MINISTER OF INTERIOR ON YEMEN-SAUDI SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001451

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2013
TAGS: PBTS PREL PTER PGOV SA YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF INTERIOR ON YEMEN-SAUDI SECURITY
COOPERATION

Classified By: Charge Alan G. Misenheimer for Reasons 1.5 (b,d)


1. (C) Begin summary: On June 21, Charge met with Minister
of Interior Alimi to discuss recent developments in
Yemen-Saudi border security, Red Sea counter-terrorism
cooperation, press reports of Yemeni terrorist arrested in
Saudi Arabia, and other issues. The Charge was accompanied
by RSO and PolOff. End summary.

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Yemen-Saudi Arabia Border Security
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2. (C) During a 6/21 meeting with Minister of Interior, Dr.
Rashad Alimi, Charge asked him to discuss the recent
Yemen-Saudi border agreement and its implications for
improved border security. Alimi noted that Yemen-Saudi
border cooperation is complicated by populations that
straddle the border and flow freely from one side to the
other. The border security agreement between the two
countries established several committees to manage this
phenomenon, but controlling the flow of "cars and lambs"
around the border towns is very difficult. Smuggling remains
a major problem; some groups are able to bypass ROYG
checkpoints crossing from Yemen's Hadramut region into Saudi
Arabia, and vice versa.


3. (C) Overall, Alimi described Yemen-Saudi border
cooperation as strong and improving. The joint committees
are responsive to changes in the situation and meet whenever
Yemeni or Saudi Arabia desires. Since the recent terrorist
attacks in Riyadh, Alimi feels there is a heightened Saudi
commitment to security throughout the Kingdom.


4. (C) Noting that the Minister of Defense was unable to
attend a scheduled 6/17 meeting in order to deal with a
security incident near Marib, Charge asked whether terrorist
suspects had been arrested. Alimi explained that the incident
was not terror-related, but criminal. A group of criminals
in Saudi broke a colleague out of police custody and fled
across the border into Yemen. Saudi Armed Forces, not
police, followed the fugitives about 240 kilometers into
Yemen, killing one during the exchange of gunfire which
ensued. The fugitives car later overturned in the desert.
The remaining suspects ran off and remain at large. The
Minister of Defense went to Marib for talks with his Saudi
Defense counterpart after this "hot pursuit."


5. (C) According to Alimi, ROYG considers the incident the
sort of territorial infringement that underscores the need
for cooperation. The ROYG asked the Saudis to ensure that it
does not happen again, "Yemen will take care of the Yemeni
side of the border, but we accepted their apology."


6. (C) In response to the Charge's query on recent press
reports of Yemeni terrorists arrested in Saudi Arabia, Alimi
noted that two people were arrested with false Yemeni
passports, but are now believed to be Egyptians. The ROYG is
currently seeking the extradition of about 100 Yemenis in
Saudi Arabia for criminal prosecution.

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Qatari and Djiboutian Cooperation
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7. (C) Alimi indicated that there was no direct CT
discussions during the recent visits of the Djiboutian
President or the Qatari Emir to Yemen. However, Qatar has an
active CT agreement with Yemen and works with all its
neighbors on Red Sea security -- a top ROYG priority. That
security requires an effective Coast Guard reporting to the
MOI. Alimi then repeated a familiar refrain - Yemen needs
financial assistance to defray the Coast Guard's $100 million
plus price tag. The Saudis have not been forthcoming -
during Alimi's last trip to the Kingdom, they told him that
the U.S. should assist the Coast Guard because of Yemen's
cooperation in the war on terror.

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And Now, About Our Cars...
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8. (C) Charge thanked Alimi for MOI's commitment to the
security of American interests in Yemen, and reiterated the
need for continued vigilance. Alimi agreed to look into some
administrative delays that affect Embassy security including
non-diplomatic license plates for Embassy vehicles and an
18-car backlog of privately owned vehicles for mission
personnel at Hodeidah port.


MISENHEIMER