ITALY: FACTORS AFFECTING BASING OF U.S. MILITARY

S E C R E T ROME 004736

SIPDIS


NOFORN

STATE FOR EUR, EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, PM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2023
TAGS: PREL MOPS IT FORCES IN ITALY
SUBJECT: ITALY: FACTORS AFFECTING BASING OF U.S. MILITARY
FORCES


Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon, 1.5 B and D.


Summary



1. (S/NF) US military forces in Italy, which are present
under NATO auspices and operate on Italian (not US) bases,
are generally welcome, and we expect that situation to
continue. In return for basing access, Italy expects a
spirit of partnership, timely consultation, and full respect
for Italian sovereignty. In general, US operations under
NATO or UN auspices gain swift political approval; requests
for unilateral US operations from Italian bases are more
complex, and could be denied depending upon the Italian
political context. Changes in US basing posture in Italy are
generally acceptable, if founded on sound military and/or
economic principles, balanced, and consistent with the NATO
umbrella under which our forces operate in Italy. Issues
related to specific locations of US forces can be more
difficult and subject to extensive discussion, although we
generally get to yes. The Berlusconi government offers a
unique opportunity to finalize basing agreements (TAs) under
the 1995 Shell Agreement; it is in USG interest to nail these
down without further delay. End summary.


US Forces are welcome in Italy...



2. (S/NF) The US has a long and positive history of basing
military forces in Italy, and this situation is accepted as
normal by most Italians. Approximately 15,000 US soldiers,
sailors, airmen and Marines are stationed in Italy at eight
major installations. There are, however, no US bases per se
in Italy; all US forces are present under NATO auspices on
Italian repeat Italian bases. US military forces are
generally &good guests8, maintaining high professional
standards and hewing to environmental, safety, and other
standards that often surpass those required locally. While
much attention today is focused on our excellent bilateral
relations with PM Berlusconi,s center-right government, its
center-left predecessors were also generally receptive to the
presence of US forces in Italy. This long history has paid
dividends: Italian communities often feel a vested interest
in &their8 local bases, and the US and Italian militaries
generally work together closely at these facilities.


... in return for consultation, partnership, and respect for
sovereignty



3. (S/NF) In the period after the Cold War, Italy has sought
a more mature relationship with the US, stressing partnership
and early consultation on issues of mutual concern. This is
especially true on matters related to the presence and
activities of US military forces in Italy. The 1998 Cavalese
tragedy, in which 20 persons died when a US military aircraft
severed a ski gondola cable, brought these concerns to the
fore, and they have never been far from the surface in
subsequent years. One of the reasons for this vigilance is
the fact that Italian military and civilian officials can be
(and have been) held both civilly and criminally liable for
lapses or misjudgments that involve US forces and occur
during the course of those officials, duties. The bottom
line is that Italian authorities now inquire with far greater
frequency and specificity about US military activities in
Italy, expect to be briefed fully and, failing that, are not
beyond denying the US permission to operate.

NATO Operations v. Unilateral Operations



4. (S/NF) Since US forces in Italy are present under NATO
auspices, Italian governments are quick to provide full
support for Alliance operations, even when public and
political support for a specific operation (e.g., Kosovo)
might be weak. The same is generally true for missions
carried out pursuant to UN authorization, and would likely be
the same for a Berlin Plus operation involving NATO support
for an EU lead. When a proposed operation involving Italian
territory lacks a multilateral imprimatur, Italy,s response
will generally be based on an ad hoc set of factors,
according to political exigencies and the government of the
day. The deployment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade to
northern Iraq during OIF was politically complicated for this
reason. Although Berlusconi,s government was as good as its
word and facilitated the deployment, the decision was
politically difficult, and a center-left government might
well have come out the other way.


5. (S/NF) US planners should carefully consider the likely
missions of US military personnel -- and likely stances of
Italian officials -- before making final decisions to seek
basing for them in Italy. For example, proposed basing of
U-2 aircraft in Sicily for operations in the Middle East led
to extensive (albeit ultimately successful) negotiations,
even though the U-2 operations were flown in support of the
Camp David accords. Special operations forces in Italy could
pose particularly difficult issues because of their need to
meet unilateral requirements rapidly. When the possibility
of basing SOF was raised with Italy over a decade ago, its
reaction was cool. If SOF were based in Italy, their ability
to operate freely would not, in our view, be guaranteed.


Basing changes are acceptable, in general...



6. (S/NF) Italian political and military leaders have a
sophisticated understanding of the US, and generally endorse
steps to make our military forces more efficient and better
positioned. They accepted limited NATO restructuring, even
when it "cost" Italy (i.e., AirSouth). Likewise, they will
grumble little at the macro level about repositioning of US
forces presently in Italy, so long as such changes make
military and economic sense and there is no perception of
Italy -- whose government supported OEF and OIF in the face
of strong opposition from the center-left and public opinion
-- being singled out for adverse treatment.


.. but scrutinized for local impact



7. (S/NF) Since all politics ) including Italian politics )
is local, the views of both local communities and national
authorities are important in considering specific basing
changes. Generally speaking, Italy favors basing US forces
south and east, for both political and economic reasons.
Most importantly, Italy,s political and military leaders
expect us to consult with ) and listen to ) them on
proposed basing changes.


8. (S/NF) In 2000, the Italian government was initially cool
to our proposal to augment SETAF (Vicenza) with additional
troops, pointing out that the Veneto area has high population
density, low unemployment, and a highly stressed


infrastructure, and that a &better8 alternative (Camp
Darby) existed. In the end, we gained approval only when we
promised not to exceed previously-agreed personnel numbers
and to seek no expansion of existing facilities (i.e., build
up and not out). Improvements to the sub tending operation
at Santo Stefano/La Maddalena offer an equally challenging
set of issues, since it is located in a marine nature
preserve and uses over two dozen sites. Closure of Gaeta,
currently home port for the Sixth Fleet flagship, while
locally significant, might cause relatively few ripples on
the national level.


9. (S/NF) Italy's insistence on timely consultation is not
new. US requests in the late 80's to relocate the 401st
Tactical Fighter Wing from Torrejon AFB to a specific site in
Italy met with resistance; Italy insisted that we first
conduct site surveys on three other locations. Examples
abound, but the rule is simple: consult early and often with
local and national authorities about proposed changes in
basing footprints and, when possible, take on board their
concerns.


Berlusconi's government: a unique opportunity to lock in
basing agreements



10. (S/NF) The 1995 Shell Agreement provides for the
establishment of technical agreements (TAs) for each base
with US forces. After almost two years of negotiations, no
TAs under the Shell have been finalized, even though the
bilateral Joint Military Commission continues to work
intensively on the issue. Most issues are resolved, but one
sticking point involves differing views by US military
services on legal and financial issues. Embassy Rome is
agnostic on how these differences are resolved, but urges in
strongest terms that they be resolved as soon as possible.
As noted earlier, the Berlusconi government provides an
unprecedented opportunity to work with the Italians. We do
not foresee any successor government offering more favorable
terms for TAs. Given that elections will be held in Spring
2006, or possibly earlier, we need to accelerate progress on
all TAs, including the Sigonella TA, if we want to secure the
best possible terms for the US military. We recommend that
the USG lock in these provisions without further delay.
Failure to do so could erode our operational capabilities in
Italy.
SEMBLER


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2003ROME04736 - Classification: SECRET