AMBASSADOR MEETS NEW IRAQI CHALDEAN PATRIARCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VATICAN 005521

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR NEA, EUR/WE (LEVIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2013
TAGS: IZ PREL VT SOCI PGOV IS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS NEW IRAQI CHALDEAN PATRIARCH

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR JIM NICHOLSON

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) IN TWO MEETINGS WITH THE AMBASSADOR, THE NEWLY ELECTED
PATRIARCH OF THE CHALDEANS AND FORMER BAGHDAD AUXILIARY
ARCHBISHOP EMMANUEL-KARIM DELLY, LED OFF HIS REMARKS BY
CONVEYING HIS GRATITUDE FOR U.S. ACTIONS IN IRAQ TO REMOVE
SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM POWER AND HIS HOPE FOR RAPID IMPROVEMENT
IN THE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. HE
URGED THE U.S. TO "WORK MORE QUICKLY IN EVERY RESPECT" TO
GIVE THE IRAQI PEOPLE MORE TANGIBLE DEMONSTRATIONS THAT THE
U.S. LIBERATION WILL BRING A BETTER LIFE. PATRIARCH EMMANUEL
III, AS HE WILL BE CALLED, ASSERTED THAT THE TERRORISTS
DISRUPTING IRAQ WERE BY AND LARGE "NOT IRAQIS" BUT CAME FROM
OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY, AND HE URGED THE U.S. TO TIGHTEN ITS
CONTROL ON THE BORDERS TO PREVENT FURTHER INFILTRATION. THE
PATRIARCH EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR HIS PREVIOUS CONTACT
MEETINGS WITH CPA HEAD BREMER, AND HIS DESIRE TO CONTINUE
WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER WITH THE CPA. HE EXPRESSED OPTIMISM
ABOUT INTER-RELIGIOUS COOPERATION IN IRAQ, NOTING THAT THE
CHALDEANS RETAINED GOOD TIES WITH BOTH SHIITE AND SUNNI
LEADERS. FINALLY, THE CHALDEAN LEADERS ASKED THAT THE
AMBASSADOR CONVEY THEIR STRONG CONCERNS ABOUT NEPOTISM IN THE
ALLOTMENT OF JOBS IN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. END SUMMARY.

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THE NEW PATRIARCH EMMANUEL III
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2. (C) FOLLOWING AN EXTRAORDINARY SYNOD AT THE VATICAN CALLED
BY POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE CHALDEAN BISHOPS ELECTED ARCHBISHOP
EMMANUEL-KARIM DELLY, RETIRED AUXILIARY OF BAGHDAD, AS
PATRIARCH EMMANUEL III. AS HEAD OF THE CHALDEANS, A CATHOLIC
COMMUNITY WITH 800,000 MEMBERS IN IRAQ, AND ANOTHER 500,000
MEMBERS LIVING IN IRAN, SYRIA, LEBANON, EGYPT, TURKEY AND
THE UNITED STATES, HE WILL BE AN IMPORTANT VOICE FOR
RELIGIOUS MODERATION IN IRAQ. THE PATRIARCH'S ELECTION IN
ROME FOLLOWS A DEADLOCKED VOTE IN SEPTEMBER, IN WHICH NEITHER
AMERICAN BISHOP, SARHAD JAMMO OF SAN DIEGO NOR SYRIAN BISHOP
ANTOINE AUDO, WERE ABLE TO SECURE A MAJORITY. DELLY, THE
EMINENCE GRISE OF THE CHALDEAN BISHOPS, EMERGED AS A
COMPROMISE CANDIDATE BEING FROM IRAQ AND SPEAKING THE SYRIAC
LANGUAGE OF THE CHALDEANS. FOLLOWING THE ELECTION, THE POPE
URGED IRAQI CATHOLICS TO "WORK TO JOIN FORCES WITH ALL
BELIEVERS IN RESPECTFUL DIALOGUE, WHICH WILL FAVOR THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A STABLE AND FREE SOCIETY" IN IRAQ.

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GRATEFUL FOR SADDAM'S REMOVAL
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3. (C) AT A MEETING IN VATICAN CITY DECEMBER 5 AND A
SUBSEQUENT BREAKFAST AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE DECEMBER
8, THE NEW PATRIARCH CONVEYED TO THE AMBASSADOR HIS GRATITUDE
FOR SADDAM'S REMOVAL FROM POWER AND FOR "BRINGING FREEDOM TO
MY COUNTRY." WITH SADDAM GONE, HE NOW HAD HIGH HOPES FOR
IRAQ'S FUTURE. THE PATRIARCH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LIFE IN IRAQ
UNDER SADDAM HAD BEEN DIFFICULT. EVEN THOUGH SADDAM HAD
GIVEN THE CHALDEAN CHURCH A DEGREE OF FREEDOM TO CARRY OUT
ITS RELIGIOUS MISSION, THE CHURCH ALWAYS HAD TO BE CAREFUL,
PARTICULARLY AFTER THE FIRST GULF WAR WHEN SADDAM BEGAN TO
PLAY MORE UPON MUSLIM, ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENTS. HIS
SENTIMENTS WERE ECHOED BY MANY OTHER CHALDEAN BISHOPS PRESENT
AT THE TWO MEETINGS, INCLUDING BISHOP KASSAB OF BASRA, BISHOP
SHLEMON WARDUNI, THE OUTSPOKEN AUXILIARY OF BAGHDAD, AND
BISHOP IBRAHIM IBRAHIM OF DETROIT.

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NEED TO MOVE MORE QUICKLY ON ESSENTIAL SERVICES
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4. (C) THE PATRIARCH'S MAIN MESSAGE TO THE U.S. WAS THE NEED
TO "WORK MORE QUICKLY IN EVERY RESPECT" -- PARTICULARLY IN
IMPROVING ESSENTIAL SERVICES. HE NOTED THAT IRAQIS HAD
INITIALLY WELCOMED THE U.S. FORCES BECAUSE THE BELIEVED THEIR
ARRIVAL WOULD BRING A BETTER LIFE. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS EARLY
ENTHUSIASM HAD GIVEN WAY TO GROWING DOUBTS AS PEOPLE FOUND
THAT THEY HAD LOST MANY BASIC SERVICES SUCH AS DEPENDABLE
ELECTRICITY THAT THEY HAD HAD UNDER SADDAM. THE IRAQI
PEOPLE'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH U.S. FORCES -- WHICH
THE PATRIARCH BELIEVED WAS THE KEY TO BETTER SECURITY --
WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER THEY FELT THE U.S. PRESENCE WAS
BRINGING THEM IMPROVED LIVING CONDITIONS. HE NOTED HE HAD
TOLD CPA HEAD BREMER THAT IF THE U.S. BROUGHT IN A FEW
THOUSAND GENERATORS, THEY WOULD GENERATE ENORMOUS GOODWILL.
THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THE MANY POSITIVE CHANGES THAT

VATICAN 00005521 002.1 OF 003

NFRASTRUCTURE
IMPROVEMENT THAT WOULD GIVE IRAQ A MODERN, EFFICIENT
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE LONG TERM.

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SECURITY: BORDERS TOO POROUS
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5. (C) THE PATRIARCH TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE SECURITY
PROBLEMS IN IRAQ WERE NOT CAUSED BY IRAQIS -- WITH THE
POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF LINGERING SADDAM LOYALISTS -- BUT BY
FOREIGN TERRORISTS FROM SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, AND ELSEWHERE IN
THE REGION WHO WERE INFILTRATING IRAQ THROUGH ITS POROUS
BORDERS. IN THIS REGARD, HE URGED THE U.S TO DO MORE TO
PROTECT THE BORDERS BOTH AT CROSSINGS AS WELL AS THROUGH
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE. ASKED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF SADDAM'S
CAPTURE ON STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY, THE PATRIARCH AND OTHER
IRAQI BISHOPS SAID IT WOULD BE WELCOME, BUT BECAUSE THE
PROBLEMS CAME PREDOMINANTLY FROM OUTSIDE, THEY BELIEVED IT
WOULD NOT END THE INSECURITY. REGARDING THE THREAT FROM
SADDAM LOYALISTS WITHIN THE SUNNI TRIANGLE, THE BISHOPS
BELIEVED THAT SADDAM ALWAYS HAD A SURVIVAL PLAN READY TO
FIGHT AGAINST INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL FOES, AND WAS NOW DRAWING
ON LONG-HIDDEN WEAPONS STASHES.

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ROUNDING UP WEAPONS: USE CASH NOT SEARCHES
--------------


6. (C) TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF THE EXCESS WEAPONS
CIRCULATING IN IRAQ, THE PATRIARCH RECOMMENDED THAT THE U.S.
DEVELOP A PROGRAM TO PAY PEOPLE FOR WEAPONS RATHER THAN
CONDUCT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES THROUGH IRAQI HOUSES. HE
OBSERVED THAT THE IMAGES OF U.S. SOLDIERS BANGING DOWN DOORS
AND ROUSING FAMILIES FROM THEIR SLEEP WAS GENERATING A
TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF ILL WILL AND WAS "THE WRONG APPROACH."
HE ALSO URGED THE U.S. TO MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY TO PROVIDE JOBS
TO PEOPLE THAT WOULD PUT CASH IN THEIR POCKETS AND MAKE THEM
LESS LIKELY TO TURN TO ARMED OPPOSITION. HE SUGGESTED EVEN A
SMALL CASH STIPEND FOR EACH FAMILY WOULD CURRY MUCH FAVOR.

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INTER-RELIGIOUS RELATIONS ON TRACK
--------------


7. (C) THE PATRIARCH TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE CHALDEAN
LEADERSHIP'S RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE SHIITE AND SUNNI
LEADERSHIP WERE "VERY GOOD" AND THAT HE HAD "GREAT
CONFIDENCE" FOR THE FUTURE OF INTER-RELIGIOUS RELATIONS IN
THE COUNTRY. ALL FAITHS HAD CONDEMNED THE TERRORIST ACTIONS,
HE ADDED. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE WERE MANY "FANATICAL
MULLAHS" WHO OFTEN TOOK TO LABELING IRAQI CHRISTIANS AS
INFIDELS. THERE HAD BEEN SOME INCIDENTS OF RETRIBUTIONS
AGAINST CHRISTIANS, WITH 5-6 CHALDEANS KILLED AND SHOPS
SELLING ALCOHOL BURNED, BUT IN GENERAL, THE CHALDEAN
COMMUNITY CONTINUED TO BE ACCEPTED WITHIN IRAQ. THE
PATRIARCH'S FEAR IS THAT SHOULD IRAQ BECOME AN ISLAMIC STATE,
THEY COULD FIND THEIR CURRENT FREEDOMS SEVERELY RESTRICTED.
FOR THE TIME BEING, HOWEVER, HE FELT THAT IT WAS A TESTIMONY
TO THE DEEPLY ROOTED IRAQI TRADITIONS OF INTER-RELIGIONS
ACCEPTANCE THAT SEVEN MONTHS AFTER THE END OF THE WAR, IN A
SITUATION WITH ALMOST NO POLICE OR PUBLIC ORDER, THERE HAD
BEEN SO FEW RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS OR ACTS OF RELIGIOUS ATTACKS.

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LIBERATION OR OCCUPATION?
--------------


8. (C) REITERATING THAT THE KEY TO A BETTER SECURITY
SITUATION WAS GETTING THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ TO COOPERATE WITH
U.S. FORCES, THE PATRIARCH OBSERVED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME
SENSITIVITY AMONG IRAQIS THAT THE U.S. HAD GONE FROM BEING
LIBERATORS TO OCCUPIERS. THE DISTINCTION WAS A CRITICAL ONE,
HE EMPHASIZED. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE HAD BEEN A MEETING WITH
A SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL IN WHICH THE OFFICIAL STATED THAT THE
U.S. WAS IN FACT NOW "OCCUPYING" IRAQ, A STATEMENT THAT
PROMPTED A NUMBER OF OTHER RELIGIOUS FIGURES TO LEAVE THE
MEETING. TO BUILD SUPPORT AMONG IRAQIS, HE CAUTIONED, THE
U.S. SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO COUNTER THE IMAGE OF
OCCUPATION. THE AMBASSADOR ASSURED THE PATRIARCH THAT THE
U.S. GOAL WAS TO TURN POWER OVER TO A LEGITIMATE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHILE ENSURING A STABLE AND
SECURE FUTURE.


9. (C) MONSIGNOR PHILIP NAJIM, THE CHALDEANS REPRESENTATIVE
IN ROME AND A FREQUENT COMMENTATOR ON IRAQI DEVELOPMENTS FOR
ITALIAN TELEVISION, EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING A
BETTER RAPPORT AND GREATER CONFIDENCE BETWEEN U.S. FORCES AND

VATICAN 00005521 002.2 OF 003

NFRASTRUCTURE
IMPROVEMENT THAT WOULD GIVE IRAQ A MODERN, EFFICIENT
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE LONG TERM.

--------------
SECURITY: BORDERS TOO POROUS
--------------


5. (C) THE PATRIARCH TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE SECURITY
PROBLEMS IN IRAQ WERE NOT CAUSED BY IRAQIS -- WITH THE
POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF LINGERING SADDAM LOYALISTS -- BUT BY
FOREIGN TERRORISTS FROM SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, AND ELSEWHERE IN
THE REGION WHO WERE INFILTRATING IRAQ THROUGH ITS POROUS
BORDERS. IN THIS REGARD, HE URGED THE U.S TO DO MORE TO
PROTECT THE BORDERS BOTH AT CROSSINGS AS WELL AS THROUGH
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE. ASKED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF SADDAM'S
CAPTURE ON STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY, THE PATRIARCH AND OTHER
IRAQI BISHOPS SAID IT WOULD BE WELCOME, BUT BECAUSE THE
PROBLEMS CAME PREDOMINANTLY FROM OUTSIDE, THEY BELIEVED IT
WOULD NOT END THE INSECURITY. REGARDING THE THREAT FROM
SADDAM LOYALISTS WITHIN THE SUNNI TRIANGLE, THE BISHOPS
BELIEVED THAT SADDAM ALWAYS HAD A SURVIVAL PLAN READY TO
FIGHT AGAINST INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL FOES, AND WAS NOW DRAWING
ON LONG-HIDDEN WEAPONS STASHES.

--------------
ROUNDING UP WEAPONS: USE CASH NOT SEARCHES
--------------


6. (C) TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF THE EXCESS WEAPONS
CIRCULATING IN IRAQ, THE PATRIARCH RECOMMENDED THAT THE U.S.
DEVELOP A PROGRAM TO PAY PEOPLE FOR WEAPONS RATHER THAN
CONDUCT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES THROUGH IRAQI HOUSES. HE
OBSERVED THAT THE IMAGES OF U.S. SOLDIERS BANGING DOWN DOORS
AND ROUSING FAMILIES FROM THEIR SLEEP WAS GENERATING A
TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF ILL WILL AND WAS "THE WRONG APPROACH."
HE ALSO URGED THE U.S. TO MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY TO PROVIDE JOBS
TO PEOPLE THAT WOULD PUT CASH IN THEIR POCKETS AND MAKE THEM
LESS LIKELY TO TURN TO ARMED OPPOSITION. HE SUGGESTED EVEN A
SMALL CASH STIPEND FOR EACH FAMILY WOULD CURRY MUCH FAVOR.

--------------
INTER-RELIGIOUS RELATIONS ON TRACK
--------------


7. (C) THE PATRIARCH TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE CHALDEAN
LEADERSHIP'S RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE SHIITE AND SUNNI
LEADERSHIP WERE "VERY GOOD" AND THAT HE HAD "GREAT
CONFIDENCE" FOR THE FUTURE OF INTER-RELIGIOUS RELATIONS IN
THE COUNTRY. ALL FAITHS HAD CONDEMNED THE TERRORIST ACTIONS,
HE ADDED. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE WERE MANY "FANATICAL
MULLAHS" WHO OFTEN TOOK TO LABELING IRAQI CHRISTIANS AS
INFIDELS. THERE HAD BEEN SOME INCIDENTS OF RETRIBUTIONS
AGAINST CHRISTIANS, WITH 5-6 CHALDEANS KILLED AND SHOPS
SELLING ALCOHOL BURNED, BUT IN GENERAL, THE CHALDEAN
COMMUNITY CONTINUED TO BE ACCEPTED WITHIN IRAQ. THE
PATRIARCH'S FEAR IS THAT SHOULD IRAQ BECOME AN ISLAMIC STATE,
THEY COULD FIND THEIR CURRENT FREEDOMS SEVERELY RESTRICTED.
FOR THE TIME BEING, HOWEVER, HE FELT THAT IT WAS A TESTIMONY
TO THE DEEPLY ROOTED IRAQI TRADITIONS OF INTER-RELIGIONS
ACCEPTANCE THAT SEVEN MONTHS AFTER THE END OF THE WAR, IN A
SITUATION WITH ALMOST NO POLICE OR PUBLIC ORDER, THERE HAD
BEEN SO FEW RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS OR ACTS OF RELIGIOUS ATTACKS.

--------------
LIBERATION OR OCCUPATION?
--------------


8. (C) REITERATING THAT THE KEY TO A BETTER SECURITY
SITUATION WAS GETTING THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ TO COOPERATE WITH
U.S. FORCES, THE PATRIARCH OBSERVED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME
SENSITIVITY AMONG IRAQIS THAT THE U.S. HAD GONE FROM BEING
LIBERATORS TO OCCUPIERS. THE DISTINCTION WAS A CRITICAL ONE,
HE EMPHASIZED. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE HAD BEEN A MEETING WITH
A SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL IN WHICH THE OFFICIAL STATED THAT THE
U.S. WAS IN FACT NOW "OCCUPYING" IRAQ, A STATEMENT THAT
PROMPTED A NUMBER OF OTHER RELIGIOUS FIGURES TO LEAVE THE
MEETING. TO BUILD SUPPORT AMONG IRAQIS, HE CAUTIONED, THE
U.S. SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO COUNTER THE IMAGE OF
OCCUPATION. THE AMBASSADOR ASSURED THE PATRIARCH THAT THE
U.S. GOAL WAS TO TURN POWER OVER TO A LEGITIMATE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHILE ENSURING A STABLE AND
SECURE FUTURE.


9. (C) MONSIGNOR PHILIP NAJIM, THE CHALDEANS REPRESENTATIVE
IN ROME AND A FREQUENT COMMENTATOR ON IRAQI DEVELOPMENTS FOR
ITALIAN TELEVISION, EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING A
BETTER RAPPORT AND GREATER CONFIDENCE BETWEEN U.S. FORCES AND

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AND BARBED WIRE. HE
RECOGNIZED THE PREDICAMENT FACED BY TROOPS WHO SOUGHT TO WORK
WITH THE IRAQI PEOPLE ONLY TO FIND THEMSELVES AMBUSHED AND
ATTACKED, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WAS NO EASY WAY TO SQUARE
THIS CIRCLE. THE CHALDEAN ARCHBISHOP OF DETROIT IBRAHIM
IBRAHIM INSISTED THAT IRAQIS "LOVED" THE U.S., BUT WERE NOT
COOPERATING BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID AND BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT
YET SEEN THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION. THE FREEDOM TO SAY
WHATEVER THEY WANT DOES NOT GO FAR, HE CAUTIONED, IF PEOPLE
ARE UNABLE TO WORK, LACK ESSENTIALS, AND ARE AFRAID TO GO OUT
OR SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL.

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GOVERNANCE: FOCUS ON REGIONS, AVOID NEPOTISM
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10. (C) TURNING TO IRAQ'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, THE
PATRIARCH OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NOT EASY FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE
TO HAVE SO MUCH LIBERTY AND FREEDOM IMMEDIATELY AFTER 30
YEARS OF DICTATORSHIP. HE NEVERTHELESS FELT THAT THE
REGIONAL COUNCILS WERE FUNCTIONING WELL, AND REPRESENTED ONE
OF THE MORE POSITIVE POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS. HE CAUTIONED
THAT THE U.S. HAD GIVEN TOO MUCH WEIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTIES
-- MANY WITH ROOTS OUTSIDE IRAQ -- RATHER THAN WORKING ON A
PROVINCIAL BASIS, WHICH HE BELIEVED WOULD BE MORE
REPRESENTATIVE. HE ALSO CAUTIONED AGAINST "GIVING TOO MUCH
TO THE SHIITES, NOTING THAT WITH 13 OF THE 25 SEATS ON THE
GOVERNING COUNCIL THEY COULD PUSH THROUGH ANYTHING THEY
WANTED. THE PATRIARCH APPEALED TO THE AMBASSADOR TO CONVEY
HIS REQUEST THAT THE CHALDEANS BE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED ON
CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING COMMITTEES.


11. (C) AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, THE PATRIARCH AND
HIS FELLOW BISHOPS REITERATED THEIR STRONG CONCERN ABOUT
NEPOTISM WITHIN THE DEVELOPING IRAQI ADMINISTRATION. THEY
NOTED THAT THE NEW PETROLEUM MINISTER WAS THE SON OF A MEMBER
OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL, AND SAID THIS WAS A PATTERN THAT
WOULD LOOK TO PEOPLE JUST LIKE THE DAYS OF SADDAM. TO BE
CREDIBLE, IT WOULD BE VITAL FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO HAVE
THE BEST PEOPLE AVAILABLE, NOT A NETWORK OF CRONIES.

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THE FIGHT AGAINST TERROR IN IRAQ
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12. (C) MONSIGNOR NAJIM WAS SHARPLY CRITICAL OF U.S.
STATEMENTS SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S. WAS FIGHTING TERRORISTS
IN IRAQ RATHER THAN FIGHTING THEM IN THE UNITED STATES. HE
SAID THESE STATEMENTS CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S.
CARED SO LITTLE FOR IRAQ THAT IT WAS WILLING TO TURN IRAQ
INTO A TERRORIST BATTLEFIELD. HE BELIEVED SUCH STATEMENTS
WERE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO U.S. EFFORTS TO BUILD SUPPORT AMONG
THE IRAQI PEOPLE. THE CHALDEAN BISHOPS ALSO TOLD THE
AMBASSADOR THAT IF THE U.S. WANTED PEACE IN THE BROADER
MIDDLE EAST REGION, ITS POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO BE
REVIEWED, AS IT GENERATED CONTINUING ILL-WILL. THE
AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT U.S. POLICY, CONTRARY TO POPULAR
PERCEPTIONS, WAS BALANCED AND EVEN FORWARD-LEANING TO THE
PALESTINIANS, CALLING FOR THE FIRST TIME FOR THE CREATION OF
A PALESTINIAN STATE, AS WELL AS AN END TO SETTLEMENT
ACTIVITY, AND FURTHER ISRAELI STEPS TO IMPROVE PALESTINIAN
LIVING CONDITIONS.

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COMMENT
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13. (C) THE PATRIARCH HAD HIGH PRAISE FOR CPA HEAD BREMER,
WHO HE SAID HAD BEEN OPEN AND ATTENTIVE TO CHALDEAN CONCERNS.
WHILE HE UNDERSTANDS THE OBSTACLES INVOLVED IN IMPROVING
ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND SECURITY, HE REITERATED HIS DESIRE FOR
THE CPA TO MOVE MORE RAPIDLY IN ALL AREAS TO IMPROVE THE
DAILY LIFE FOR IRAQIS. OVERALL, WE FOUND THE NEW PATRIARCH
TO BE VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THE U.S. DECISION TO GO INTO IRAQ,
BUT CONCERNED THAT POPULAR DISSATISFACTION OVER THE SLOW PACE
OF IMPROVEMENT TO THEIR DAILY LIVES HAD UNDERMINED THE IRAQI
APPRECIATION FOR THE U.S. ACTION. THE PATRIARCH, AND HIS
FELLOW CHALDEAN BISHOPS, GREATLY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY
TO MEET WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND PROMISED TO KEEP IN CLOSE
CONTACT WHEN THEY RETURN TO THE VATICAN.


14. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

NICHOLSON

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2003VATICA05521 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL