IAEA/IRAN: DUTCH MFA ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002173 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2013 TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC IR NL IAEA SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DUTCH MFA ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM REF: A. STATE 245961 ¶B. DEAN-FITZPATRICK EMAIL 08/27/03 ¶C. THE HAGUE 1888 Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS 1.5 (B AND D). ¶1. (C) Summary: PolMilOff delivered ref A demarche to Dutch MFA Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on August 27. The Dutch believe a noncompliance resolution on Iran is merited, but are concerned this may not be achievable as Dir. ElBaradei's latest report is not final, so some board members may support waiting until the next report in November. In addition, they think key European players such as France and Germany may favor a more "quiet" approach. The Dutch believe going for a resolution now will be difficult, but waiting will give Iran more time to "whitewash" details of its nuclear program. In general, Wilke thought only a package of significant political and economic pressure as well as certain incentives might get the Iranians to abandon their program, and he rated the chances of success as "fairly slim." End Summary. ¶2. (C) PolMilOff made ref A points to Dutch MFA Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on August 27. Wilke said the Dutch agree that a noncompliance resolution on Iran is warranted -- "there's no room for misunderstanding, they're lying." Wilke was struck by the Iranian claim they had commenced development of a heavy water facility to produce isotopes for medical and industrial purposes because they did not know if their uranium enrichment program would work. "Now that the enrichment program has been shown to be successful, why are they still pursuing heavy water?" Wilke expressed interest in obtaining a U.S. technical assessment as to how useful the heavy water reactor is for isotope reductions as opposed to HEU and LEU facilities (ref B). ¶3. (C) Wilke provided his take on internal EU discussions about the Iranian nuclear program. He said that the Italians as EU president had initially only wanted to make an EU demarche to Malaysia as head of the NAM, but were persuaded to broaden the approach to include Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Morocco, Panama, South Africa and Sudan. That demarche was made prior to ElBaradei's latest report and did not seek a non-compliance finding but rather to "push up the base line" on the Iranians and urge their signing of an Additional Protocol. Wilke said the EU is trying to make the argument to the NAM that the Iranian program lacks an economic rationale; one he thinks might resonate with some NAM states. Concerning major EU players, Wilke thought significant economic interests in Iran might influence Italy, and that the French and the Germans were likely to favor "quiet diplomacy," even though he thought that French intelligence and technical experts shared our concerns about the Iranian program. ¶4. (C) In Wilke's view, the only chance of persuading the Iranians to abandon their program would be to employ significant political and economic pressure (threatening sanctions) and incentives (e.g., guaranteed fuel for Bushehr, U.S. diplomatic recognition). Even so, he was pessimistic about the chances of success in that he thinks the Iranians may have decided the pressure is worth taking, and that the more public the issue becomes, the less likely they will retreat. RUSSEL