MANDALAY OUTREACH CENTER: NOW MORE THAN EVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 RANGOON 000890 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2013 TAGS: KPAO PREL ABLD ASEC BM SUBJECT: MANDALAY OUTREACH CENTER: NOW MORE THAN EVER REF: A) RANGOON 00183 B) 02 RANGOON 1493 C) 02 RANGOON 1624 D) WEGMANN-GLAZEROFF E-MAIL 2/12/03 Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5 (D) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See para 2. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: In order to expand its democracy training and outreach, Embassy proposes to establish an American Center Teaching Annex in Mandalay (see reftels),Burma's second largest city and its geographic and cultural center. The American Center Teaching Annex would enable post to include significantly larger numbers of those supporting political change in these regions in public diplomacy outreach programs fostering democracy and civil society, a core MPP goal. The most recent GOB crackdown on opposition parties throws into stark relief the need and utility of another outreach channel to those organizations and individuals. An OIG team visiting post in February applauded post,s plans to expand outreach beyond the capital. Among its draft key judgments: "The (Public Diplomacy) section continues to make significant strides in its outreach efforts and conducts a highly successful educational program in Rangoon." The OIG recommended that Post provide for the Department an analysis of alternatives for establishing an outreach center in Mandalay. Post herein offers an assessment of three possible options for the establishment of the Mandalay outreach center: A) Opening an American Center Teaching Annex in USG-owned property: Utilize former Mandalay Consulate property for the Center and begin the program with four FSNs and two AmCit grantees; B) Leasing the USG property to an Educational NGO to perform outreach programs under a grant agreement: Have an American educational NGO provide program activities similar to Public Diplomacy programs at the USG-owned property; and C) Opening an American Center Teaching Annex as a Tenant in Commercial Space: Rent commercial space in Mandalay, sell the USG-owned property, and begin the program with four FSNs and two AmCit grantees. Funding would need to come from a variety of sources, but could include ESF from the "Burma Earmark" for democracy programs. In making this assessment, site visits to Mandalay were conducted by the COM, DCM, PAO, GSO, and RSO, as well as by two DS Regional Security Engineers, an OBO architect, and the OIG team. ACTION REQUEST: that the Department review the options and select which, if any, it deems most appropriate and name a point of contact to work with Post to implement the proposal. End Summary. THE NEED FOR AN AMERICAN CENTER TEACHING ANNEX, MANDALAY ¶3. (SBU) Even before the May 30 ambush on Aung San Suu Kyi's motorcade and the subsequent arrests of hundreds of democracy supporters, Burma was a country subject to Orwellian censorship and control by the military dictatorship. There is no free press, free speech, or right of assembly. The universities, historically a source of political activism, have been virtually dismantled by the regime. Graduating high school students must wait more than a year before space opens for them in a university "distance learning" program. Thus, at precisely the time they are making life decisions and are perhaps most open to influence, thousands of young adults are turning to the American Center in Rangoon each month to use the Library/Information Resource Center (IRC), attend films or lectures, or join English language classes. These English language classes have a high content of civil society training, such as critical thinking, expressing opinions and persuading others, mediating disputes and conflicts, etc. A number of the students in the English language classes are former political prisoners, or representatives of opposition political parties or minority ethnic groups, who have been granted tuition waivers for the classes. ¶4. (C) For the past year, through an ESF Burma Earmark grant, post has been providing governance training and English classes (eight hours a week) for seven to twelve opposition leaders. The program was begun at the request of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the participants are her hand-picked representatives -- predominantly MP's elected in 1990, but never seated -- her shadow Ministers and successors to the aging party leadership. Because of the importance of this program to ASSK, she asked that the training be continued for a second year. During the first year of the program, ASSK also sought to include party leaders and MP's from other provinces. A group of three Mandalay MP's moved to Rangoon for two six week sessions, but were unable to keep up with the main cohort because they could not be away for long from party responsibilities in Mandalay. Another group including a Shan, a Mon, and a Karen party member were able to come for just one session. A clear benefit to establishing a public diplomacy facility in Mandalay would be to extend activities like this high priority (but stealth) training program to NLD leadership in Mandalay and neighboring states and divisions. This is one reason ASSK herself has endorsed establishing an American Center Teaching Annex in Mandalay. ¶5. (C) The enthusiastic reception ASSK received in Mandalay and neighboring divisions, which led directly to the SPDC's dastardly May 30 ambush and crackdown on the National League for Democracy party leadership, demonstrates that there is a groundswell of popular support for political change in these regions. All offices of the NLD (the only place party members can legally assemble) have been closed. If the GOB experimentation with a longer leash for the opposition parties is indeed over, and the NLD's freedom of activity is curtailed, their ability to operate in the Mandalay region and beyond will be severely restrained. Post can best aid democratization efforts, and our core MPP goal of a return to democracy, by increasing the capacity (widening the pipeline) to deliver training and information about the outside world to these supporters of political change. ¶6. (SBU) The American Center Teaching Annex in Mandalay need not be an open-ended commitment. In the period before democracy returns to Burma, and in the transition period, it would be in a unique position to provide valuable training for civil society organizations, particularly the democratic opposition. Once democracy returns, the USG could investigate deeding the facility and its apparatus to a local institution as a democracy think tank or an American Studies Institute, as was done with many USIS libraries during the 1990's. OPTION A OPENING AN AMERICAN CENTER ANNEX IN USG-OWNED PROPERTY (FORMER MANDALAY CONSULATE) ¶7. (SBU) Reftel A provided post,s rationale for opening an American Center Annex at the former consulate building Mandalay. Reftels B and C, reported on the RSO,s security survey of the site and on probable costs associated with opening an American Center Annex there. ¶8. (SBU) To recap, under Option A, the Teaching Annex would be staffed by a combination of LES (4) in the Library/Information Resource Center, and English teachers/trainers (2) hired through a grant agreement, with supervision from the PAO in Rangoon. The former Consulate building offers approximately 3700 square feet well configured to function as a small American Center. It could include two teaching classrooms and a language/computer lab in the upstairs rooms, and a Library reading room, reference section, and office space in the downstairs rooms. An OBO architect, concluding a site visit in May, reported: "The property is in excellent condition and would be well-suited for use as an American Center," citing the building's excellent location, accessibility, and setback. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ¶9. (SBU) The RSO determined (see Ref B) that the building is &in good to excellent condition8 has &excellent setback and reasonably effective safe area/office complex.8 &Basic structures are fundamentally sound and could be made operational with appropriate upgrades and DS exceptions to specific standards.8 ¶10. (SBU) According to 12 FAH-6, H-020, Definition of Terms the Annex would be a Public Office Facility. ("Facility, which exists for public use or functions, such as libraries and cultural centers. It is located in a commercial or residential building not collocated with the chancery or consulate. No classified material is maintained. U.S. Government may or may not be sole occupant.") Thus it would be governed by the physical security standards for "Public Office Facilities" as provided by regulation 12 FAH-6, H-111.8, Physical Security (Public Office Facilities - Such as Libraries and Commercial Offices). ¶11. (SBU) The current property was acquired prior to 1991 and therefore falls in the category of an Existing Office Building, 12 FAH-5, H-111, Differentiation Between Existing and New Buildings; 12FAH-5, H-112, Existing Office Building (EOB). Thus, no waiver for collocation or setback is required, according to SECCA, 1999, A.1, 00 State 82682. ("A quick reference checklist for waiver requirements involving building collocation and setback follows: A. No waiver required: 1) Existing U.S. diplomatic facilities as of 29 November 1999....") ¶12. (SBU) If this option is chosen, RSO is ready to prepare a formal Site Survey and Security Upgrade Plan for the facility utilizing 12 FAH-5 and 12 FAH-6 as specific guidelines. These reports would provide DS the exact site layout, recommended security upgrades, and define those physical security standards that are not feasible as defined per regulation. This would satisfy the requirement of 12 FAH-5, H-121.2, Exceptions to Standards, and serve as the documentation to support a funding request for security upgrades, 12 FAH-5, H-121.1, Applicability. FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS ¶13. (SBU) Reftel C discussed post,s estimates of funding needs for this option. Post estimated approximately $200,000 in non-recurring expenses and about $95,000 in recurring costs, including salaries for locally engaged staff. English teachers/trainers would be recruited through a grant to an educational NGO, at additional cost. (A similar grant arrangement using Burma Earmark ESF is under consideration this fiscal year to assist the Rangoon American Center's English Teaching Program.) ¶14. (SBU) In Ref D, AID indicated to State Desk Officer its estimation, after consultation with its Legal office, that of the $295,000 post estimated would be needed for year one, most could be covered by ESF. (This may include costs for furnishings, computers and telecommunications, generator, electrical upgrade and maintenance costs, program materials, books, janitorial, grounds keeping, utilities, and fuel.) ¶15. (SBU) AID advised that non-project costs, such as raising the perimeter fence and providing security guards, could not be allocated to ESF. Funds for this, which post estimated at $45,000, will need to be found elsewhere. Some recurring costs such as LES salaries ($37,000) should come from PD allotment. PAO would request an increase in PD allotment from EAP/PD to meet this new cost. OPTION B: LEASING THE USG PROPERTY TO AN EDUCATIONAL NGO TO PERFORM OUTREACH PROGRAMS UNDER A GRANT AGREEMENT ¶16. (SBU) The USG property (former Consulate Building) could be leased to an international NGO active in Education programs to run programs similar to Public Diplomacy programs, but not under the direction of the country PAO. Funds from the Burma earmark, with appropriate notification to Congress, could be used in a multiyear grant to pay for most startup and recurring costs associated with the project. Security upgrades would not be required by law. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POST AND GRANTEE ¶17. (SBU) The grantee NGO would administer a program with aims similar to the country public diplomacy program, but would not be under the supervision of the country PAO. In accordance with grants policy, the PAO could function as a program officer to the grant, ensuring that the program is being run in good faith, but could not provide day-to-day direction. PAS Rangoon could cooperate on programs and could provide some materials and assistance to the grantee, as it does to other local organizations ¶18. (SBU) As part of the grant agreement, the USG could lease the former consulate building to the NGO for a nominal fee of $1 per year. The facility would not be a diplomatic installation, but may have a status equivalent to the British Council, which has quietly operated a small reading room in Mandalay for two years. Post hopes that the grantee would enjoy protection from GOB harassment because of its affiliation with a diplomatic entity. The NGO would have to register with the Government of Burma. ¶19. (SBU) The grantee could recruit and provide teacher/trainers for the English language programs, and could locally recruit a reference librarian and other clerical support staff. The grantee,s program could host speaker and cultural presentations from PAS Rangoon on a quarterly basis. The grantee could network with other civil society organizations in Mandalay and help the PAO to identify exchange participants from Mandalay and northern Burma. The grantee,s library staff could help disseminate PAS Rangoon,s publications and products. ¶20. (SBU) The grantee could not be expected to perform the policy advocacy role of a State Department public diplomacy program. ¶21. (C) In addition, without the diplomatic cover of the USG, it is unclear whether the grantee could effectively run the stealth governance program described in paragraph 4 above. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ¶22. (SBU) By leasing the property to the NGO, the USG is no longer obligated by regulation to bring the property up to security standards mandated for USG diplomatic installations. However, because the site has strong association with the United States, and because American citizens may be among the grantee,s staff, the place may run some risks of being a target of terrorism, as do many American NGO's around the world. The Department will have to decide whether it has a perceived obligation to provide the same security upgrades it would to an American Center. FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS ¶23. (SBU) By AID,s estimation, in consultation with its Legal office, costs for furnishings, computers and telecommunications, generator, electrical upgrade and maintenance costs, program materials, books, annual staffing costs, janitorial, grounds keeping, utilities, and fuel could be covered by ESF. Although most of the above will be provided by the grantee, it might be expedient for post (still using ESF) to provide procurement and importation of furniture, computers, and other aspects of the facilities upgrade. ¶24. (SBU) AID advises that non-project costs, such as raising the perimeter fence and providing security guards, could not be allocated to ESF. If these are deemed necessary, funds will need to be found. FINDING THE RIGHT GRANTEE ¶25. (SBU) In preliminary discussions, post has not found a grantee willing to take on such a novel arrangement. The representative of one large Educational NGO with extensive worldwide experience, already in grant relationships with both AID and State, has told PAO they would be willing to provide English teachers to a USG operated facility in Mandalay (as per Option A or C). But the representative said they would not be interested in taking on a challenge like Option B &on our own.8 The well-known difficulties of establishing a relationship with the GOB, together with the controversy inherent in teaching English with a democracy bent, apparently makes the risks outweigh the benefits for this organization. While there may be more zealous or less experienced organizations willing to take up the challenge, post would need to weigh the judiciousness of entering into a close programming association with them. OPTION C OPENING AN AMERICAN CENTER ANNEX AS A TENANT IN COMMERCIAL SPACE ¶26. (SBU) In May, GSO, PAO, and RSO, accompanied by regional Security Engineers, visited several commercial properties available for rent in Mandalay. GSO and PAO identified two as best meeting requirements for the proposed program in acceptable downtown mixed retail/residential areas. Available commercial space affords no setback from road or neighbors, and is often adjacent to open sewers or other eyesores. While rents are not high, there would be costs associated with security upgrades and other modifications. ¶27. (SBU) Property One is a new, four-story, reinforced concrete structure, currently configured as living space, sharing one half of the ground floor with a fast food retail shop. The ground floor hall has ample room to install a PAC. With some modifications, the upper three floors could be configured to serve as classrooms, office space, library reading room, and event space. Rent was quoted at $1,000/month for 5880 square feet. ¶28. (SBU) Property Two is a three-story space in a row of similar shops in a new, reinforced concrete structure. Most are not yet occupied but are designed for street-level retail, and mixed retail/residential above. The first floor could accommodate a PAC and office space, and the upper two floors could accommodate a 1500 square foot library reading room and two English teaching classrooms. Rent was quoted at $2000/month for 4536 square feet. There are many similar rental spaces available in this newly redeveloped quarter of Mandalay, which is a joint venture of the local government and some (Chinese) businessmen. ¶29. (SBU) In the interests of thoroughness, GSO and PAO also investigated commercial space in Mandalay,s centrally located hotels, but found nothing appropriate. The Sedona Hotel offered space configured as serviced apartments and space designed for their own administrative offices accessible only through a service stairway. Access and space configurations were problematic in both. The Mandalay Swan Hotel offered four adjoining shops spaces adjacent to the hotel with a very pleasant entrance off quiet 68 th street. The total space, under 1500 square feet, could accommodate the teaching classrooms but the associated library/information resource center program. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ¶30. (SBU) As with every commercial property examined, there is no setback from the street, or from neighboring buildings, which are as near as six inches away. Because of the high price of land in central Mandalay, new structures are built on their entire allowable footprint (and possibly beyond it). The facility would be governed by the physical security standards of 12 FAH-6, H-111.7 - Physical Security Tenant of Commercial Office Space. Collocation and setback waivers would have to be sought. FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS ¶31. (SBU) Startup and recurring costs and possible sources of funding would be similar to Option A, with the addition of annual rent of $12,000 to $24,000. Also, security upgrades will be at least as expensive as for Option A, and possibly higher. THREE OPTIONS: PRO'S AND CON'S WEIGHED ¶32. (SBU) Option A Pro,s and Con,s: Pro,s: -- The attractive USG-owned facility is in good to excellent repair, requiring little upgrading (other than security) and reconfiguration. -- On a large parcel of land, it has excellent setback and could be brought up to security standards with some outlay. -- USG-owned means no delay or harassment from local authorities, also no additional recurring costs from rent ($12,000 ) $24,000/year). -- American Center Teaching Annex (vs. grant agreement with NGO) means mission has control over all program content. -- Prime location for reaching target groups Con,s: -- Post will have large initial outlays for start-up and security upgrade (but not necessarily larger than with other options). ¶33. (SBU) Option B Pro,s and Con,s Pro's: -- No legal requirement for security upgrade. -- NGO programming would share most Country PD goals. -- More recurring costs, such as salaries, could be covered by ESF through the grant agreement. Con's: -- Mission would not have supervisory role or control over all program content. -- NGO could not play Policy Advocate role of PD. -- Without diplomatic or USG employee status, NGO, program, and participants may be subject to more harassment by GOB and local authorities. ¶34. (SBU) Option C Pro,s and Con,s Pro,s: -- The commercial space identified, though in some ways inferior to the USG owned property in Mandalay, could be made as serviceable. -- Locations are as good as the USG owned property. Con,s: -- Being a "tenant in commercial space" is meant to lower the facility's desirability as a terrorism target because it would entail too much collateral damage to other tenants. But crowded urban locations afford more chances for terrorists to hide. With no setback from neighbors or the street, these locations may be less secure than the USG owned property set apart on a large parcel of land. -- Post will have to spend the same amount of dollars, if not more, for necessary security upgrades on the rental properties as on USG-owned property. -- Post will have to secure a setback waiver and other waivers for the rental properties. -- With a rental property, post gives GOB and local authorities an entry point for harassment. The authorities may use threats or pressure on the landlord to cause delays or interference with services to the PD program. The landlord of the current American Center in Rangoon was jailed before the Center opened in 1991. And Mandalay authorities used threats to hotel employees to disrupt a PD cultural program in January 2003 (Rangoon 00134). Post may even spend funds on security upgrades only to find the landlord renege on the contract because of pressure from authorities. -- Implicit in this option is post's disposal of the USG property, i.e., sell it back to the despotic Burmese regime for what was paid for it (now worth $75),leading to a huge windfall for the Generals, and a public affairs embarrassment for the Department. ¶35. (U) Post POC for this project is PAO Mary Ellen Countryman, countrymanme@state.gov. Martinez