HONDURAS READY TO MOVE FORWARD ON REGIONAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 002380

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, T, WHA, WHA/CEN, PM, AND INR/IAA
NSC FOR SHANNON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013
TAGS: PARM PREL MASS MCAP PBTS PINR HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAS READY TO MOVE FORWARD ON REGIONAL
DISARMAMENT; WILL NOT NEGOTIATE BILATERALLY

REF: A. MANAGUA 2274

B. TEGUCIGALPA 2022

C. MANAGUA 2575

D. MANAGUA 2585

E. SECSTATE 249219

F. MANAGUA 2659

G. USDAO TEGUCIGALPA 041716Z SEP 03

Classified By: PolChief Francisco Palmieri;
Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: According to Government of Honduras (GOH)
officials, Honduras is still very inclined to move forward on
regional disarmament, but remains insistent that the process
proceed through established channels, particularly the
Central American Security Commission (SICA),and that all the
Central American (CENTAM) countries proceed in tandem.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials acknowledged that
the current process is proceeding slowly, but strongly argued
that it at least presents a viable roadmap that the CENTAMs
can follow. Moreover, the Maduro Administration maintains
they are much more concerned about trans-national security
threats, such as organized crime and narco-terrorism, rather
than excess military inventories, which they claim are not a
major problem in Honduras. Apart from its vaunted F-5 fleet
(of which only 7-8 out of 11 aircraft are operational),
Honduras' armed forces are the smallest in the region and its
weapons inventories among the most modest. As such, the
Nicaraguan arms reduction initiative was not well received in
Honduras (ref A). The GOH views the proposal as a means to
divert attention from Nicaragua's excess Man Portable Air
Defense Systems (MANPADS). Beyond that, the GOH feels that
the Government of Nicaragua (GON) proposal lacks substance,
and in its current form, actually sets back progress that has
already been made through the SICA. Post will send
translated synopsis of Nicaraguan proposal via septel. END
SUMMARY

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Nicaraguan Arms Reduction Initiative
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2. (S) The GOH takes issue with the Nicaraguan arms reduction
initiative on many levels. Politically, GOH officials view
the Nicaraguan proposal as grandstanding; offering nothing
new, ignoring long-standing positions, and actually reopening
important key elements (including agreed upon concepts,
definitions, and reporting formats) from the existing agenda.
In essence, the MFA points out that it basically brings the
whole process back to square one. The GOH believes the GON
knows this and is suspicious that the true GON agenda is to
undermine the disarmament process and deflect USG and
regional attention away from its excess stocks of MANPADS.
Moreover, the GOH remains concerned over the mixed signals
being sent from the GON by its civilian leadership and
military establishment. They cite numerous press statements
by GON military leaders that seem to contradict elements of
the GON proposal. GOH officials tell us that they have
little confidence in negotiating with the GON civilian
leadership, whom they feel will not be able to deliver on any
agreement over the objections of the Nicaraguan military.


3. (S) Militarily, Honduras views MANPADS as a bilateral
issue between the USG and the GON. Minister of Defense (MOD)
Federico Breve has been emphatic that, while he supports a
rationally balanced program of CENTAM arms control, the GOH
will not sacrifice Honduras' fleet of F-5's on a bilateral
basis (ref G). (COMMENT: The GOH understands the need to
reduce MANPAD stocks in Nicaragua. However, the GOH feels
that unfair pressure is being applied by the U.S. on
Honduras. The MOD has made clear to EmbOffs, SecDef, and
CJCS that the GOH will continue to resist any effort to
couple its remaining fleet of F-5's for a reduction of
Nicaraguan SA-7 stocks, which in his view are of little value
against F-5's. END COMMENT)

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Beyond F-5's
--------------


4. (C) There is a clear divergence of views on regional
disarmament. GOH military and diplomatic sources report that
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala do not believe the
disarmament process concerns them. A senior MFA official
said El Salvador particularly views the process instead to be
between the GOH and the GON over MANPADS and F-5's.
President Maduro and MOD Breve, in carefully nuanced public
statements, have indicated the GOH remains ready to discuss
its fleet of F-5's, but only as part of a regional
discussion. GOH civilian leaders are also quick to point out
that the Honduran military is considerably smaller than its
neighbors, and that the fleet of F-5's go a long way toward
countering its neighbors numerical superiority.

5. (C) President Maduro has repeatedly stated that military
hardware in the region is excessive. However, Maduro feels
strongly that time would be more productively spent
concentrating on ways to improve CENTAM cooperation against
trans-national threats such as organized crime,
narco-terrorism, and kidnapping syndicates, which affect the
entire region and pose significant threats to all CENTAM
countries. The constant violation of CENTAM territory by
narcotraffickers is a particular area where Maduro would like
to see increased regional cooperation. (COMMENT: Maduro's
comments reflect the extent to which SOUTHCOM Combatant
Commander General Hill's and WHA Deputy Assistant Secretary
Fisk's initiatives on regional military integration have
penetrated strategic thinking here. GOH officials have noted
on numerous occasions that war between any of the CENTAM
countries is now unthinkable as well as unsustainable. END
COMMENT)


6. (S) Post notes that Honduras' over-rated fleet of F-5's
should also be put in perspective. Honduras maintains a
fleet of 10 F-5's at the Coronel Hector Caraccioli Moncada
Air Base in La Ceiba on the Caribbean coast. Of these, only
seven-to-eight are currently operational with a readiness
rate of only 72 percent. The remaining fleet will
deteriorate further because of a lack of spare parts, making
it likely that within a few years Honduras will not be able
to effectively deploy these assets. It is also highly
improbable the GOH will invest scarce resources into
replacing this fleet with more modern jet aircraft.
Moreover, Honduran combat pilots train on these aircraft only
one hour a month due to high fuel costs.


7. (C) COMMENT: While open to discussing disarmament issues
on a regional basis, Honduran MFA and MOD officials express
some exasperation and frustration that the GON has
successfully convinced the USG to link MANPAD destruction to
either a reduction in Honduras' F-5 inventory or a broader,
and more politically tedious and difficult, regional arms
balancing process. The bottom line is that Honduras will
resist any effort to discuss disarmament issues on a
bilateral basis, particularly with the GON. END COMMENT.
Palmer