JAPANESE AMBASSADOR URGES DEPUTIES TO ADDRESS BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000993 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV JA BM SUBJECT: JAPANESE AMBASSADOR URGES DEPUTIES TO ADDRESS BURMA REF: A. STATE 236768 ¶B. TOKYO 5714 Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.5(D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Japanese Ambassador to Burma says that he will urge his Deputy Foreign Minister to address next steps in Burma during a September meeting with Deputy Secretary Armitage. He advocates that the U.S. and Japan SIPDIS quietly collaborate in developing a package of carrots and sticks to entice and prod the SPDC toward political reform. The Ambassador, known for his pro-engagement stance, does not appear to be in sync with Tokyo's evolving Burma policy. End summary. ¶2. (C) On August 14, the Japanese Ambassador to Burma, Yuji Miyamoto met with the COM to discuss views on next steps in Burma. Miyamoto said that Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Takeuchi would meet with Deputy Secretary Armitage in Washington on September 5 and he, the Ambassador, was hopeful that the two senior officials would discuss developments in Burma (note: the Japanese here do not appear to be aware of SE Asia Division Director Yamanouchi's tentatively scheduled meeting with EAP DAS Daley on September 3, per reftel A). ¶3. (C) Ambassador Miyamoto said that he would propose to his headquarters that Tokyo and Washington talk in secret to "form a grand design" for supervising constructive change in Burma. He would urge that a package of "carrots" be developed to balance existing sticks (sanctions, suspended assistance, etc.) aimed at Burma's military regime. Miyamoto said he was frustrated with the lack of progress in Rangoon and offered his view that U.N. special envoy Razali needed to be in a position to offer more to the SPDC in exchange for a return to dialogue and transition to democracy. ¶4. (C) Miyamoto said that the GOJ supported the Thai roadmap in principle, but that ownership of the plan had to shift to Razali and/or ASEAN because the Burmese would never trust the Thais or accept the possibility that Thailand could one day claim responsibility for democratizing Burma. He criticized Thai politicians for pandering to their own constituencies and using public venues, rather than discrete diplomacy, to advance the roadmap. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Miyamoto affirmed that Japan would not undertake new assistance programs in Burma, nor would it renew programs that expire or run their natural course. He noted, however, that he had yet to receive an official directive from Tokyo on GOJ assistance policy and added that Deputy Foreign Minister Takeuchi, a hardliner on Burma policy, might be "shuffled" away from his current portfolio following party elections in late September. ¶6. (C) Miyamoto said that he meets regularly with SPDC ministers, and generally writes SPDC Secretary One General Khin Nyunt every two or three weeks. He said his consistent message to the Burmese was that Burma-Japan relations had entered a new, and unwelcome, phase following the May 30 attack against Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and her NLD convoy. The generals must endeavor to restore the dialogue process, he tells the GOB, and they should also avoid the trap of counting on India and China for moral and financial support. ¶7. (C) Miyamoto concluded with his view that, despite rumors to the contrary, the SPDC would not release ASSK before the ASEAN summit in October. He said that the generals would not risk being viewed domestically as responsive to international pressure. Furthermore, he added, the SPDC would only release ASSK in the short term if she made political concessions, which Miyamoto quickly acknowledged the opposition leader would never do. ¶8. (C) Comment: Ambassador Miyamoto, prior to May 30, was well known for his articulate defense of unconditional engagement with the SPDC as a means of effecting political change in Burma. He has changed his tune in the aftermath of the premeditated attack, but does not yet appear to have caught up with Tokyo's view that the first priority is to seek the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. The COM told Miyamoto that we have not seen the Thai roadmap, nor endorsed the concept, but agreed that such an approach must be multilateral and not bilateral. Martinez