IAEA/IRAN: DUTCH MFA NONPRO CHIEF ON ELBARADEI

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002846

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2013
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC IR NL IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DUTCH MFA NONPRO CHIEF ON ELBARADEI
REPORT

REF: A. STATE 315022


B. STATE 313454

C. STATE 302819

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS
1.5 (B AND D)


1. (C) Poloffs delivered ref A nonpaper to MFA
Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on November 13. Wilke
(protect throughout) said the GONL shared the U.S. conclusion
that the latest ElBaradei report confirms Iran has been
pursuing capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program.
In the Dutch view, the report provides "every reason to
conclude that there has been non-compliance." As to next
steps, the GONL places a premium on maintaining a common EU
position on the issue but also wants to uphold transatlantic
unity. Wilke said the EU3 was keeping its discussions on the
issue from other members. That said, he thought it possible
FM Fischer might have briefed FM de Hoop Scheffer on the
issue; if so details had not reached his (DAS) level. He
also noted there has been no leaking either in Teheran or in
EU3 capitals, and the EU3 embassies in Teheran did not seem
to be well-informed on the issue. Wilke shares U.S. concerns
about Iran trying to split the U.S. from the EU on this issue
(ref B). In terms of pursuing a noncompliance resolution at
the November 20 Board of Governors (BOG) meeting, the key for
the GONL was the British. It was not likely the GONL could
go along if the UK were not onboard.


2. (C) Wilke raised the issue of the desired end-state, i.e,.
if the goal is elimination of the Iranian weapons program,
now that the Iranians are providing some measure of
cooperation it will be difficult to agree on which elements
of the fuel cycle are peaceful and which support a weapons
program. Concerning a technical finding of noncompliance,
such as the Romanian example detailed ref C, Wilke thought it
might be possible but said it could be disadvantageous for
follow-on actions because it would take the initiative away
from the BOG. Wilke said that given that an additional
report was possible owing to the need to confirm details such
as the source of HEU and LEU contamination the results of
this might provide even more diplomatic leverage for a
noncompliance finding.
RUSSEL