IRAQI SOURCE PROVIDES THREAT-RELATED INFORMATION

S E C R E T SANAA 000602 SIPDIS NOFORN TERREP FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2013 TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: IRAQI SOURCE PROVIDES THREAT-RELATED INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE EMBASSY ATTACK REF: 03/26/2003 RSO TIM LAAS - DS/IP/NEA RD STEVE GLEASON SECURE TELCON Classified By: RSO TIM LAAS, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On March 26 Italian Ambassador to Yemen called on AMB Hull stating that he had information regarding an Iraqi plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy on March 27. Italians arranged for an alleged IIS operative responsible for the plot to come to Embassy Sanaa for interview by ORCA. Subject was cooperative and provided credible information on the planned attack, which he said he did not/not wish to carry out. Embassy arranged with Yemeni Political Security Organization for other members of the attack cell, with their explosive devices, to be seized evening of 3/26. Post is considering appropriate follow-on security steps. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S/NF) On March 26, 2003, at approximately 1700, Italian Ambassador to Yemen Giacomo San Felice visited Embassy Sanaa and called on AMB Hull. Ambassador San Felice stated that he had information regarding an Iraqi IIS operative who intended to bomb the U.S. Embassy the following day, March 27. ¶3. (S/NF) Following discussion in a meeting including ORCA, DCM and RSO, Italians arranged for the suspected IIS operative and a friend to come to Embassy Sanaa. They arrived at approximately 1800. After thorough security screening procedures, they entered the Chancery and were separately interviewed by ORCA. ¶4. (S/NF) RSO provided walk-ins' cellular phones to Embassy assets for exploitation.and will forward the information separate channel. ¶5. (S/NF) The walk-in claims to be an IIS asset in command of an operational cell. ORCA finds his claim convincing. The man stated he had orders to attack Embassy Sanaa using multiple IEDs comprised of 6.8 kg of TNT rigged for timed or command detonation. The Iraqi operative stated that the explosives were to be delivered in unspecified packages, three with timers and two built for detonation by remote control. The cell realized that the explosions would have limited physical effect on the well-fortified Embassy, but desired a political effect from the attempt. The cell also undertook surveillance of DATT and PAO residence and Egyptian consulate. The individual has agreed to cooperate, terminate the attack and turn over cell members and explosives. Further details will be provided via ORCA reporting, including knowledge of attacks in 11 other countries. ¶6. (S/NF) Based on information provided by the walk-in, ORCA arranged with ROYG Political Security Organization (PSO) to seize the explosive devices and the three other members of the attack cell evening of March 26. Accordingly, RSO believes the attack plan outlined in this report has been thwarted. ¶7. (S/NF) RSO will brief Embassy security assets to be vigilant regarding methods of explosive delivery with use of timers or remote control devices. Post will decide on appropriate follow-on security measures. HULL