PM'S DIP ADVISORS ON REQUEST FOR TROOPS IN IRAQ

S E C R E T ROME 005008 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2013 TAGS: PREL IT EUN ESDP NATO AFGHANISTAN IRAQI FREEDOM SUBJECT: PM'S DIP ADVISORS ON REQUEST FOR TROOPS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN; CONFUSING SIGNALS ON STRUCTURED COOPERATION REF: A) STATE 303817 B) ROME 4907 C) ROME 4974 D) ROME 4957 E) ROME 4933 Classified By: POL MINISTER COUNSELOR TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.5 (B)( D) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. On October 31, Deputy Diplomatic Advisors to the PM, Paolo Dionisi and Francesco Talo, confirmed that Italy will likely approve our request for an extension of its deployment in Iraq. They asked that the Italian role in Iraq security and stabilization be given more public and official US acknowledgment, that Italy be given a senior role on Amb. Bremer,s team, and that Italian firms be given more opportunities to compete for contracts in Iraq. They said it would be difficult for Italy to agree to the US request to provide a task force of 1000 troops to Khowst, noting that the significant Italian troop presence in Iraq and ongoing stabilization operations in the Balkans were stretching resources. They were more optimistic about the possibility of Italy deploying a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Ghazni, and asked for more specifics on scope and number of personnel required. In an apparent contradiction of ref. b readout, the PM's advisors assured us that structured cooperation as it relates to European security currently under discussion in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) would not delegate operational decisions to a core group. They insisted any use of force would require consensus at 25. END SUMMARY. FORCES IN IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶2. (S) In discussing the US request for Italian forces in Iraq, Talo and Dionisi confirmed that Italy will probably agree to the request for continued deployment of personnel in Iraq well into 2004. They stressed, however, that Italy,s strong support should not be a "secret"; indeed, it would help them to push our requests with parliament and the public for additional resources if there were more public acknowledgment of Italy's role in Iraq. They noted that while Italy is the third largest contributor to stabilization efforts in Iraq, Poland's effort, which is largely funded through NATO, gets far more mention in the US press and official statements. It would also help if Italy could be assigned one of the deputy positions in the CPA, and if Italian private industry had a larger role in infrastructure reconstruction. That said, they predicted that the US/British request to extend troop deployment in Iraq would be considered favorably. ¶3. (S) POL-Mil Counselor acknowledged the need for more recognition and publicity. He promised to pass Italy's concerns to Washington, and suggested that President Ciampi's upcoming visit to the US would be an opportunity to acknowledge, at the very highest levels, Italy's outstanding contribution to stability and reconstruction in Iraq. ¶4. (S) Our request that Italy provide a task force of 1000 troops to Khowst in March 2004 would prove more problematic, Talo and Dionisi said. When the US first asked Italy for a significant troop deployment to Afghanistan, the Iraq conflict had not taken place. Italy now had a significant troop presence in Iraq. This, coupled with the ongoing stabilization operations in the Balkans, was stretching Italian military resources. They confirmed that the MOD is examining the request, but were pessimistic that it would be approved. (Comment: This negative signal on OEF deployment accords with others we have received in recent days from MFA NATO Director Brauzzi, CHOD Mosca Moschini, and Vice CHOD Camporini. End comment.) ¶5. (S) Talo and Dionisi were more optimistic about the possibility of Italy deploying a PRT to Ghazni. The issue was more about resources rather than concept; they asked for specifics on scope and number of personnel required. Pol-Military Counselor stressed that we find 60-90 PRT personnel to be sufficient, and said there was no need to follow the more numerous German model. We promised to follow up and noted that additional operational details would be available through Italy's liaison officers at CENTCOM. (Septel reports PRT discussion with MFA experts.) IGC/STRUCTURED COOPERATION -------------- ¶6. (C) Dionisi and Talo said that the US should not be concerned over recent developments regarding European security and Structured Cooperation. The initiatives under discussion in the IGC process are designed to close capabilities and operations gaps. Additionally, underlined Talo, the participation of like-minded nations, such as Italy, the UK and Spain, in any defense core group will ensure that US interests and Berlin-plus are protected. ¶7. (C) Talo and Dionisi stressed that structured cooperation parameters within which the core group could operate would be decided at 25. They also said that any decision to go operational (use of force) would require a consensus decision. Embassy note: this contradicts ref. b readout in which Senate President Pera told us that he had been briefed by FM Frattini on the latest thinking on structured cooperation. Pera said Frattini had discussed with his German, French and British counterparts a structured cooperation proposal which would include allowing the core group authority to make operational decisions. End note. ¶8. (S) Comment. While no formal reply is in, it is becoming clear that our three-pronged request will yield a mixed, albeit generally positive, response. Iraq extension looks increasingly likely. An Italian PRT in Ghazni (septel) now looks more likely, although details of command and control and lines of authority will have to be ironed out. A renewed deployment of Italian troops to Khowst, however, remains uncertain, primarily because Italian forces are already stretched thin on other overseas missions (Iraq, Balkans). We will continue to press on all three fronts. ¶9. (S) Comment continued. PM Berlusconi has loyally supported US policy in Iraq despite deep reservations in Italian public opinion, so the requests of his diplomatic advisors for more official recognition, and more policy and commercial participation in Iraq,s reconstruction, make sense. We recommend that Washington and the CPA explore opportunities to address these concerns, and will work closely with them in this process. SEMBLER NNNN 2003ROME05008 - Classification: SECRET