TFIZ01: SANAA EAC MEETINGS MARCH 21

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000574 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2013 TAGS: ASEC AMGT PTER PREL CASC YM EAC COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: TFIZ01: SANAA EAC MEETINGS MARCH 21 REF: A. SANAA 573 ¶B. SANAA 570 Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: The Ambassador convened two Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meetings on March 21. At 1400, EAC met to assess threat information in light of developments with the Iraq contingency and a developing demonstration. At 1830, EAC met to discuss Embassy response to the violent demonstration near the Embassy that left several demonstrators and security forces dead and injured (ref a). Internal defense measures are in place, including standing a 24/7 watch using RSO-directed Embassy elements with agreed-upon rules of engagement. At 1915 Ambassador discussed the situation with President Saleh, offering condolences and appreciation for security provided, asking for further enhancements and suggesting that Saleh might issue a public statement urging non-violence. Saleh is convening a security meeting immediately and will respond on specific enhancements for security. More demonstrations are expected March 22. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: AMB, DCM, POL/ECON, CONS, ADMIN, PD, RSO, ORCA, OMC, SOC YEMEN and RMO. -------------- Demonstration Near Embassy Turns Violent -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) A demonstration at Sheraton Circle near the Embassy turned violent, leaving several dead (ref a). By 1800 local, ROYG and Embassy security called an all clear. SOC said Central Security Organization (CSO) reported two officers killed and four critically wounded. DAO sources reported three demonstrators killed and 14 injured. Media reports on deaths and injuries vary. Al Jazeera and Yemeni television reported the death of a 12 year old boy during the demonstration. ¶4. (S/NF) ORCA reported that the hard-core demonstrators who remained to clash with the security forces were in two main groups, one with approximately 400 persons and one with approximately 250. ROYG elements reported approximately 800 in total. ¶5. (S/NF) In response to rumours at 1845, RSO spoke to MOI to dispatch CSO forces to deal with an alleged mob of demonstrators who had gathered at the Sanaa International School (SIS),which is currently closed. The rumors proved unfounded. ¶6. (S/NF) DAO reported that evening mosque sermons were calling for additional protests and stoking the emotions of worshippers. Demonstrators are planning to return to the Embassy March 22. ¶7. (S/NF) The YALI teacher and stringer for Associated Press who was detained by military intelligence at the demonstration was taken to the Embassy pending a safe time to get him home via armored vehicle. -------------- Embassy Response -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Internal defense measures were put in place to ensure wide security coverage and adequate response. The plan included a floor-by-floor approach by MSG and other augmentees for defense of the chancery. 24/7 watchstanding began at 1930, with personnel on the roofs of both the chancery and the residence. Rules of Engagement have been agreed, to include clear command and control under RSO, watchstanders in body armor and armed and use of lethal force only with RSO (and COM) direction or in self-defense or in defense of American life. ¶9. (S/NF) EAC discussed concern that the Sheraton Hotel could become a target in future demonstrations, although it was not a target at the 3/21 demonstration. EAC decided not to remove to the Embassy the 15-20 Embassy personnel on StandFast at the Sheraton. Rather, they will be moved in armored vehicles as soon as the Embassy hears a demonstration might be forming anywhere in Sanaa. Embassy personnel on StandFast at their residences and the ACC will remain because they live far from the Embassy and are not in high concentrations. ¶10. (S/NF) EAC suggested another radio message be disseminated to provide further information on the demonstration and advise them to remain at StandFast. ¶11. (S/NF) PAO reported that press guidance is being cleared through Washington and that requests were received for interviews about the demonstration, which he declined. -------------- President Saleh Promises Continued Security -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) Ambassador spoke with President Saleh by phone. Ambassador offered regret for the Yemenis killed and injured, particularly security forces. He told Saleh that he appreciated the protection provided and suggested that further enhancements of security measures for Embassy and Amcits should be discussed. Ambassador also suggested it would be helpful for President Saleh to make a statement discouraging violence and turning efforts towards humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, similar to statements made in Morocco and soon in Jordan. ¶13. (S/NF) The Presidency phoned again and told the Ambassador that Saleh appreciated the Ambassador's points and is convening immediately a security meeting to go over contingencies. The President will be in touch with specific enhancements. -------------- Other Threats and Security Issues; Marib Incident -------------- ¶14. (S/NF) ORCA reported no change in current threat information beyond the demonstrations. ORCA reported on ongoing discussions with PSO regarding Iraqis. EAC discussed developments and upcoming actions in the Iraq war and worldwide televised demonstrations in regards to their effect on the situation in Sanaa. ¶15. (S) The list of Americans for the MOI for protection continues to be worked. ¶16. (S/NF) The investigation into the Marib incident continued and no concrete evidence for a motive -- political or otherwise -- has been found (ref b). Because of the violent demonstrations, a planned trip by FBI and FPD to Marib to join the autopsy of the killer was cancelled. HULL