GOI DISAPPOINTED WITH DELAY IN EU TAKEOVER OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000931 SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/WE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2013 TAGS: EU MARR MK PREL NATO EUN SUBJECT: GOI DISAPPOINTED WITH DELAY IN EU TAKEOVER OF ALLIED HARMONY REF: A) STATE 57448 B) USNATO 228 C) USNATO 170 CLASSIFIED BY: POLMINCOUNS T. COUNTRYMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ROME 00931 061810Z ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: ON MARCH 5, ITALIAN MFA DEPUTY HEAD OF MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS CLAUDIO BISOGNIERO EXPRESSED SURPRISE TO POLMIN AT THE US INTERVENTION (REF A) DURING THAT MORNING'S NAC IN BRUSSELS DEALING WITH THE EU'S PROPOSED TAKEOVER OF OPERATION ALLIED HARMONY. RATHER THAN FULLY CONCURRING WITH THE END OF THE NATO MISSION AND THE BEGINNING OF AN EU MISSION, BISOGNIERO LAMENTED THAT THE UNITED STATES APPEARED TO BE REASSESSING THE EU'S ROLE IN MACEDONIA AND DELAYING DISCUSSION OF AN EU ROLE IN BOSNIAN SECURITY UNTIL THE END OF ¶2003. GIOVANNI BRAUZZI, DIRECTOR OF THE MFA NATO AFFAIRS OFFICE, STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF "OTHERS" WHO SAY THE U.S. HAS MISGIVINGS OVER ESDP. IN A FOLLOW UP CONVERSATION WITH BISOGNIERO, POLMIN UNDERLINED THAT OUR CONCERNS HAD BEEN RAISED CONSISTENTLY BY USNATO AT VARIOUS MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS, AND SHOULD NOT HAVE CAUGHT THE ITALIAN MISSION BY SURPRISE. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) ACCORDING TO BISOGNIERO, IT APPEARED AS IF THE U.S. WAS REASSESSING THE EU'S POTENTIAL TAKEOVER OF THE MACEDONIA MISSION. READING FROM MEETING NOTES, BISOGNIERO NOTED WITH PUZZLEMENT THE ASSERTION FROM THE U.S. SIDE THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO DISCUSS PASSING RESPONSIBILITY FOR BOSNIAN SECURITY FROM SFOR TO THE EU BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. HE EXPRESSED THE GOI'S CONCERN THAT SMALL DETAILS WERE NOW THREATENING TO STOP A PROCESS THAT WAS IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF ITALY AND THE US. BISOGNIERO ALSO STATED THAT HE HAD BELIEVED THERE WERE ONLY TWO ISSUES PENDING -- THE RELEASE OF NATO ASSETS TO THE EU AND MODALITIES FOR A POSSIBLE NATO INTERVENTION. CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 ROME 00931 061810Z ¶3. (C) POLMIN EMPHASIZED THAT OTHER ALLIES, NOT JUST THE UNITED STATES, WERE BEING CAUTIOUS IN DISCUSSING THE EU TAKEOVER OF SFOR IN BOSNIA. MACEDONIA IS A RELATIVELY SMALL JOB COMPARED TO BOSNIA. BISOGNIERO NOTED THAT THE GOI HAD NOT TABLED ANYTHING RELATED TO BOSNIA, AND WAS WELL AWARE OF ITS GREATER COMPLICATIONS. HAVING ALWAYS TRIED TO HARMONIZE EU DEFENSE POLICY WITH NATO, THE GOI WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE MARCH 5 MEETING, WHICH THEY HAD EXPECTED TO CONFIRM THE EU'S ASSUMPTION OF ALLIED HARMONY FROM NATO, WITH FULL U.S. CONCURRENCE, HAD NOT PRODUCED THE DESIRED OUTCOME. ¶4. (C) BRAUZZI STATED THAT HE HAD THOUGHT ALL THE DETAILS OF THE HANDOVER WERE FINISHED, AND RAISED TWO POINTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EU'S FIRST MISSION GOING WELL; AND THAT THE U.S. SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF "OTHERS" (READ FRENCH) WHO SAY THE U.S. HAS MISGIVINGS OVER ESDP. ¶5. (C) IN A FOLLOW UP CONVERSATION WITH BISOGNIERO, COUNTRYMAN EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOI SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SURPRISED THAT AMBASSADOR BURNS HAD LAID OUT US CONCERNS AT THE NAC. USNATO HAD CONSISTENTLY STRESSED IN VARIOUS FORA THE NEED TO AVOID MAKING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MACEDONIA, LET ALONE TO LEAPFROG TO THE LARGER BOSNIA MISSION, BEFORE TAKING CARE OF THE BERLIN PLUS ARRANGEMENTS (REFS B, C). FURTHER, THE CONDITIONS FOR THE MACEDONIA OPERATION LAID OUT BY THE U.S. IN BRUSSELS WERE REASONABLE AND ACHIEVABLE WITHIN A RELATIVELY SHORT TIMEFRAME. IT WOULD ONLY BE WISE TO SEE HOW IT GOES IN MACEDONIA BEFORE MAKING DEFINITE DECISIONS ON A BOSNIA MISSION. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: IT'S NOT CLEAR WHY THE ITALIANS WERE SUPRISED CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 ROME 00931 061810Z BY THE US POSITION IN YESTERDAY'S NAC, BUT ..... THEY WERE. THIS APPROACH BY BISOGNIERO SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS A COMPLAINT ABOUT OUR POSITION, BUT INSTEAD AS A DESIRE TO BE KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED. SEMBLER CONFIDENTIAL > 2003ROME00931 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL