CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002685

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2013
TAGS: PARM PREL UK KS CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
WEEK ENDING 17 OCTOBER

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.5 b) and d).

This is CWC-110-03.

--------------
2004 BUDGET
--------------


1. (U) Informal budget discussions on Oct. 16 broke little
new ground, and the stage is set for last-minute negotiations
during CSP-8. DG Pfirter was in attendance and reiterated
his call for a 7.36% increase. France stated that it had
sent the DG's proposals and his calculations on the impact of
smaller budget increases to Paris for consideration, but
still had no instructions. Japan had the same message,
noting that Tokyo was still considering the matter. The only
new vote of support for the DG came from Iran, which said it
backed the DG's proposal, but conspicuously tied it to a
strong pitch for a robust amount of ICA. And while India did
not explicitly express support for the DG, it did state that
the scenarios set forth by the DG as a result of smaller
budget increases were a reason for concern, as they indicated
an impact on core activities.

--------------
STABILIZATION FUND
--------------


2. (U) The new facilitator for Article IV/V (Johan
Verboom/Netherlands) chaired his first meeting, which
focused, of course, on the new draft decision on late receipt
of Article IV/V income. Delegations were generally
supportive of the overall concept -- once it was explained
adequately -- but there were many questions, and it is not
clear whether there is sufficient support and understanding
to push this through next week.


3. (U) The Mexican delegation in particular complained
about being hit with such a significant proposal only days
before the CSP, a sentiment which was shared by other
delegations. Germany had some questions and concerns, which
appeared to focus mainly on the cashflow side of the
equation. In particular, they asked why the Working Capital
Fund could not be used for the same purpose, asserting that
EC-31 had provided a dispensation that would allow
"additional" or "late" funds accumulated in 2003 and 2004 to
be put into the WCF. Administrative Director Herb Schulz and
Ali Asghar noted the limitations on the WCF and stressed that
it is not flexible enough to meet the needs of the
organization. They also argued that the WCF is not large
enough on its own to cover the initial shortfalls at the
start of the year, before many States Parties make their
initial assessed contributions.


4. (U) Canada and others had questions about the
significance of specific wording in the operative paragraphs,
but nothing which indicated solid opposition to the proposal.
Interestingly, Russia did not object to proposals to delete
a reference to consulting with the EC before tapping the
program stabilization fund. As AC/CB is aware, this
provision had been included at the request of the Russian IO
deputy director.


5. (SBU) In short, while no delegation made a serious
objection to the proposal, they will require a lot of
convincing. There is general agreement on the idea of
ensuring that late Article IV/V funds should be put to use by
the organization, and not simply become a windfall surplus to
be redistributed back to the member states. The
administrative and financial points made by Schulz and Asghar
were usually helpful, but occasionally confused the
delegates. As long as the focus remains on the overriding
goal of the draft decision document, there is a chance of
having it passed. But in view of the short time involved in
reaching this decision, and the requirement for capitals to
consider this matter, it will take a lot of work from the TS
during CSP-8, probably with a lot of help from the U.S.

--------------
EXTENSION REQUESTS
--------------


6. (SBU) UK delegation informed del that the idea of visits
to U.S. demil sites could become a very important element of
their calculus regarding our extension request. The U.S. had
satisfied the UK with our language proposed bilaterally to
them regarding our 45% deadline exceeding the 100% deadline,
but the UK was keen to maintain pressure on Russia to be open
about its demil program. Part of that was to maintain the
tool of visits to Russian demil sites which, in turn,
suggested visits to U.S. sites, under the guise of equitable
treatment, though the UK was/is not remotely concerned about
our demil program or our extension request.


7. (SBU) Del indicated that while it was encouraging that
the UK and other States Parties recognized the differences
between the U.S. and Russian demil programs and extension
requests, such recognition did not mean much if, at the end
of the day, we were treated no differently than the Russians.
Del added that we understand the sensitivity, particularly
with the Russians, of being perceived as being treated
differently or held to a different standard, but emphasized
that, if anything, we were being held to a higher standard of
conduct than the Russians. Nevertheless we would take the
UK's concerns into account.


8. (SBU) The UK delegation also asked what, if anything, we
thought needed to be done in terms of extending Albania's
deadlines for destruction of its recently-declared stockpile
of CW. Del said we did not have an immediate answer and
would respond upon receiving information from Washington.


9. (U) Del was also asked if we were aware of the fact that
Moldova had recently stated that it had approximately 1712.26
tons of "unused and forbidden" chemical products and
pesticides stored in military sites. Del responded that we
were unaware of this issue, but would raise the question with
Washington. The matter has apparently been put before the
NATO Political-Military Steering Committee and a fund has
been established to collect the estimated 20,000 Euros needed
to develop a detailed proposal for how to verify and develop
destruction procedures for this material.

--------------
ACTION PLAN ON ARTICLE VII
--------------


10. (U) (Note: the action plan was adopted on Oct. 21 at
the Special EC. The following is a record of some of the
discussions in the run-up to that decision. End Note.) One
consultation was held on Friday, 17 October, to attempt to
reach consensus. Despite the efforts of facilitator Mark
Matthews/UK, the group was unable to achieve consensus due to
Indian and Iranian intransigence. At issue are Operational
Paragraphs (OP) 10 and 19. Delegations agreed to take back
to their capitals the following proposals:

--OP10: Without prejudice to the timelines set by the
Convention, strongly stress (vice require) those States
Parties that have yet to do so take the necessary steps and
set realistic deadlines for these steps leading to the
enactment of the necessary legislation (remainder unchanged).

--OP18/9: Review at its ninth session the progress made and
decide on any further action needed; and further review at
its tenth session the status of implementation of Article
VII, and consider and decide on any measures to be taken, if
necessary, in order to ensure compliance by all States
Parties with their obligations under Article VII.


11. (U) India, Iran and the U.S. were asked to meet on Oct.
20 to determine whether consensus could be reached before the
Executive Council meeting the afternoon of Tuesday 21 October

2003.

--------------
ARTICLE XI
--------------


12. (U) Norma Suarez/Mexico chaired one informal
consultation Friday 17 October, announcing that she hoped to
achieve consensus on her draft decision document before the
CSP and called for general views one by one from attending
delegations. Generally, delegations supported the draft as a
good starting point, and requested specifics on the origin of
specific text paragraphs in order to focus our work.


13. (U) Pakistan stated that because Article XI is one of
the pillars of the Convention, the TS needs to do more than
merely sponsor seminars and workshops. Pakistan slammed the
continued maintenance by some delegations of discriminatory
export controls and asked that delegations focus on sharing
rather than excluding. Iran demanded that the coordinator
include its proposal for the establishment of an
International Cooperation Committee, and again made a fifteen
minute intervention on the damage done by the Australia Group
restrictions in particular and noted that the EU had
reconfirmed its support of these controls. Germany noted
that progress would not be possible if the draft decision
included a call for an International Cooperation Committee.
France noted that it was important to avoid theological
debates if progress was to be made on the Article XI draft
decision document.


14. (U) Delegations agreed that there was no possibility of
consensus before the Eighth CSP, and the facilitator
tentatively set a date of mid-November for her next
consultation and noted that delegations should bring concrete
text proposals at that point.

--------------
RESULTS BASED BUDGETING
--------------


15. (U) Consultant Robert Smith, together with DDG Brian
Hawtin and Administrative Director Herb Schultz provided a
briefing and summary paper (faxed to AC/CB) to interested
delegations on October 15. Keying his presentation to the
distributed paper, Smith summarized the postulated six core
objectives of the OPCW. (These are drawn from the draft
Medium Term Plan and have not changed since they were
proposed in July, but have not been vetted by Policy Making
Organs.) These six core, or overarching, objectives address
universality, national implementation, destruction
verification, industry inspections, international assistance,
and operation of the Secretariat. These objectives are
intended to capture every activity carried out by the OPCW.


16. (U) Underlying these core objectives are 105 lesser
objectives, which have not been released. Organizationally,
Smith identified 18 OPCW "units" contributing to these
objectives. Some units are Divisions, and others Branches.
This, he explained at length, was the result of careful study
which found that some Divisions (like Verification) are
thoroughly "integrated" with respect to the objectives they
pursue, while others (such as Administration) have clearly
delineated Branches pursuing different objectives. The
Office of Special Projects is not included at all, because it
sets its own objectives from year to year. Nor are the
Policy Making Organs addressed in any way by RBB (because the
Technical Secretariat is not in a position to direct the
PMOs).


17. (U) Although the purpose of RBB is focused on
budgeting, Smith emphasized that it is a tool, not an
automatic mechanism. It is intended to measure progress
against clearly defined goals to answer the question "how did
we do?" The next questions are "why?" and "what next?" -
allowing for course changes and a flexible budgetary response.

--------------
ROK EXTENSION REQUEST
--------------


18. (C) (Note: the ROK extension request was approved at
the Oct. 21 Special EC. The following is a record of some of
the discussions in the run-up to that decision. End Note.)
At an Oct. 16 lunch, we asked PRC Counselor Kang Yong about
the South Korean request for an extension of its destruction
deadline. At EC-34, the PRC has requested that action be
deferred on this item. Kang declined to even state if
Beijing had made a decision, simply informing us that the ROK
request was made more difficult by the fact that the South
Koreans had classified the background information regarding
their request. However, in a separate conversation with the
Korean delegation, Mr. Lee indicated that the Chinese MoD had
reviewed Korea's extension request and, through the Chinese
delegation, had indicated that it would support it. The UK
delegation privately questioned why the Koreans needed a
three-year extension for a four-month delay in operations and
indicated that it would be consulting bilaterally with Korea
during the CSP on this question.


19. (U) Javits sends.


SOBEL