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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03THEHAGUE2578
2003-10-08 11:22:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SAMPLING AND

Tags:   PARM  PREL  EIND  ETTC  CWC 
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						UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002578 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR FOLEY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL EIND ETTC CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SAMPLING AND
ANALYSIS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

REF: STATE 220996

This is CWC-103-03.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002578

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR FOLEY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL EIND ETTC CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SAMPLING AND
ANALYSIS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

REF: STATE 220996

This is CWC-103-03.


1. Washington experts and the U.S. Permanent Delegation held
bilateral consultations with the OPCW Technical Secretariat
(TS) on September 30, 2003 in The Hague on technical
considerations associated with sampling and analysis (S&A)
during CWC inspections at U.S. declared industry facilities.
Director of Verification Horst Reeps, Head of Verification's
Policy Review Branch (PRB) Per Runn, Head of Verification's
Industry Verification Don Clagett, Faiza Patel King (PRB),
Laboratory Chief Stefan Mogl, and staffer Alex Savercenko
participated. Richard D'Andrea (State/AC/CB), Larry Denyer
(Commerce/BIS/TCD), Gary Mallard (Commerce/NIST), and Brandon
Williams (Del) participated for the U.S. side.


2. The U.S. team began the discussions by noting the S&A
progress made since the previous consultations in November

2002. Specifically mentioned were the TS exercise of
off-site analysis conducted in February 2003, the TS paper on
preparedness for S&A dated 15 May 2003, refinement of U.S.
internal S&A procedures, and the U.S. exercise of on-site
analysis using the mobile lab conducted in August 2003. The
team also noted some S&A gaps. Specifically mentioned were
the lack of S&A activities during routine industry
inspections, incomplete procedures for off-site analysis, and
policy issues concerning the basis for taking a sample, and
what substances could be looked for in the analysis. The
team thanked the TS for their excellent written response to
the U.S. S&A non-paper (REFTEL) which has been given to the
American Chemistry Council (ACC). The team expressed
interest in discussing lessons learned from the recent U.S.
exercise, TS plans for conducting S&A in other countries, and
further thoughts on dealing with condition 18 (no samples
taken during CWC inspections in the United States may be
analyzed outside of the United States). The team emphasized

the technical nature of these consultations and that S&A
policy issues would be discussed tomorrow as part of the
Article VI consultations.

--------------
U.S. Exercise
--------------


3. Larry Denyer described the U.S. exercise as a follow-up to
the S&A exercise conducted in June 2002. The exercise
consisted of a S&A seminar and the analysis of a sample taken
from raw material feed stock. The Army's mobile lab set up
on-site and performed the analysis with no support from the
site. The analysis part of the exercise took about four
hours. Mr. Denyer noted that the exercise was "under
attended" by industry, however, the companies that did attend
gained valuable insights. The U.S. has offered to repeat the
S&A seminar for ACC and ACC has scheduled it for November 18,

2003. Mr. Reeps asked if the TS could attend. Mr. D'Andrea
said yes, and outlined the nature of the seminar
presentations. Mr. Reeps concluded that the TS would
probably not benefit from attending and withdrew his request.
The TS team expressed interest in conducting an exercise
with the U.S. to see what sort of support would be required
for the TS analytical equipment and also see what
modifications site analytical equipment would be needed for
use during an inspection. Mr. D'Andrea said that the
previous two U.S. exercises were Commerce initiatives, and
that a new exercise would likely also be a Commerce
initiative, but nothing is currently on the drawing board.

--------------
TS Plans for S&A in Other Countries

SIPDIS
--------------


4. The U.S. team asked what plans the TS had for conducting
S&A in other countries noting that it would be easier to
manage the S&A logistical burden in countries closer to The
Hague. The TS pointed out that they could not single out
countries for S&A based on ease or difficulty of the
logistics. When the S&A function is needed it must be
deployable anywhere. The TS continues to refine its S&A
plans and capabilities and displayed a new prototype kit for
sample taking and preparation. The new kit is smaller and
lighter than the old one and is contained in three small
suitcase sized containers. The U.S. team was given copies of
the kit's inventory.

5. The S&A planning discussion naturally lead to a discussion
about costs. The TS team stated that the average cost of an
industry inspection is approximately 16,000 Euros and that
S&A adds 3-16 thousand Euros and adds another team member.
The costs associated with taking S&A equipment on every
inspection would be prohibitive. Mr. D'Andrea suggested that
in order for S&A to occur during a routine industry
inspection the inspection team would have to know in advance
that sampling was necessary, and that could only happen if
there was an uncertainty from a previous inspection. Mr.
Clagett stated that there have been 17 uncertainties and only
three of those could have been avoided or resolved by S&A.
He also stated that all of the uncertainties have been
resolved.

--------------
Condition 18
--------------


6. Mr. D'Andrea outlined recent U.S. efforts to have a
nongovernmental laboratory receive OPCW designation. He
outlined the legislative requirement and the events leading
up to the current participation of three nongovernmental
laboratories in the current proficiency test. Mr. D'Andrea
then asked if that had any impact on TS thinking about
condition 18 and whether the TS had any new ideas. The TS
team noted that the condition 18 language refers to samples
leaving the U.S. "for analysis" and that perhaps samples
could leave the U.S. only for repackaging. Mr. D'Andrea
stated that the U.S. had considered and rejected that literal
approach because condition 18 is aimed at protecting the
custody of the sample such that no information unrelated to
the Convention could be extracted from the sample. The TS
asked whether the U.S. could accept a procedure in which the
samples were packaged with controls and blanks in The Hague
without loss of U.S. custody. This could be accomplished
using optical seals and U.S. observers. Mr. D'Andrea said
that he would take that concept back to Washington for review.


7. Mr. D'Andrea stated that the U.S. has identified possible
laboratory facilities proximal to Dulles that could be used
for sample packaging in lieu of The Hague laboratory and
asked if the TS had further considered this option. The TS
appears set on doing the sample packaging exclusively in The
Hague in order to protect sample anonymity. The U.S. team
pointed out that no matter where the samples were packaged
the Host Team would know the sample's seal number that is
applied on-site during the inspection. The TS countered that
the designated labs worldwide do not know the origin of the
sample and host teams would not know which designated labs
would be used for the analysis. The TS is considering
requiring designated labs to execute a confidentiality
agreement to protect analysis results. Ms. King asked if the
U.S. would accept such an agreement for its designated labs.
Mr. D'Andrea replied that if the agreement were required as
part of the OPCW designation, then it would be acceptable.

--------------
Next Steps
--------------


8. The TS asked about next steps and the U.S. team replied
that further S&A exercises would be beneficial. The TS is
planning S&A talks with France in November and made no
mention of further talks with other countries. Clearly the
U.S. owes the TS a response concerning their idea of
packaging the samples in The Hague with retention of U.S.
custody. Additionally, the TS would welcome any offer for a
joint S&A exercise in the U.S. Neither side brought up the
subject of further S&A consultations.


9. Javits sends.
SOBEL