wikileaks ico  Home papers ico  Cables mirror and Afghan War Diary privacy policy Privacy
Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03SANAA2701
2003-11-12 13:21:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S 11/8/03 CT COORDINATION MEETING WITH

Tags:   PTER  PREL  IR  YM  COUNTER  TERRORISM 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
						S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002701 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS,
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL IR YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S 11/8/03 CT COORDINATION MEETING WITH
MOI/PSO DIRECTORS


Classified By: CTC AUSTIN G. GILREATH, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002701

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS,
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL IR YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S 11/8/03 CT COORDINATION MEETING WITH
MOI/PSO DIRECTORS


Classified By: CTC AUSTIN G. GILREATH, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On 8 November 2003, the Ambassador was
called to a meeting with Minister of the Interior, Dr. Rashad
al-Alimi, and the Director of the Political Security
Organization, BG Ghalib al-Qamish, to discuss current levels
of cooperation on the counter-terrorism front. The
Ambassador presented a number of requests for further
information on threats to American targets and details of
Al-Qa,ida presence in Sana,a, and reaffirmed the need for
the ROYG to commit fully in word and deed to the Global War
On Terrorism. Alimi and Qamish confirmed Yemen,s interest
in cooperating with America. End summary.

--------------

THE AL-SHARIF CELL

--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador told attendees that based on
information given to him by MOI Alimi on the 28 October, he
understood that the Amr al-Sharif al-Qa,ida cell arrested in
September 2003 had attempted to conduct two attacks on the
Ambassador,s motorcade. The Ambassador requested additional
information, to include weapons, locations and timings of the
aborted attacks. The Ambassador also asked for additional
threat targeting information, developed from cell member
interrogations, on western restaurants, institutes, USG
residences and the Hadda Compound. The Ambassador told the
attendees that because the cell members were currently in
jail, and the arrest team had discovered a wealth of
information (computer disks, written targeting packets, and
casing videotape), these requests were not unreasonable.


3. (C) After some initial confusion regarding the existence
or non-existence of a videotape containing casing information
of the British Embassy, Dr. Alimi finally produced the
original and promised that copies would be made and delivered
to the embassy and the British Ambassador. (Comment: It
appears PSO, the designated conduit for materials, was not
provided with a key piece of material. End comment)



4. (S/NF) The Ambassador said that it was his understanding
that seventeen individuals had been arrested in connection to
the cell. The Ambassador asked why their names had not been
provided to the Embassy yet. Qamish told the Ambassador that
he had indeed provided those names to his liaison Pol/Mil
contact at the Embassy. After the meeting, the Pol/Mil
Section Head confirmed to the Ambassador that he has not
received any of these names, but that he would check with PSO
liaison to see if such material was in the pipeline.
Subsequently, the names were turned over in memo format on 9
November.

--------------

THE IRANIAN DEPORTEES

--------------


5. (S/NF) Referring to a recent Yemeni press article
detailing the extradition by Iran to Yemen of thirteen Yemeni
al-Qa,ida terrorists, the Ambassador pointedly asked
attendees why the Embassy, and officials in Washington, had
to receive such information late from open sources and not
early from our committed CT partners in the ROYG. Qamish
responded that this was in fact old news and that the
transfer had taken place in January 2003. He continued by
saying that these individuals had targeted objectives outside
of Yemen, did not present a threat to the Embassy, and that
it was a Yemeni-Iranian matter. The Ambassador asked if
Embassy interlocutors had been made aware of the transfer
during the time of its execution, and attendees responded
that while Washington knew of the transfer, the names had not
been conveyed at the Iranians' request. Qamish said he would
provide these names in official channels since Iran has now
leaked them.

--------------
ESCAPED FUGITIVES

--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador queried the current status of ROYG
efforts to capture Ahmed al-Quso and Jamal Muhamad Ahmad Ali
al-Badawi. Attendees confirmed that the two individuals were
in Yemen, but that they did not have specific locational data
on the fugitives. Attendees confirmed that two of the ten
March 2003 Aden prison escapees had been recaptured. Qamish
again reiterated that if the Embassy had any information on
the current location of Abu Asim al-Makki, this information
should be turned over to the PSO.

7. (C) Comment: A joint Alimi/Qamish meeting is rare, and
this one was at the Yemenis request. It was obviously an
effort by the Yemenis to respond to concerns raised by FBI
Director Mueller and the Ambassador. (Septel) The episode of
the missing UK Embassy videotape indicates the lack of
coordination between Yemeni agencies. In Ambassador,s
judgment, it illustrates dramatically why we need to develop
close and constant contact with the MOI. Embassy,s DCM will
take the lead in this regard. End comment.
MISENHEIMER