GOI THINKS SOME KIND OF RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001345

SIPDIS

FOR SA/PAB, EUR/WE, DRL/MLA, IO, IO/ESA
GENEVA FOR CHRIS CAMPONOVO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2008
TAGS: PHUM IT IT AF AFPHUM AFGHANISTAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: GOI THINKS SOME KIND OF RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN
IS INEVITABLE

REF: A. STATE 80103


B. ROME 1168

CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
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1. (C) SUMMARY: WE DELIVERED REFTEL POINTS TO BOTH AFGHAN
AND HUMAN RIGHTS COUNTERPARTS IN THE MFA, AND BOTH SAID THE
GOI DID NOT SEE HOW A UNCHR DOCUMENT COULD BE AVOIDED.
VARIOUS EU MEMBER STATES WERE ADAMANT THAT A RESOLUTION (EVEN
STRONGER THAN THAT ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY ITALY) WAS
NECESSARY; A DOCUMENT WAS NEEDED TO PROVIDE THE LEGAL BASIS
FOR UN EXPENDITURES AND ASSISTANCE TO THE TISA; AND "PUBLIC
OPINION" WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE LACK OF A RESOLUTION ON A
COUNTRY WHERE MANY PROBLEMS REMAINED, DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL
PROGRESS. THAT SAID, THE GOI IS WILLING TO WORK WITH US ON
VIRTUALLY ANY LANGUAGE, UNDERSTANDS THAT THE END RESULT MUST
BE "MUCH SOFTER," AND WOULD ACCEPT EITHER A RESOLUTION UNDER
ITEM 19 OR A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT WITH EASE. EMBOFFS
IMPRESSED ON OUR INTERLOCUTORS THAT WASHINGTON DID NOT THINK
ANY KIND OF RESOLUTION OR STATEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE
KARZAI GOVERNMENT OR GIVE CREDIT TO THE PROGRESS WE HAD
JOINTLY MADE IN AFGHANISTAN THUS FAR. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) LABOR COUNSELOR AND POLOFF DELIVERED REFTEL POINTS
TO CONS. GIUSEPPE CALVETTA, MFA HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE DIRECTOR,
AND TO MIN. ENRICO DE MAIO, MFA SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR
AFGHANISTAN, IN SEPARATE MEETINGS ON MARCH 28. WE ALSO LEFT
THE POINTS WITH MIN. ALESSANDRO DI FRANCO, CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
UNDER SECRETARY FOR ASIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS MARGHERITA BONIVER.
(WE HAD HELD EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS WITH ALL THREE BETWEEN
RECEIPT OF THE ORIGINAL GOI DRAFT UNCHR RESOLUTION ON
AFGHANISTAN (REF B) AND RECEIPT OF REF A.) DE MAIO EXPRESSED
UNDERSTANDING FOR WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO THE DRAFT TEXT,
WHICH HE INDIRECTLY ACKNOWLEDGED DID NOT REFLECT ADVANCES
MADE BY THE KARZAI GOVERNMENT, BUT BOTH HE AND CALVETTA SAID
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IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO WITHDRAW THE RESOLUTION
AT THIS POINT. EMBOFFS STRESSED THAT WASHINGTON WAS NOT
PREPARED TO ACCEPT A RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN AND BELIEVED
STRONGLY THAT ANY RESOLUTION WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND
RISKED DAMAGING THE TRANSITIONAL ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHANISTAN.


3. (C) THE GOI HAD THREE REASONS IT BELIEVED WITHDRAWING
THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT FEASIBLE. FIRST, OUR COUNTERPARTS
SUGGESTED, WITHOUT ANY KIND OF TEXT, THE UN WOULD NOT BE IN A
POSITION TO OFFER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OR EXPEND RESOURCES TO
CONTINUE ASSISTING AFGHANISTAN IN IMPROVING ITS HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION. (NOTE: WE WERE NOT ABLE TO ADDRESS THIS POINT
EFFECTIVELY, BUT BOTH CALVETTA AND DE MAIO HAVE SERVED IN
GENEVA AND WERE CONVINCED THIS WAS TRUE.) SOME KIND OF
RESOLUTION, CALVETTA EMPHASIZED, PROVIDED THE "LEGAL BASIS"
FOR UN INTERVENTION AND ASSISTANCE.


4. (C) SECOND, MANY IN THE EU (BOTH MEN SUGGESTED IN
PARTICULAR THE NORDIC COUNTRIES) INSISTED ON A RESOLUTION,
AND INDEED WANTED ONE MORE STRONGLY-WORDED THAN THE ORIGINAL
GOI DRAFT AND UNDER ITEM 9 IN THE CHR. CALVETTA SUGGESTED
THE GOI HAD TAKEN THE PEN IN PART TO ENSURE THE LANGUAGE
WOULD NOT BE MADE WORSE. GIVEN INTERNAL EU DYNAMICS, THE GOI
WAS CONVINCED THE IDEA OF "MAKING THE RESOLUTION DISAPPEAR"
WAS A NON-STARTER. TO BOLSTER THE POINT, CALVETTA SHARED THE
TEXT OF AN ITALIAN PAPER INTENDED FOR EU PARTNERS, ARGUING ON
BEHALF A SOFTER RESOLUTION. (TEXT OF PAPER AT PARA 9.)


5. (C) THE THIRD (COMMENT: AND WEAKEST) ITALIAN POINT WAS
THAT "PUBLIC OPINION" DEMANDED SOME KIND OF RESOLUTION, IN
LIGHT OF ONGOING PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN. FULLY RECOGNIZING
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THAT THE TISA WAS NOT THE PERPETRATOR OF THE ABUSES, CALVETTA
SAID NONETHELESS EUROPEAN PUBLICS, AT LEAST, "WOULD NOT
UNDERSTAND" HAVING NO RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN. (NOTE: HE
MAY HAVE BEEN REFERRING AS WELL TO EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
NGOS.)


6. (C) BOTH CALVETTA AND DE MAIO URGED THE U.S. TO WORK
WITH THE GOI IN GENEVA TO IMPROVE THE LANGUAGE. (CALVETTA
WILL ARRIVE IN GENEVA ON MARCH 29 FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL DAYS.)
CALVETTA SAID THE GOI WAS VERY FLEXIBLE ON WORDING AND
FORMAT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DOCUMENT SHOULD BE MUCH SHORTER
AND "SOFTER." THE GOI WANTED A DOCUMENT THAT COULD BE
ADOPTED AT CONSENSUS, INCLUDING BY THE AFGHAN DELEGATION,
WHICH, HE SAID, RECEIVED A DRAFT THE MORNING OF MARCH 28.
THE GOI COULD ACCEPT EITHER AN ITEM 19 RESOLUTION OR A
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT. THE THREE DELEGATIONS COULD WORK
TOGETHER TO ENSURE NOTHING IN THE RESOLUTION WAS OFFENSIVE.
THE GOI WAS FLEXIBLE AS WELL ON THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND WOULD
ASSIST US WITHIN THE EU IN KEEPING THIS PROVISION OUT, IF THE
U.S. SAW IT AS A PROBLEM. CALVETTA REITERATED THAT THE GOI
COULD WORK OUT ESSENTIALLY ANY LANGUAGE -- BUT A RESOLUTION
OF SOME SORT WAS VIRTUALLY INEVITABLE, IN HIS OPINION.
CALVETTA STRONGLY URGED THE U.S. NOT TO DEMAND A VOTE ON THE

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ACTION SA-00

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00
EB-00 EUR-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00
NEA-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OPIC-01 PA-00 PRS-00
P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00
PRM-00 DRL-01 G-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /005W
-------------- 4C7F3C 281651Z /38
O 281651Z MAR 03
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9018
INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001345

SIPDIS

FOR SA/PAB, EUR/WE, DRL/MLA, IO, IO/ESA
GENEVA FOR CHRIS CAMPONOVO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2008
TAGS: PHUM IT IT AF AFPHUM AFGHANISTAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: GOI THINKS SOME KIND OF RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN
IS INEVITABLE

RESOLUTION, BUT TO WORK WITH ITALY IN KEEPING THE DOCUMENT A
CONSENSUAL ONE, EVEN IF THE U.S. HAD TO ISSUE A STATEMENT TO
CLARIFY ITS RESERVATIONS.


7. (C) DURING THESE AND PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS, OUR MFA
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INTERLOCUTORS (INCLUDING DI FRANCO OF U/S BONIVER'S OFFICE)
REPEATEDLY UNDERSCORED THAT BY MOVING THE RESOLUTION TO ITEM
19, WE WERE ENSURING THAT AFGHANISTAN, UNLIKE BURMA, CUBA OR
OTHER "BAD" COUNTRIES, WAS NO LONGER ON THAT LIST. IT HAD
"GRADUATED." THEY ALSO SAID THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD
A GOOD STORY TO CONVEY ABOUT AFGHANISTAN'S SUCCESS AND COULD
USE THE REVISED TEXT OF A RESOLUTION AS THE BASIS FOR PUTTING
THAT MESSAGE BEFORE THE WORLD.


8. (C) COMMENT: USMISSION GENEVA WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO
EVALUATE THE POINTS RAISED BY THE ITALIANS, BUT OUR
INTERLOCUTORS WERE CONVINCED OF BOTH THE "LEGAL" NEED FOR A
RESOLUTION TO ENABLE UN EXPENDITURES AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
WITHDRAWING THE RESOLUTION AT THIS POINT, DUE TO PRESSURE
FROM OTHER DELEGATIONS. WE JUDGE THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE
TO CONVINCE ITALY AT THE WORKING LEVEL TO WITHDRAW A
RESOLUTION COMPLETELY. IF WASHINGTON REMAINS CONVINCED
WITHDRAWAL IS THE ONLY OPTION, HIGHER-LEVEL INTERVENTION WILL
BE REQUIRED.


9. (C) BEGIN TEXT OF INTERNAL MFA PAPER (AS PROVIDED IN
ENGLISH BY THE MFA). PLEASE PROTECT.

THE NEW TEXT INCORPORATES MOQ OF THE SUGGESTIONS AND
COMMENTS MADE BY PARTNERS. IN PARTICULAR IT MAKES REFERENCE
TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
(OP. 40 PARA 1). THE WORDING IS THE ONE SUGGESTED BY UK AND
TAKEN FROM THE RECOMMENDATION MADE BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
ON EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLINGS. ITALY IS NOT AGAINST IN
PRINCIPLE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION AND SHARES
THE VIEW THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD ENCOURAGE
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THE AFGHAN AUTHORITIES TO HANDLE THE PAST ATROCITIES. BUT
HAVING CONSIDERED THAT THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY IS STILL UNDER EVALUATION BY THE UNCHR
THAT THE DRAFT CHAIRPERSON'S STATEMENT ALREADY CONTAINS A
NUMBER OF SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO THE NEED FOR INVESTIGATING
CRIMES OF THE PAST AND COMBATING IMPUNITY, AND THAT BOTH
BRAHIMI AND KARZAI HAVE SHOWN A CAUTIOUS APPROACH ON THE
ISSUE IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT DELICATE POLITICAL CONTEXT,
ITALY SUGGESTS TO KEEP A FLEXIBLE APPROACH AND CONSIDERS THE
POSSIBILITY OF DROPPING SUCH A REFERENCE IN THE COURSE OF
FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS OF THE TEXT WITH THIRD COUNTRIES.

THE NOMINATION OF AN INDEPENDENT EXPERT (OP. 40 PARA C) TO
REPLACE THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR IS A TECHNICAL RESULT OF THE
DECISION TO PRESENT THE CHAIRPERSON'S STATEMENT UNDER ITEM 19
OF THE CHR AGENDA. AS IN THE CASE OF SOMALIA HE IS ENTRUSTED
WITH PERIODICALLY REPORTING TO THE COMMISSION ON THE
SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

ITALY BELIEVES THAT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THE INTERNAL
SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN FULLY JUSTIFY THE DECISION TO TABLE
THIS TEXT UNDER ITEM 19 OF THE AGENDA. THE TRANSITIONAL
AUTHORITY HAS GIVEN CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO
CO-OPERATE IN AN EFFECTIVE WAY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND WE NEED TO FOCUS
ON HOW TO STRENGTHEN ITS CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH THESE TOPICS
AND SUPPORT ITS EFFORTS IN THE FIELD. A COMMUNICATION TO THE
PLENARY IN THIS RESPECT WILL BE ISSUED BY THE ITALIAN
DELEGATION JUST AFTER THE PRESENTATION OF THE REPORT BY THE
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR.
SEMBLER
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2003ROME01345 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL