AUGUST 29, 2003, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SANAA 002534

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013
TAGS: ASEC PTER COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: AUGUST 29, 2003, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE

REF: A. SECSTATE 249843

B. SANAA 01945

Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE
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1. (S/NF) Demonstrations


A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
that are capable of carrying out significant anti-American
demonstrations?

Yes, Muslim Yemeni pro-Palestinian/pro-Iraqi/anti-American
demonstrators.


B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?

On March 21, 2003, a march of 5-7,000 people protesting the
war in Iraq was stopped by police approximately 1/4 mile from
the U.S. Embassy; violent confrontations resulted in the
death of several police and protesters.

In Winter 2002 - 2003, Yemeni women held demonstrations in
front of the German Embassy protesting the arrest of Sheikh
Moayed in Frankfurt, Germany, on terrorism charges.

In March, 2003, Yemenis held several anti-war demonstrations,
most near the UN headquarters complex in Sanaa, Tahrir Square
and Old Airport Road, all several miles from the Embassy.


C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of
U.S. diplomatic facilities?

The usual sites for anti-American gatherings are in areas of
Sanaa away from the Embassy, however, the above-mentioned
March 21, 2003 event took place nearby.


D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration?

Depending on the location, up to several hundred people. In
our experience, demonstrations in front of the Embassy are
usually less than 100 people. Peaceful demonstrations
protesting the war in Iraq have ranged from approximately
1,000 to 100,000, by some media accounts. Local press
routinely carry inflated estimates ranging from half a
million to one million-plus.


E. Are these anti-American demonstrations usually triggered
by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by
domestic issues?

U.S. foreign policy initiatives and military/law enforcement
counter-terrorism endeavors, in addition to ROYG cooperation
with the USG.


F. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?

Generally peaceful. Demonstrations must be coordinated and
approved by ROYG in advance, consequently, the vast majority
are peaceful. If not approved in advance, ROYG forces will
disband a demonstration.


G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to
USG property or injuries to USG employees?

No, however, Yemeni police and protester fatalities in March
2003 were due in large part to the intervention of host
government security protecting the U.S. Embassy.


H. If violent, have any demonstrations ever penetrated our
perimeter security line?

No.


I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?

Yes, directed at specific policies, including child labor,
education and bringing mosques under government control.
Several anti-government demonstrations occurred in Sanaa and
Aden.


J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of
U.S. diplomatic facilities?

No.


K. What is the average size of an anti-government
demonstration?
Fairly small, approximately 50 to 200 individuals, similar to
anti-U.S. protests.


L. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?

Generally peaceful.


M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to
USG property?

No.


2. (S/NF) Macro Conflict Conditions

A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or
intrastate conflict?

Host country is cooperating with U.S. efforts to identify and
stop/attack terrorist targets within Yemen. In this regard,
the ROYG in recent months has demonstrated willingness to
engage in fairly large-scale hostile operations against an
identified terrorist force -- e.g. in Abyan in July 2003.


B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is
limited to a specific region or a country-wide civil war?

Host government counter-terrorism operations tend to occur in
areas where terrorists strike first. ROYG's actions are
usually reactive, following attacks perpetrated by the
terrorists. However, when ROYG believes taking the
initiative is in its interests, it has struck first.


C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic
facilities located in this region?

Yes. In Sanaa: the U.S. Embassy; Yemen America Language
Institute (YALI),which is part of the Embassy; and the Sanaa
International School (SIS),which employs American teachers.


D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate
conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American
orientation?

Yes, al-Qaeda members and tribesmen sympathetic to al-Qaeda's
ideology or beholden to an al-Qaeda element for past support.



3. (S/NF) Host Country Capabilities


A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well-trained?

They are often corrupt, poorly trained and underpaid. For
example, an average officer earns 60 USD per month. A
captain with 20 years experience earns only 120 per month. A
Brigadier General earns 300 USD per month. This economic
condition -- reflecting Yemen's widespread poverty (average
per capita income is less than USD 400 countrywide) --
fosters widespread corruption that possibly could be
diminished with increased remuneration. Further, law
enforcement agencies face numerous challenges regarding
planning, coordination and execution of complex
counter-terrorism operations. Reliance on manpower is
emphasized over the use of technology. Agencies have
difficulty maintaining operations security and have
difficulty operating in a nighttime environment. As
evidenced by observation at the August 9, 2002, blast site,
Yemeni law enforcement's ability to conduct a complex
criminal investigation resulting in a successful resolution
is limited, despite relevant training and equipment provided
in the past by European donors.

In July - August 2003, 24 host government police
investigators from across the country participated in a
two-week DS/ATA Terrorist Crime Scene investigation course
taught by Evidence Response Team FBI special agents.



B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies?

Some officers have received DS/ATA training, however, the
full impact of this training will be manifest only over the
long term. The Regional Security Office does maintain
high-level contacts within the Ministry of Interior who
received ATA training.

The Central Security Forces (CSF) is the counter-terrorism
(CT) arm of the Central Security Organization (CSO). The CSF
has been trained by U.K./U.S. personnel for the past year and
will continue into the next fiscal year. This unit is being
equipped and trained. They are ROYG's primary CT force.


C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious,
widespread corruption inside their agencies?

Yes, see question 3A.

D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of
deterring terrorist actions?

The intelligence services are moderately professional but in
no way can deter a determined terrorist group.

E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with U.S.
Embassy requests or information and support?
Yes, but often begrudgingly. Intelligence services rarely
volunteer information. Yet on some occasions the ROYG takes
the initiative to inform the USG of CT developments -- e.g.
in the case of ROYG success in September 2003 in disrupting a
Sanaa-based al-Qaeda cell.


F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in
recent years, have host country security services been able
to score any major anti-terrorism successes?

Yes.


G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and
allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective
security?

Yes.


H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major
airports in the country?

Poor, but the ROYG is quite receptive to additional
U.S.-funded equipment and security training. This view is
corroborated by a recent visit to Sanaa by a two-person
Transportation Security Administration assessment team.


I. How effective are customs and immigration controls
agencies?

Ineffective but improving. Since February 2002, Somali and
Ethiopian refugees have been entering Yemen at a reported
rate of approximately 1,500 per month, adding to the 60,000
refugees previously registered. They are settling on the
southern and western coasts, forming criminal and
prostitution rings along clan lines. Criminal related
violence is on the rise. With USG assistance, the customs
and immigration services are attempting to standardize and
modernize equipment and coverage.


J. How effective are border patrol forces?

In the recent past ineffective; however, a current surge of
more than 7,000 troops from MOI/MOD resources and increased
cooperation by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (to include
collaboration on intelligence and smuggling information) has
generally improved the effectiveness of border patrol forces.


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INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
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4. (S/NF) Anti-American Terrorist Groups


A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in
country?

Yes.


B. If yes, how many?

Four are known: Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA); Yemen Islamic
Jihad; al-Qaeda Sympathizers; Yemen Hizballah.


C. Have these groups carried out an anti-American attacks
within the last 12 months?

No, however potential attacks may have been foiled due to
pre-emptive U.S. strikes and joint U.S.-Yemeni operations.


D. Were any of these lethal attacks?

N/A.


E. Have these groups attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities?
N/A.

F. Have these groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military,
or related targets?

N/A.


G. Have these groups limited their attacks to specific
regions or do they operate country-wide?

N/A, but these groups do possess the capability to operate
country-wide.


H. If their attacks are limited to regions, are there any
U.S. diplomatic facilities located in these regions?

See 4G.


5. (S/NF) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups


A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not
anti-American) in country?

Yes.


B. If yes, how many?

Two: National Liberation Front (MAWJ) and the Right to
Self-Determination Movement (HATM).


C. Have these groups carried out attacks in the capital or in
areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located?

No known incidents of this type.


D. Were these attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate?

None known.


E. Have any Americans ever been killed or injured in these
attacks?

No.


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TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
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6. (S/NF) Transnational Terrorist Indicators


A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a
presence in country?

Yes. Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ),al-Gama'a
al-Islamiyya (AKA: The Islamic Group),Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG),Algerian Islamic Group GIA),Salafi
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC),Hamas, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Hizballah. The Iraqi Intelligence
Service formerly maintained a presence in Yemen, but is no
longer visible in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom.


B. How does the EAC assess this presence? Is it an
operational cell? Financial cell? Support cell? Propaganda
cell?

Al-Qaeda: all of the above. Many, but not all, of these
other groups maintain close links or cooperate directly with
al-Qaeda, thus bolstering their operational capabilities.


C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups?

ROYG officially supports Palestinian groups, including Hamas
and Hizballah, but support is mainly rhetorical and does not
extend to operational activities inside Yemen.


D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
the country that have a relationship with any of these groups?

Per reftel B:

Organization, Nationality.
-- Al-Haramain al-Sharifain Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Ihsan Association, Saudi Arabia
-- World Assembly for Muslim Youth, Saudi Arabia
-- Dar al-Arqam Stationary for Printing and Publication,
Saudi Arabia
-- Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia
-- Dubai Charitable Association, Saudi Arabia
-- Abu-Baker Salem Al-Sa'ari Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Supreme Authority for Muslims of Bosnia, Saudi Arabia
-- Tibah Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Saeed Qahtan Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- International Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia
-- League of the Islamic World, Saudi Arabia
-- Charitable Association in Fujaira, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Bir Islamic Committee, Saudi Arabia
-- Zahra Al-Khalidiah Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Salem Omar Ba'ashem and Omar Badahda, Saudi Arabia
-- Mecca Association, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Emir al-Khairiyah Committee (Al Haramain),Saudi Arabia
-- Islamic Union (Quebec),Saudi Arabia
-- Hamoud al-Hayyawi Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Noor Charitable Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Bin Saynoon Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Bin Mahdi Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Bayelghoum Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Fittrah Foundation, UAE
-- Al-Islah And Tawhid Social Association, UAE
-- Kuwait Joint Committee for Relief of the Global Islamic
Charitable Organization, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
-- United Arab Emirates Association, UAE
-- Bayt al-Shariqa al-Khairi (Sharja Charitable House),UAE
-- Omar Bin Yousuf, UAE
-- Qatar Charitable Association, Qatari
-- Islamic Relief, UK
-- Dubai Charitable Association, UAE
-- Al-Fikrah Center, UAE
-- Al-Islah Association, Kuwait


E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
that are sympathetic to these groups?

Many Yemenis in rural/tribal areas are deemed sympathetic to
the ideology of al-Qaeda. Public sympathy for
pro-Palestinian/anti-ISRAELi groups is widespread.


F. How does the EAC assess the level, intent, and scope of
hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia,
Sudan, et. al.) in country relative to potential
anti-American terrorist acts?

Foreign hostile intelligence services, e.g. Syria, are
primarily focused on information gathering for their own
countries' interests, not to assist anti-American groups in
country with terrorist activity. However, the notion that a
country such as Iran maintains connections with terrorist
groups in Yemen is highly likely.


G. How does the EAC assess the availability of weapons and
explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile
terrorist elements?

Yemen likely has among the highest number of weapons per
capita in the world, with easy access to varieties of
explosives. Weapons and explosives are easily attainable and
quite inexpensive. Tribal-owned gun markets are large, and
in some cases may be better stocked than host country
military and law enforcement arsenals.

Though Yemen is awash in numerous types of weapons, the
Yemeni cabinet approved a series of amendments to a 1992 gun
control law intended to bolster regulation of weapons
possession and trafficking. These amendments must gain
approval by the Yemeni Parliament before becoming law.
Parliamentary opposition to the amendments remains
significant; more than 150 MPs have reportedly signed a
petition to quash the gun control law that is still under
discussion. Accordingly, Speaker of the Parliament Sheikh
Abdullah al-Ahmar has publicly equated possession of weapons
as a Yemeni symbol of manhood.

In a separate effort, the ROYG has initiated a weapons
buy-back program, at a reported cost of 38 million USD,
intended to acquire Man Portable Air Defense Systems
(MANPADS),rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and a variety of
other heavy weapons from civilian weapons markets. Citing
the acquisition of over 1,400 MANPADS from January to June
2003, ROYG says the program is a success. There are
problems, however, such as: 1) cataloguing weapons; 2) ROYG
paying over market value; and 3) the sustainability of the
weapons buy-back program.
HULL