AUGUST 29, 2003, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SANAA 002534 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013 TAGS: ASEC PTER COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: AUGUST 29, 2003, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE REF: A. SECSTATE 249843 ¶B. SANAA 01945 Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) -------------- POLITICAL VIOLENCE -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Demonstrations ¶A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country that are capable of carrying out significant anti-American demonstrations? Yes, Muslim Yemeni pro-Palestinian/pro-Iraqi/anti-American demonstrators. ¶B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the country within the last 12 months? On March 21, 2003, a march of 5-7,000 people protesting the war in Iraq was stopped by police approximately 1/4 mile from the U.S. Embassy; violent confrontations resulted in the death of several police and protesters. In Winter 2002 - 2003, Yemeni women held demonstrations in front of the German Embassy protesting the arrest of Sheikh Moayed in Frankfurt, Germany, on terrorism charges. In March, 2003, Yemenis held several anti-war demonstrations, most near the UN headquarters complex in Sanaa, Tahrir Square and Old Airport Road, all several miles from the Embassy. ¶C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. diplomatic facilities? The usual sites for anti-American gatherings are in areas of Sanaa away from the Embassy, however, the above-mentioned March 21, 2003 event took place nearby. ¶D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration? Depending on the location, up to several hundred people. In our experience, demonstrations in front of the Embassy are usually less than 100 people. Peaceful demonstrations protesting the war in Iraq have ranged from approximately 1,000 to 100,000, by some media accounts. Local press routinely carry inflated estimates ranging from half a million to one million-plus. ¶E. Are these anti-American demonstrations usually triggered by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by domestic issues? U.S. foreign policy initiatives and military/law enforcement counter-terrorism endeavors, in addition to ROYG cooperation with the USG. ¶F. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? Generally peaceful. Demonstrations must be coordinated and approved by ROYG in advance, consequently, the vast majority are peaceful. If not approved in advance, ROYG forces will disband a demonstration. ¶G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to USG property or injuries to USG employees? No, however, Yemeni police and protester fatalities in March 2003 were due in large part to the intervention of host government security protecting the U.S. Embassy. ¶H. If violent, have any demonstrations ever penetrated our perimeter security line? No. ¶I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the country within the last 12 months? Yes, directed at specific policies, including child labor, education and bringing mosques under government control. Several anti-government demonstrations occurred in Sanaa and Aden. ¶J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. diplomatic facilities? No. ¶K. What is the average size of an anti-government demonstration? Fairly small, approximately 50 to 200 individuals, similar to anti-U.S. protests. ¶L. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? Generally peaceful. ¶M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to USG property? No. ¶2. (S/NF) Macro Conflict Conditions ¶A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or intrastate conflict? Host country is cooperating with U.S. efforts to identify and stop/attack terrorist targets within Yemen. In this regard, the ROYG in recent months has demonstrated willingness to engage in fairly large-scale hostile operations against an identified terrorist force -- e.g. in Abyan in July 2003. ¶B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is limited to a specific region or a country-wide civil war? Host government counter-terrorism operations tend to occur in areas where terrorists strike first. ROYG's actions are usually reactive, following attacks perpetrated by the terrorists. However, when ROYG believes taking the initiative is in its interests, it has struck first. ¶C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic facilities located in this region? Yes. In Sanaa: the U.S. Embassy; Yemen America Language Institute (YALI),which is part of the Embassy; and the Sanaa International School (SIS),which employs American teachers. ¶D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American orientation? Yes, al-Qaeda members and tribesmen sympathetic to al-Qaeda's ideology or beholden to an al-Qaeda element for past support. ¶3. (S/NF) Host Country Capabilities ¶A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well-trained? They are often corrupt, poorly trained and underpaid. For example, an average officer earns 60 USD per month. A captain with 20 years experience earns only 120 per month. A Brigadier General earns 300 USD per month. This economic condition -- reflecting Yemen's widespread poverty (average per capita income is less than USD 400 countrywide) -- fosters widespread corruption that possibly could be diminished with increased remuneration. Further, law enforcement agencies face numerous challenges regarding planning, coordination and execution of complex counter-terrorism operations. Reliance on manpower is emphasized over the use of technology. Agencies have difficulty maintaining operations security and have difficulty operating in a nighttime environment. As evidenced by observation at the August 9, 2002, blast site, Yemeni law enforcement's ability to conduct a complex criminal investigation resulting in a successful resolution is limited, despite relevant training and equipment provided in the past by European donors. In July - August 2003, 24 host government police investigators from across the country participated in a two-week DS/ATA Terrorist Crime Scene investigation course taught by Evidence Response Team FBI special agents. ¶B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies? Some officers have received DS/ATA training, however, the full impact of this training will be manifest only over the long term. The Regional Security Office does maintain high-level contacts within the Ministry of Interior who received ATA training. The Central Security Forces (CSF) is the counter-terrorism (CT) arm of the Central Security Organization (CSO). The CSF has been trained by U.K./U.S. personnel for the past year and will continue into the next fiscal year. This unit is being equipped and trained. They are ROYG's primary CT force. ¶C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious, widespread corruption inside their agencies? Yes, see question 3A. ¶D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of deterring terrorist actions? The intelligence services are moderately professional but in no way can deter a determined terrorist group. ¶E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with U.S. Embassy requests or information and support? Yes, but often begrudgingly. Intelligence services rarely volunteer information. Yet on some occasions the ROYG takes the initiative to inform the USG of CT developments -- e.g. in the case of ROYG success in September 2003 in disrupting a Sanaa-based al-Qaeda cell. ¶F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in recent years, have host country security services been able to score any major anti-terrorism successes? Yes. ¶G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective security? Yes. ¶H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major airports in the country? Poor, but the ROYG is quite receptive to additional U.S.-funded equipment and security training. This view is corroborated by a recent visit to Sanaa by a two-person Transportation Security Administration assessment team. ¶I. How effective are customs and immigration controls agencies? Ineffective but improving. Since February 2002, Somali and Ethiopian refugees have been entering Yemen at a reported rate of approximately 1,500 per month, adding to the 60,000 refugees previously registered. They are settling on the southern and western coasts, forming criminal and prostitution rings along clan lines. Criminal related violence is on the rise. With USG assistance, the customs and immigration services are attempting to standardize and modernize equipment and coverage. ¶J. How effective are border patrol forces? In the recent past ineffective; however, a current surge of more than 7,000 troops from MOI/MOD resources and increased cooperation by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (to include collaboration on intelligence and smuggling information) has generally improved the effectiveness of border patrol forces. -------------- INDIGENOUS TERRORISM -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Anti-American Terrorist Groups ¶A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in country? Yes. ¶B. If yes, how many? Four are known: Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA); Yemen Islamic Jihad; al-Qaeda Sympathizers; Yemen Hizballah. ¶C. Have these groups carried out an anti-American attacks within the last 12 months? No, however potential attacks may have been foiled due to pre-emptive U.S. strikes and joint U.S.-Yemeni operations. ¶D. Were any of these lethal attacks? N/A. ¶E. Have these groups attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities? N/A. ¶F. Have these groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military, or related targets? N/A. ¶G. Have these groups limited their attacks to specific regions or do they operate country-wide? N/A, but these groups do possess the capability to operate country-wide. ¶H. If their attacks are limited to regions, are there any U.S. diplomatic facilities located in these regions? See 4G. ¶5. (S/NF) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups ¶A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not anti-American) in country? Yes. ¶B. If yes, how many? Two: National Liberation Front (MAWJ) and the Right to Self-Determination Movement (HATM). ¶C. Have these groups carried out attacks in the capital or in areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located? No known incidents of this type. ¶D. Were these attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate? None known. ¶E. Have any Americans ever been killed or injured in these attacks? No. -------------- TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Transnational Terrorist Indicators ¶A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a presence in country? Yes. Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ),al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (AKA: The Islamic Group),Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),Algerian Islamic Group GIA),Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC),Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Hizballah. The Iraqi Intelligence Service formerly maintained a presence in Yemen, but is no longer visible in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom. ¶B. How does the EAC assess this presence? Is it an operational cell? Financial cell? Support cell? Propaganda cell? Al-Qaeda: all of the above. Many, but not all, of these other groups maintain close links or cooperate directly with al-Qaeda, thus bolstering their operational capabilities. ¶C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups? ROYG officially supports Palestinian groups, including Hamas and Hizballah, but support is mainly rhetorical and does not extend to operational activities inside Yemen. ¶D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the country that have a relationship with any of these groups? Per reftel B: Organization, Nationality. -- Al-Haramain al-Sharifain Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Al-Ihsan Association, Saudi Arabia -- World Assembly for Muslim Youth, Saudi Arabia -- Dar al-Arqam Stationary for Printing and Publication, Saudi Arabia -- Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia -- Dubai Charitable Association, Saudi Arabia -- Abu-Baker Salem Al-Sa'ari Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Supreme Authority for Muslims of Bosnia, Saudi Arabia -- Tibah Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Saeed Qahtan Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- International Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia -- League of the Islamic World, Saudi Arabia -- Charitable Association in Fujaira, Saudi Arabia -- Al-Bir Islamic Committee, Saudi Arabia -- Zahra Al-Khalidiah Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Salem Omar Ba'ashem and Omar Badahda, Saudi Arabia -- Mecca Association, Saudi Arabia -- Al-Emir al-Khairiyah Committee (Al Haramain),Saudi Arabia -- Islamic Union (Quebec),Saudi Arabia -- Hamoud al-Hayyawi Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Al-Noor Charitable Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Bin Saynoon Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Bin Mahdi Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Bayelghoum Foundation, Saudi Arabia -- Al-Fittrah Foundation, UAE -- Al-Islah And Tawhid Social Association, UAE -- Kuwait Joint Committee for Relief of the Global Islamic Charitable Organization, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait -- United Arab Emirates Association, UAE -- Bayt al-Shariqa al-Khairi (Sharja Charitable House),UAE -- Omar Bin Yousuf, UAE -- Qatar Charitable Association, Qatari -- Islamic Relief, UK -- Dubai Charitable Association, UAE -- Al-Fikrah Center, UAE -- Al-Islah Association, Kuwait ¶E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country that are sympathetic to these groups? Many Yemenis in rural/tribal areas are deemed sympathetic to the ideology of al-Qaeda. Public sympathy for pro-Palestinian/anti-Israeli groups is widespread. ¶F. How does the EAC assess the level, intent, and scope of hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia, Sudan, et. al.) in country relative to potential anti-American terrorist acts? Foreign hostile intelligence services, e.g. Syria, are primarily focused on information gathering for their own countries' interests, not to assist anti-American groups in country with terrorist activity. However, the notion that a country such as Iran maintains connections with terrorist groups in Yemen is highly likely. ¶G. How does the EAC assess the availability of weapons and explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile terrorist elements? Yemen likely has among the highest number of weapons per capita in the world, with easy access to varieties of explosives. Weapons and explosives are easily attainable and quite inexpensive. Tribal-owned gun markets are large, and in some cases may be better stocked than host country military and law enforcement arsenals. Though Yemen is awash in numerous types of weapons, the Yemeni cabinet approved a series of amendments to a 1992 gun control law intended to bolster regulation of weapons possession and trafficking. These amendments must gain approval by the Yemeni Parliament before becoming law. Parliamentary opposition to the amendments remains significant; more than 150 MPs have reportedly signed a petition to quash the gun control law that is still under discussion. Accordingly, Speaker of the Parliament Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar has publicly equated possession of weapons as a Yemeni symbol of manhood. In a separate effort, the ROYG has initiated a weapons buy-back program, at a reported cost of 38 million USD, intended to acquire Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS),rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and a variety of other heavy weapons from civilian weapons markets. Citing the acquisition of over 1,400 MANPADS from January to June 2003, ROYG says the program is a success. There are problems, however, such as: 1) cataloguing weapons; 2) ROYG paying over market value; and 3) the sustainability of the weapons buy-back program. HULL