Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON647
2003-06-03 12:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

MFA BRIEFING ON NLD/GOVERNMENT CLASHES

Tags:  PGOV PINS PREL BM ASSK NLD 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000647 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
CDR USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL BM ASSK NLD
SUBJECT: MFA BRIEFING ON NLD/GOVERNMENT CLASHES

REF: A. RANGOON 640

B. RANGOON 639

C. RANGOON 636

D. RANGOON 635

E. RANGOON 634

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000647 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV CDR USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2013 TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL BM ASSK NLD SUBJECT: MFA BRIEFING ON NLD/GOVERNMENT CLASHES REF: A. RANGOON 640 ¶B. RANGOON 639 ¶C. RANGOON 636 ¶D. RANGOON 635 ¶E. RANGOON 634 Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win's briefing for diplomats on the recent deadly clash between NLD and government supporters in Depeyin satisfied no one. While he provided a faithful rehash of government press reporting on the incident, he would not say where Aung San Suu Kyi or other members of the NLD leadership are being held or why NLD offices in Rangoon had been closed. He could only assure diplomats that both measures were "temporary" and that neither Aung San Suu Kyi or any of the members of the NLD leadership had been charged with any crime. On Razali, he said it was up to the Special Envoy to decide whether he came to Burma June 6 as planned, but noted that he could not guarantee that Razali would see Aung San Suu Kyi, if he came. Razali may be willing to continue his mission on those terms, but we don't see the point. So long as she remains in detention and the NLD offices remain closed, Razali should stay away. In the meanwhile, we plan to send officers to Depeyin to see what we can determine regarding events there. It may be impossible to re-assemble any clear picture of events on May 31, but we believe it is essential to show our interest and concern. End Summary. The Government's Briefing ¶2. (U) At a briefing for diplomats on June 3, Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win provided a rehash of the government's side of the story regarding the recent riot in Depeyin. According to the Minister, the events in Depeyin were provoked by the youth wing of the NLD and militant Buddhist monks who had affiliated themselves with the NLD. He said that there had been a variety of incidents leading up to the riot on May 31. He asserted that a 21-year old girl had been run down in Shwebo and, in Indaw on May 26, NLD supporters had attacked villagers with "sticks, iron pipes and bicycle chains." In Depeyin on May 31, the NLD convoy, consisting of nine cars and about 40 motorcycles, were stopped by a crowd of 5,000 local people about 2 miles outside the town, he said. As the NLD tried to push its way through the crowd, fights broke which eventually left four dead and fifty &#x
000A;hospitalized. Initially, there were "no Burmese police or military forces" on the spot, according to the DepFonMin. Security forces from Mon Ywa only arrived about two hours after the altercation started. They secured the situation, took Aung San Suu Kyi and her party into "protective custody", and took count of the casualties. The government still has not identified all the dead, missing, or injured, but says categorically that neither Aung San Suu Kyi nor NLD Vice Chairman U Tin Oo were injured. The DepFonMin also denied that gunshots were fired during the course of the incident. ¶3. (U) On Aung San Suu Kyi, the Minister said that the government had been obliged to provide "temporary protection" for her and her party. Similarly, the NLD had been asked to "temporarily" close their offices throughout the country. The DepFonMin asserted that the government had "no animosity or hostility" towards Aung San Suu Kyi, and maintained that, for the government, the "greatest nightmare" is that some harm might come to her. However, some of the NLD youth had acted "very rashly," and there was "growing resentment" against the NLD in Burma. He also assured diplomats that the process of national reconciliation would continue and hoped "that the international community will understand the situation and not complicate it." Diplomats Reaction ¶4. (U) Diplomats reacted to brief with incredulity and tough questions that focused on Aung San Suu Kyi's health and circumstances, the situation of the NLD's Central Committee members, and the government's reasons for closing NLD offices throughout Burma. The DepFonMin would not say where Aung San Suu Kyi was being held, though he did say she was not in the notorious Insein prison. He also said that neither she nor any of the other leaders of the NLD would be charged with any crime. When pressed regarding access to ASSK and the other NLD detainees by the COM, the British Charge, and the French, German and Norwegian Ambassadors, however, he stated flatly that "for security reasons," it would not be possible for any diplomats to have access to either Aung San Suu Kyi or any of the other members of the NLD's leadership and gave no time frame for the "temporary" detention. His answer regarding the NLD's offices was much the same; the offices had been closed down as a "temporary measure for security reasons." On SE Razali's upcoming visit, the DepFonMin said that he had been in touch with the Special Envoy on both June 2 and June 3 but it was entirely up to Razali as to whether he came or not. However, he emphasized that at "his level" (the DepFonMin's) he could not assure Razali that he could meet with Aung San Suu Kyi. ¶5. (U) The DepFonMin also ruled out any international investigation of the incident. Burma, he said, was "very conscious of its independence" and would never allow foreigners to dictate to it. When the COM informed the DepFonMin that officers form the Embassy were traveling to Depeyin on June 4, he was taken off guard, but did not indicate that the area would be off limits to travel. ¶6. (U) The DepFonMin's answers satisfied no one. The COM was emphatic in stating that the GOB's credibility on this matter was gone, and that the diplomatic community could not be sure whether Aung San Suu Kyi and the other NLD members were alive or dead. Without access, no one could verify any part of the government's story. She also questioned the credibility of the government's account of the events in Depeyin and insisted that names of the dead should be released. The British noted that, in large measure, the GOB's own credibility and reputation was at stake - if we could not verify the government's statements, others would undoubtedly question them. The Italian Ambassador similarly expressed his concern and that of the EU regarding the situation and read a statement from the EU. Comment ¶7. (C) This was a deservedly brutal session for Khin Maung Win. His account convinced no one. In fact, his presentation left behind the impression that the government have stage-managed recent events in order to end the latest tentative political liberalization episode in Burma, and to scuttle the UN-sponsored dialogue process. It is hard otherwise to understand how Aung San Suu Kyi's party could have run into a mob of 5,000 anti-NLD agitators at night on a country road without any government security present. The government's actions since then in closing all NLD offices and holding all senior NLD leadership incommunicado also suggest that the government has a broader agenda than simply assuring internal security. Burmese government spokesmen will deny this, as the DepFonMin did in the briefing today, but the government's seeming indifference to the strong international reaction to the latest events, and to Razali's mission, suggests that neither political transition nor international opinion carries any weight with them at the moment. Internal security and keeping the junta's power intact comes first, even if that means political repression and international condemnation. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: For the United States and other countries which have focused their policy on the goal of a transition to democracy and increased respect for human rights and the rule of law, these latest developments are powerfully negative. The GOB may restore ASSK's liberty and may allow the NLD to re-open its offices, but there is little doubt that it will do so only on terms that make explicit that political liberty will always be subordinate to the internal security concerns of the regime in Burma. Razali may be willing to continue his mission on those terms, but we don't see the point, unless there is some clarification of the government's intention regarding the teatment and liberties of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. So long as she remains in detention and the NLD offices remain closed, Razali should stay away. End Comment. ¶9. (U) We are sending two officers and an FSN employee to Depeyin to see what we can determine on the ground regarding events there. It may be impossible to re-assemble any clear picture of events on May 31, but we believe it is essential to show our interest and concern. Martinez

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