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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
03THEHAGUE3051 2003-12-11 15:57:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

DUTCH SHARE COPY OF UK-FR-GE ESDP NONPAPER

Tags:   MARR NL NATO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003051 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2013
TAGS: MARR NL NATO
SUBJECT: DUTCH SHARE COPY OF UK-FR-GE ESDP NONPAPER

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS
1.5 (B AND D).



1. (C/NF) PM Balkenende's Foreign Policy Advisor (protect)
passed to Amb. Sobel a copy of a French-British-German non
Paper entitled "European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation,
Planning and Operations" on December 11. Post transmits the
text of the non paper in para 2.



2. (C) Begin text of French/British/German non paper:

Building on the experience of EU civilian and military
operations in 2003 and on the discussions on these issues
between the UK, France and Germany, this paper sets out how
the collective capability of the EU can be strengthened,
including the ability to plan and run certain operations, and
describes how consideration of the options involved would
take place between EU partners and NATO allies.

NATO is the forum for discussion and the natural choice for
an operation including the European and American allies. In
accordance with the EU/NATO permanent arrangements adopted in
Nice, in a crisis contacts and meetings will be intensified
so that EU and NATO can discuss assessments of the crisis and
clarify their intentions regarding possible engagements. The
experience of 2003 shows that these arrangements are
fundamentally sound, providing for intensified consultation,
while respecting fully the decision-making autonomy of both
organisations.

Where NATO as a whole is not engaged, the EU, in undertaking
an operation, will choose whether or not to have recourse to
NATO assets and capabilities, taking into account in
particular the Alliance's role, capacities, and involvement
in the region in question. That process will be conducted
through the "Berlin plus" arrangements.

In order to improve the preparation of EU operations having
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under Berlin plus
arrangements, we propose that a small EU cell should be
established at SHAPE and to invite NATO to establish liaison
arrangements at the EUMS. It will also ensure full
transparency between EU and NATO embodying their strategic
partnership in crisis management.

We also propose to enhance the capacity of the EUMS to
conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic
planning through the establishment within the EUMS of a cell
with civil/military components. It will in particular

-- link work across the EU on anticipating crises, including
opportunities for conflict prevention and post-conflict
stabilisation;

-- assist in planning and co-ordinating civilian operations;

-- develop expertise in managing the civilian/military
interface;

-- do strategic advance planning for joint civil/military
operations;

-- reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU
autonomous operation.

Regarding the conduct of autonomous EU military operations,
the main option for this will be national HQs, which can be
multi-nationalised for the purpose of conducting an EU-led
operation. In certain circumstances, the Council may decide,
upon the advice of the Military Committee, to draw on the
collective capacity of the EUMS, in particular where a joint
civilian/military response is required and where no national
HQ is identified.

Once such a decision was taken, the civilian/military cell in
the EUMS would have responsibility for generating the
capacity to plan and run the operation. This would not be a
standing HQ. Rather it would be a capacity rapidly to set up
an operation centre for a particular operation. The centre
would operate separately from the strategic role of the EUMS;
under a designated Operation Commander. This would require
the necessary resources, including augmentation personnel, to
be made available on short notice, by the EUMS and member
states. A core staff, essentially "double hatted" from the
EUMS, would be required to maintain the necessary level of
readiness. To that effect the personnel of the EUMS could be
reinforced, if necessary.

In light of the lessons learned further developments of the
scope or nature of this capacity could be examined. It would
require further decision by the Council.

End text of French/British/German non paper.
SOBEL