IAEA/IRAN: DUTCH MFA ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002173

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2013
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC IR NL IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DUTCH MFA ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

REF: A. STATE 245961

B. DEAN-FITZPATRICK EMAIL 08/27/03

C. THE HAGUE 1888

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS
1.5 (B AND D).


1. (C) Summary: PolMilOff delivered ref A demarche to Dutch
MFA Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on August 27. The
Dutch believe a noncompliance resolution on Iran is merited,
but are concerned this may not be achievable as Dir.
ElBaradei's latest report is not final, so some board members
may support waiting until the next report in November. In
addition, they think key European players such as France and
Germany may favor a more "quiet" approach. The Dutch believe
going for a resolution now will be difficult, but waiting
will give Iran more time to "whitewash" details of its
nuclear program. In general, Wilke thought only a package of
significant political and economic pressure as well as
certain incentives might get the Iranians to abandon their
program, and he rated the chances of success as "fairly
slim." End Summary.


2. (C) PolMilOff made ref A points to Dutch MFA
Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on August 27. Wilke said
the Dutch agree that a noncompliance resolution on Iran is
warranted -- "there's no room for misunderstanding, they're
lying." Wilke was struck by the Iranian claim they had
commenced development of a heavy water facility to produce
isotopes for medical and industrial purposes because they did
not know if their uranium enrichment program would work.
"Now that the enrichment program has been shown to be
successful, why are they still pursuing heavy water?" Wilke
expressed interest in obtaining a U.S. technical assessment
as to how useful the heavy water reactor is for isotope
reductions as opposed to HEU and LEU facilities (ref B).


3. (C) Wilke provided his take on internal EU discussions
about the Iranian nuclear program. He said that the Italians
as EU president had initially only wanted to make an EU
demarche to Malaysia as head of the NAM, but were persuaded
to broaden the approach to include Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Egypt, India, Morocco, Panama, South Africa and Sudan. That
demarche was made prior to ElBaradei's latest report and did
not seek a non-compliance finding but rather to "push up the
base line" on the Iranians and urge their signing of an
Additional Protocol. Wilke said the EU is trying to make the
argument to the NAM that the Iranian program lacks an
economic rationale; one he thinks might resonate with some
NAM states. Concerning major EU players, Wilke thought
significant economic interests in Iran might influence Italy,
and that the French and the Germans were likely to favor
"quiet diplomacy," even though he thought that French
intelligence and technical experts shared our concerns about
the Iranian program.


4. (C) In Wilke's view, the only chance of persuading the
Iranians to abandon their program would be to employ
significant political and economic pressure (threatening
sanctions) and incentives (e.g., guaranteed fuel for Bushehr,
U.S. diplomatic recognition). Even so, he was pessimistic
about the chances of success in that he thinks the Iranians
may have decided the pressure is worth taking, and that the
more public the issue becomes, the less likely they will
retreat.
RUSSEL