C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001990

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2011
TAGS: PREL PARM MCAP YM DPRK
SUBJECT: YEMENI MILITARY LEADERS BRIEF AMBASSADOR ON DPRK
CONTACTS

Classified By: AMB EDMUND J. HULL FOR REASONS 1.5 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On 8/10 Yemen's Chief of Staff and Defense
Minister informed the Ambassador that President Saleh had
taken the decision to end Yemeni military cooperation with
North Korea. At Yemen's invitation a senior DPRK delegation,
possibly including the deputy ministers of defense and
industry, will soon visit Sanaa to discuss modalities. Yemen
will seek redress of "technical problems" with SCUD missiles
delivered in December, possibly involving the return of
defective missiles to North Korea and refund of payment. The
Yemenis made clear that these steps are being taken in
response to the requests of the USG, particularly U/S
Bolton's June visit, and Japan. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, OMC Chief and CT
Coordinator, called on Chief-of-Staff Qasimi and MinDef Aliwa
August 10 to discuss an impending visit to Yemeni by a North
Korean delegation to discuss military cooperation. The
meeting was a follow-up to MoD's meeting with BG Robeson
August 4, in which Aliwa first informed the Ambassador that
DPRK officials would visit soon.


3. (C) Following an initial discussion of Yemen's
increasingly effective counter-terrorism efforts, the
Ambassador turned to the main topic of the meeting: North
Korea. Ambassador noted that he had requested the meeting to
receive the ROYG's briefing on the impending visit of DPRK
officials to review aspects of military cooperation between
the two countries. He reminded Qasimi and Aliwa of the USG's
deep concern over North Korea's past cooperation with Yemen,
as underscored during the June visit of Under Secretary
Bolton.


4. (C) Aliwa stated that Yemen had understood U/S Bolton's
message, and for that reason had informed the U.S. Embassy of
the pending DPRK visit -- which would possibly include the
Deputy Ministers of Defense and Industry -- and welcomed the
opportunity to provide details. Aliwa stated that Yemen had
benefited from the low prices North Korea charged for its

military goods and services. Nevertheless, at the urging of
the USG, Japan and others, the ROYG had taken a "political
decision" to end all cooperation with the DPRK. Talks with
the visiting North Korean officials would concentrate on
modalities of doing so. Aliwa said that President Saleh had
personally made the decision and directed that he (Aliwa)
brief the Ambassador. He added that Yemen would need U.S.
help to compensate for the loss of affordable North Korean
services, particularly with regard to construction of a
naval/coast guard facility at Hodeidah.


5. (C) Chief of Staff Qasimi reviewed three areas of past
bilateral cooperation between Yemen and the DPRK:

-- SCUD missiles, which had been provided under an old
contract. Qasimi stressed that Yemen would not/not undertake
any upgrades to its current stock of missiles, and revealed
for the first time that the shipment of SCUDs received last
December had "technical problems." He said Yemen had not
formally accepted the defective missiles, and that addressing
this problem would be one focus of the impending DPRK visit.
Qasimi noted that one option was to return the missiles to
North Korea and seek a refund if no other solution could be
found. Aliwa suggested, in jest, that the U.S. might want to
buy the missiles. In response to a direct question from the
Ambassador, he said there was no/no possibility of any SCUDs
being exported from Yemen to a destination other than North
Korea.

-- A small ammunition factory in Abyan (southern Yemen),
which had been producing small caliber ammunition since the
1970s.

-- A "coastal project" which had as yet had not been
implemented. This involved several aspects, including
construction of docks, a repair workshop and buildings for
the residence of naval/coast guard personnel. The terms had
been attractive for Yemen, as the North Korea had offered
financing over a period of more than 10 years.


6. (C) The Ambassador urged the Yemeni military leadership to
think holistically about planning facilities for the navy and
coast guard to avoid duplication and inefficiency. He
stressed that Yemen should develop its own domestic
capabilities and minimize dependence on outside assistance,
such as North Korea had provided. Qasimi agreed, but noted
that the ROYG had approached China, which was currently
performing a study of possible coastal defense construction.
Ambassador pointed out that cooperation with China did not
carry the same sensitivity for the United States as did
cooperation with North Korea. Qasimi and Aliwa both asked
that the USG urge Japan to provide financial assistance to
help Yemen meet its coastal defense needs. Aliwa asked that
the USG also ask Yemen's Gulf neighbors to offer support.
Qasimi expressed frustration with Saudi Arabia, which was
providing financial support to improve security along the
land border between the two countries but no help on
confronting the maritime threat, which in fact was greater.


7. (C) Ambassador also raised the recent EP-3 incident, which
is reported via a separate channel.


8. (C) Comment: Clearly the ROYG at the highest level
received and have understood U/S Bolton's message on North
Korea. Post will continue to work this issue closely with
the Yemeni leadership as the ROYG works toward ending its
cooperation with the DPRK. Embassy is currently studying
ways to assist Yemen in developing coastal facilities. We
have a plan to use currently available funding for facilities
that serve the Yemen Coast Guard and Navy. Through military
channels, we are requesting experts to look at the
requirements holistically with the objective of a
cost-effective approach that precludes recourse to North
Korea.

HULL