TF1Z01: SANAA EAC MEETING APRIL 6

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000671

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS,
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2013
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER CASC YM EAC
SUBJECT: TF1Z01: SANAA EAC MEETING APRIL 6

REF: SANAA 661 (NODIS)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alan G. Misenheimer, for reasons 1.5 (
b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) The Charge convened an Emergency Action Committee
(EAC) meeting on April 6 to assess threat information and
discuss Sheraton security in light of concerns expressed by
President Saleh April 5 (reftel). Key offices and personnel
represented at the meeting included: ADMIN, Charge, CONS,
DAO, FPD, OMC, ORCA, PD, POL/ECON, RMO and SOC YEMEN.


2. (S/NF) ORCA reported no new specific threat information.


3. (S/NF) EAC discussed Sheraton Hotel security (currently
home to 24 Embassy TDY personnel, nearly all of whom are
military). President Saleh April 5 asked Charge if Embassy
would consider removing its personnel from the Sheraton Hotel
to the Embassy for the duration of the war in Iraq. He cited
no specific threat information, which was corroborated by PSO
Chief Gamish. Saleh brought subject up in a matter of fact
manner, and Gamish asked Charge to "think about it."


4. (S) On April 6, RSO raised Sheraton security with MOI
second-in-command BG Ahmed Sunidar. RSO asked if ROYG was
aware of any threat to the hotel, and whether MOI saw cause
to consider relocating to another location during the Iraq
war. Sunidar expressed surprise at the idea that the
Americans saw a need to depart the Sheraton Hotel. Sunidar
had no threat related information regarding the Sheraton
Hotel and, because of the line of questions, asked if the
Embassy had any knowledge of a threat. Sunidar went on to
list reasons that the Sheraton Hotel was the best most secure
choice, which included recent physical security upgrades,
best utilization of MOI security assets, and close proximity
to the American Embassy which reduced the time and distance
Embassy employees were exposed as soft targets while driving
to and from work. (Note: Sunidar was the ranking ROYG
official at a recent working lunch, also attended by DCM and
RSO, in which on-site security arrangements were discussed in
great detail with the Sheraton management. The ROYG has been
cooperative and forward-leaning in upgrading hotel security
over past months. End Note.)

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Saleh's Possible Reasons
--------------


5. (S) EAC discussed possible reasons for Saleh's
suggestion, including:

-- uneasiness on Saleh's part that security is not solely
provided by the ROYG at the Sheraton;

-- non-specific threat information that he is unwilling to
divulge;

-- commercial reasons possibly relating to the Sheraton;

-- an unclear understanding on the part of Saleh of the
comprehensive security measures in place at the Sheraton (in
contrast to the perfunctory measures in place at Tourist
City);

-- desire on Saleh's part to appear to be "doing something"
to ensure Amcit security.

EAC members lacked sufficient information to draw any
conclusions about Saleh's reasoning. They agreed that a) it
could not be ignored but b) was hard to understand and
impossible to justify on strict security grounds --
particularly in the absence of specific threat information.

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Comparative Security
--------------


6. (S) EAC members discussed the security provisions at the
Sheraton Hotel, security at other possible locations and the
ramifications of a change, noting the following:

-- following numerous security upgrades in recent months, the
Sheraton is the second-hardest target in Yemen after the
Embassy;

-- when specific threat information was known in late 2002
about possible vehicle-borne attacks against hotels in Sanaa
and Aden, the EAC assessed all available options and decided
that the Sheraton remained preferable to any alternative
housing site(s);

-- comprehensive security measures at the Sheraton include
1) equipment such as drop barriers able to stop vehicles
going up to 40MPH and metal detectors, 2) personnel
well-trained in using all equipment and 3) procedures that
are in place and working well;

-- other possible locations such as Tourist City near the
Embassy are much less secure, with the possibility of
vehicle-borne threat at a much higher level;

-- wide dispersal of personnel to other locations throughout
Sanaa would stress the capability of the ROYG to protect them;

-- removing personnel from the Sheraton could degrade their
security posture and make it difficult to raise the level of
Sheraton security again after the Iraq war ends.

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Suggested Embassy Response
--------------


7. (S/NF) EAC members decided to respond to Saleh's
concerns by doing the following:

-- using existing ROYG channels via ORCA and RSO to pursue a
dialogue on the issue;

-- offering to brief appropriate ROYG officials, perhaps
including the President, on details of Sheraton security with
a comparison of the poorer security offered by other options;

-- telling ROYG that the Embassy is considering the issue
seriously, reassessing Sheraton security, actively seeking
options that would provide comparable or superior security to
that provided at the Sheraton, and minimizing official Amcit
presence at the Sheraton and in Yemen as a whole;

-- re-doubling Embassy's focus on Sheraton security to ensure
that equipment, security personnel and equipment continue in
top working order;

-- putting the onus back on the ROYG to tell Embassy of any
places that might be more secure than the Sheraton and of any
possible threats immediately.
MISENHEIMER