UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 002814

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT (JREAP), L, IO, EB, INL, AND NP
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/USOAS, AND WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PREL KTIA AORC PARM EAIR EWWT KCRM HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAS: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 301352


1. The 2003 Annual Terrorism Report for Honduras follows.
Points are keyed to reftel paragraph headings:


A. Significant Actions by GOH
--------------

In 2003, President Ricardo Maduro continued his policy of
strong Honduran support for U.S. efforts against terrorism,
was a member of the Coalition of the Willing for Iraq, and
sent 370 troops to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The GOH also ratified three outstanding counterterrorism (CT)
conventions during the year. The GOH promptly issued freeze
orders for terrorist-related assets at U.S. request. No
terrorist assets have been found in Honduran financial
institutions, to date. However, the GOH has yet to designate
a national coordinator for counterterrorism. The GOH has
been an advocate in the region for U.S. anti-terrorism goals
and supported the United States in regional fora, in the
United Nations and in the Honduran media with forthright and
unambiguous public statements against terror. The Government
of Honduras (GOH) continues to provide increased security
around the U.S. Embassy and other USG facilities.

After September 11, 2001, Honduras took the lead, in its role
as President Pro-Tempore of the Central American Integration
System (SICA), in organizing Central American cooperation in
the war against terrorism. The GOH convoked Central American
heads of state for a terrorism summit on September 19, 2001.
The Summit produced an endorsement of President Bush's call
for an international coalition against terrorism, a firm
condemnation of all terrorist acts, and full support for
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and
Organization of American States (OAS)/Rio Treaty actions. In
February 2002, the Congress passed and President Maduro
signed legislation to strengthen the Honduran anti-money
laundering regime, in accordance with UN conventions. The
GOH re

sponded significantly to all U.S. requests for
intelligence cooperation. The GOH took immediate measures to
implement new U.S. civil aviation security regulations, and
continues to work with the Transportation Security
Administration on such measures.

The GOH has tightened visa restrictions by adding countries
to its list of countries that require Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) approval prior to visa issuance, coordinated
the Central American SICA regional counterterrorism plan, and
began developing its own national counterterrorism plan.

Since September 11, 2001, the GOH has signed and ratified the
Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism
Crimes in November 2002, acceded to the Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings in November 2002, and
signed the OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of
Terrorism in June 2002. In 2003, the GOH ratified three more
pending counterterrorism (CT) conventions, the 1980
Convention on the Physical Protection on Nuclear Materials,
the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
and the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives
for the Purpose of Detection (signed by the GOH March 26,
1991), which makes the GOH a party to 10 international CT
conventions. The GOH still needs to sign and ratify two
outstanding International Maritime Organization
conventions/protocols and ratify two OAS conventions (1971
and 2002) against terrorism.


B. Response of the Judicial System
--------------

The weakness of the rule of law in Honduras continues to be
the most serious impediment to any prospective government
prosecution, extradition, or investigation of suspected
terrorist activity. Historically, the judicial system has
not played a significant role in dealing with terrorism.
Heavy caseloads, severe resource constraints, insufficient
personnel and lack of expertise in handling complex
international investigations limit the ability of the
judicial and law enforcement authorities to deter terrorists
from operating in Honduras. Moreover, the judicial system
remains vulnerable to political tampering, corruption, and
improper, extra-legal influence.

There were no terrorist incidents thwarted or terrorist cells
broken up in Honduras in 2003. There were no cases of
terrorism, domestic or international, before the Honduran
judicial system during 2003.
On May 14, a group calling itself the "Popular Revolutionary
Forces" issued a communique announcing the beginning of a
campaign to overthrow the Maduro government and vowed to
evict "Yankees" and other foreign occupiers. The communique
also identified diplomats from the United States, United
Kingdom, and Spain as legitimate military targets. Initial
assessment by both the Embassy and the Honduran police
concurred that the communique was an attempt to gain
political support and therefore not considered a realistic
threat.


C. Extradition of Suspected Terrorists
--------------

The GOH did not request the extradition of any suspected
terrorist. The U.S. has not asked the GOH to extradite
anyone suspected of terrorism in 2003. There are no third
country extradition requests for suspected terrorists.


D. Impediments to Prosecution/Extradition
--------------

The Honduran Constitution (Article 102) prohibits the
extradition of Honduran nationals. The U.S.-Honduras
Extradition Treaty of 1928 permits each party to refuse to
extradite its own citizens. In July 2000, Honduras ratified
a revised extradition treaty with Spain that enumerates
various acts of terrorism that cannot be considered political
crimes. The GOH will not extradite anyone for a crime
punishable by death, unless the requesting country provides
formal assurances that the individual will receive a lesser
penalty if convicted (the maximum sentence for any one crime
in Honduras is 20 years imprisonment). There are no other
legal impediments to Honduras's ability to prosecute or
extradite suspected terrorists.


E. Responses Other Than Prosecution
--------------

Honduras belongs to Interpol and shares criminal information
with other countries, but has had difficulty preparing basic
Interpol "red notices" and provisional arrest requests. As
noted above, it is sharing intelligence information with the
U.S. and its Central American neighbors. The GOH has been an
advocate in the region for U.S. anti-terrorism goals and has
supported the United States in regional fora, in the United
Nations and in the Honduran media with forthright and
unambiguous public statements against terror.

There is growing evidence of the existence of an illicit
trade of "arms for drugs" utilizing illegal narcotics that
transit through Honduras (see answer G). In July 2003, the
GOH passed Article 332 of the Honduran Penal Code making the
possession of AK-47s and other types of automatic weapons
illegal. A 90-day arms-for-money program was initiated to
facilitate the collection and destruction of weapons deemed
illegal. The GOH's severely limited capacity to interdict
drugs and the alleged involvement of current and former
military/police officials, who may retain access to arms
caches left over from the 1980's Central American conflicts,
undermine efforts to disrupt these transactions.

In addition, there is little or no security at the country's
three principal ports on the Caribbean coast, Puerto Cortes,
La Ceiba, and Trujillo. However, the GOH launched an
expedited effort to meet new International Maritime
Organization and U.S. port security standards.


F. Major Counterterrorism Efforts
--------------

Honduras strongly opposes international terrorism in
international fora. President Maduro and his cabinet
consistently and vigorously spoke out in support of U.S. and
international anti-terrorism efforts in statements to the
Honduran media.


G. Support for International Terrorism
--------------

The GOH provides no support to international terrorism,
terrorists, or terrorist groups. There are no known
terrorist elements operating in Honduran territory. The GOH
does not permit sanctuary, training sites, training or
storage/transfer of weapons to terrorists groups.

However, there is growing evidence of the existence of an
illicit trade of "arms for drugs" utilizing illegal narcotics
that transit through Honduras. The arms from these deals are
presumably destined for use by terrorist groups in Colombia.
The GOH's severely limited capacity to interdict drugs and
the alleged involvement of current and former military/police
officials, who may retain access to arms caches left over
from the 1980's Central American conflicts, undermine efforts
to disrupt these transactions.

Honduras has maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba since
late January 2002, but has not named an ambassador, even
though Cuba has an ambassador in Honduras. Honduras has no
diplomatic relations with the other state sponsors of
terrorism -- Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.


H. Public Statements in Support of Terrorist-Supporting
Countries on a Terrorism Issue
-------------- --------------

The GOH has not voiced support for terrorist groups or their
objectives, or for state sponsors of terrorism.


I. Changes in Attitude toward Terrorism
--------------

Immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks,
Honduran police and military authorities began working even
more closely with U.S. Mission counterparts to assess links
to international terrorism in Honduras. This cooperation has
continued under President Maduro in 2002-2003. Extensive
investigation and ongoing threat analysis has not revealed
any terrorist links in Honduras. Honduran financial
officials and its private sector banking association
responded promptly to UNSC and U.S. requests related to the
freezing and seizing of terrorist financial assets and
accounts. The GOH continues to issue freeze orders of
accounts of terrorist individuals and groups listed in the
U.S. Executive Order, and the financial community has fully
cooperated. To date, no terrorist accounts have been found.

On May 14, a group calling itself the "Popular Revolutionary
Forces" issued a communique announcing the beginning of a
campaign to overthrow the Maduro government and vowed to
evict "Yankees" and other foreign occupiers. The communique
also identified diplomats from the United States, United
Kingdom, and Spain as legitimate military targets. There was
no further action by the "Popular Revolutionary Forces" or
evidence that this group represented a realistic threat at
this time.
Palmer