REQUEST FOR ITALIAN TROOP EXTENSIONS AND

S E C R E T ROME 004932

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR, EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, PM, SA, NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2013
TAGS: MOPS MASS PREL AF IZ IT IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ITALIAN TROOP EXTENSIONS AND
CONTRIBUTIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. STATE 303817

B. ROME 4678

Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.5(B),(D)


1. (S) Summary. As instructed, the Ambassador met with MOD
Martino to request new Italian troop commitments in three
areas: renewal of Italy,s deployment to Iraq beyond 2003; a
new deployment of 1,000 Italian troops to Afghanistan in
March 2004; and the standing up of an Italian PRT in Ghazni.
Martino expects extension of Italian military forces in Iraq
to garner relatively easy political approval, especially in
light of the recent UNSC resolution. He said return of
Italian forces to Afghanistan is somewhat more difficult,
given their recent deployment there and the fact that Italy
is effectively maxed out on the number of troops it can
sustain on overseas missions. That said, Martino undertook
to task his CHOD with reviewing possibilities, adding that an
April start might be more realistic than March. Martino was
less enthusiastic about PRTs, expressing concern that
security needs in the Ghazni area might require a more robust
number, but agreed to study our request. End summary.


2. (S) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol-Mil
Counselor, met with Defense Minister Antonio Martino on
October 29 to raise Ref A points requesting Italian troop
extension in Iraq, return of an Italian OIF contingent to
Khowst, and the creation of an Italian PRT in Ghazni.
Martino was joined by Diplomatic Advisor Francesco Trupiano.
The Ambassador opened with praise for Italy,s work alongside
the UK in Iraq. Noting that the British Embassy in Rome had
advised us that -- in today,s meeting in London -- PM Blair
would ask PM Berlusconi to extend Italy,s troop commitment
beyond 2003, the Ambassador said the US strongly urges such
an extension.


3. (S) Martino was receptive. He said that this request
would require a political decision. However, with the recent
UN Security Council resolution, he expected few problems
garnering parliamentary approval of such an extension. (NB:
Martino was not specific about the length of time Italy might
remain in Iraq, but took on board our request that Italy
extend its deployment in Iraq "well into 2004".)


4. (S) The Ambassador also urged Italy to deploy OEF troops
in March 2004 to the Khowst area, where an Italian battalion
had served so ably until its departure in September 2003.
Martino agreed that his forces had performed well, adding
that this had been a particularly dangerous mission because
of its location. He said that this request involved
logistical and planning issues, so he would ask the CHOD to
review Italy,s capacity to respond favorably. An April
start might prove more feasible than March.


5. (S) Martino was less enthusiastic about the PRT request,
saying he feared that a considerable commitment of personnel
might be required; his staff had advised that 300 troops
would be required to provide the necessary security. The
Ambassador reinforced a message we had already passed to MOD
and MFA officials: it was our experience that only a
combined civ-mil force of 60-90 was necessary and, while the
Germans had reportedly poured hundreds into their PRT, we
believed a smaller footprint was sufficient. Martino added
with amusement that he also understood the Germans had
cherry-picked, selecting an area of Afghanistan that posed
relatively few security challenges. Ghazni, however, was
different. Italy might even find it necessary to field a far
more robust number, if it were to stand up a PRT, in order to
meet security needs. It is, he added, unclear whether Italy
has those resources. We noted that the UK has offered to
share with Italy its lessons learned on PRTs, and that this
would also address the numbers of personnel required.
Martino agreed to study the matter.


6. (S) Comment. Martino is the key official for garnering
new Italian military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. He
correctly notes that the recent UNSC resolution is likely to
pave the way for relatively broad parliamentary support of
extension in Iraq. (One center-left leader has already
signaled his receptivity to an extension.) Afghanistan is a
harder case. Martino was always concerned about the dangers
Italian troops faced there -- Italy,s first major combat
deployment since WWII -- and expressed relief when the troops
returned home without serious casualties. His decision to
engage the CHOD will give Martino cover, and time, to
reflect, but we have no doubt that, whatever the CHOD,s
advice, the decision will be Martino,s. We view Martino,s
focus on a possible April start (vice March) as a positive
signal that he is favorably disposed to a renewed deployment
at some point in 2004. Martino,s concerns about security in
Afghanistan likewise color his views of PRTs. We will follow
up with MOD and other officials to push all three requests.
As of day one, however, we are off to a good start.
SEMBLER


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2003ROME04932 - Classification: SECRET