SANAA EAC MEETING - 23 FEBRUARY 2003

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000371 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2013 TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER AADP CASC EAC COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 23 FEBRUARY 2003 Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Begin summary: The Ambassador convened an EAC meeting on February 23 to assess recent threat information and discuss security-related issues. Also mentioned was EAP readiness and the need to prepare for a future conflict in Iraq. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: CHG, POL/ECON, CONS, ADMIN, PD, RSO, ORCA, OMC, SOC YEMEN, RMO, FPD AND FBI. End summary. ¶2. (C) The EAC began their discussion with a review of the threat environment in light of the shooting of a British defense contractor in Saudi Arabia. EAC members noted that a similar scenario could play out in Yemen. Accordingly, the EAC agreed that Mission personnel should again be urged to vary their times and routes and avoid a predictable pattern in any other way. ¶3. (C) The EAC discussed the fact that the British Embassy in Sanaa had drawn down to the to a minimal staff working out of the Ambassador's residence. According to the DCM this was a pattern for British missions throughout the region, but also reflected the British concern that their Chancery was vulnerable because it lacked adequate standoff. ¶4. (SBU) The EAC noted that the U.S. mission granted authorized departures for Embassy staff in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Beirut, Syria, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem. The Ambassador asked the EAC if any members thought that American Embassy Sanaa should consider requesting such a departure status at this time. The EAC unanimously recommended not requesting authorized departure status at this time because the past has been at high security alert for some time and has procedures in place to manage the existing threat. ¶5. (SBU) EAC members were briefed about the large number of FSN and Direct Hire American staff that had opted to receive the Smallpox vaccination following excellent briefings provided by a TDY State Department medical team in Sanaa. The Ambassador noted that the likelihood of a biological attack in Sanaa remained small but the potential existed for someone regionally to become infected before traveling to Yemen at which time he/she might expose inhabitants in Yemen to the virus. The RMO discussed the fact that Anthrax inoculations would follow smallpox vaccinations at an unspecified time in the future. ¶6. (SBU) The Administrative Officer briefed the EAC that Escape Masks being held by ROYG customs would be released shortly. The RSO noted that a training team was scheduled to train Embassy personnel beginning on March 10, 2003. (Note the masks were in fact released to the Embassy on February 24.) ¶7. (U) The DCM briefed EAC members on the success of First Responder Training recently provided by the RMO. ¶8. (U) The RSO informed the EAC team that the EAP had been finalized by TDY RSO Nick Mariano and was ready for EAC Chairman review and approval before send-out. ¶9. (U) The DCM reminded EAC members about the newly updated phone tree to be used in the event of a crisis. ¶10. (SBU) The DCM invited SOC-Yemen and other EAC members to review and provide input into the recently revised Drawdown List updated by the DCM, ADMOFF, COMSOFF and RSO. ¶11. (SBU) EAC members reviewed tentative "Hunker Down" Guidelines in the event of hostilities between the U.S. led coalition and Iraq. Subjects covered included: Sleeping Arrangements FSN Access Cafeteria Reminder to bring overnight bag to office NOW Have cash on hand Update POA as necessary ¶12. (SBU) The EAC noted the success of a Safe Haven Drill administered by the RSO on 20 February at 0900 hours with the entire Embassy staff. ¶13. (SBU) The RSO noted that a Destruction Drill would be held on February 25, 2003. The DCM reminded EAC members of the importance of keeping burn times to less than 1 hour in each section. ¶14. (SBU) The ADMINOFF reviewed post mail handling guidelines formulated to avoid the risk of Chancery contamination in case of any future white powder incidents. HULL