegro may be considering a Libyan proposal to train pilots. Trip to Belgrade -------------------------- 6. (C) Mastruko said that Mesic,s upcoming first official trip to Belgrade would be heavy on protocol and light on substance. However, Mesic was seriously considering a meeting with Croatian Serb refugees to urge them to return home. Troops to Iraq -------------------------- 7. (C) When the DCM expressed appreciation for the GOC,s decision to send a small military contingent to Iraq, Mastruko carefully observed that Mesic had agreed with PM Racan not to comment publicly on this proposal before the Sabor endorses it, which the GOC expects by the end of September. Mastruko noted that there had been some criticism of this deployment in the press and the public did not seem strongly supportive. (Comment: We believe that President Mesic has reservations about deploying Croatian troops without a specific endorsement by the UNSC. End comment.) Article 98 -------------------------- 8. (C) Mastruko confirmed that the MFA was working on two possible alternative approaches to an Article 98 agreement. One would be an extradition treaty and the other an MLAT-type agreement. He said FM Picula would take the proposal to the U.S. this month for discussion with senior U.S. officials. (Comment: It was not clear whether Mastruko was suggesting the proposal would include both agreements or whether the MFA was studying whether to propose one or the other. End Comment.) ICTY -------------------------- 9. (C) In light of UNSCR 1503 and Gotovina,s failure to act, Mastruko said that President Mesic had dropped all his efforts to facilitate Gotovina,s surrender and transfer to the ICTY. He was now encouraging the Ministry of Interior and other GOC organizations to do everything possible to capture Gotovina who was now &on his own.8 Biographic Information -------------------------- 10. (C) Ambassador Mastruko was born on an island near Zadar in 1940. His work experience is as follows: 1963-1966 Journalist for Narodni List weekly 1966-1972 Professional politician in district committee of Communist Party 1972-1974 Manager and editor-in-chief of Zadar Radio and Television Center 1974-1978 President of Executive Council of the Zadar Municipal Assembly 1978-1982 President of Zadar Municipal Assembly 1979-1989 Professor at Zadar Faculty of Philosphy 1989-1991 SFRY Ambassador to Vatican 1992-1993 Croatian Ambassador to Italy 1993-1996 Croatian Ambassador to Greece and Armenia 1996-2000 Croatian Ambassador to Slovenia 2000-2001 Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 2002-2003 Advisor to President Mesic on Domestic Affairs (Relations with Religious Communities) 2003- Advisor to President Mesic for Foreign Policy 11. (C) Mastruko speaks excellent English, is fluent in Italian and is &proficient8 in German and Slovenian. Mastruko clearly enjoyed his diplomatic postings. He is married and has two grown sons who work in Zagreb. FRANK NNNN |