UPDATE ON WWII REMAINS RECOVERY IN BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000029

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2013
TAGS: MOPS PREL BM
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON WWII REMAINS RECOVERY IN BURMA

Classified By: CHIEF OF MISSION CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.5 (D)


1. (SBU) Summary: The recovery of the remains of some 600
WWII missing personnel (mostly crews of aircraft that crashed
while flying "the hump" from India to China) is an important
USG priority in Burma. With fairly good cooperation from the
Government of Burma, the recovery operation is moving ahead
more or less on schedule. The limited availability of
helicopters this dry season is a major obstacle and has
probably reduced significantly the operation's chances of
dramatic success in the initial phases. There are many
policy and public diplomacy minefields that Post will try to
help the operation avoid while working in this sensitive
area. End Summary.


2. (SBU) PROGRESS TO DATE: Following the September 2002
framework agreement reached between visiting DASD Jennings
and S1 General Khin Nyunt, three Burmese officials traveled
to the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii
(CILHI) for a familiarization visit. A well-attended Joint
Planning Meeting held in Rangoon in October ironed out many
technical details of the operation. The U.S. side included
CILHI, DoD's Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office
(DPMO),and Embassy Rangoon -- both State and DAO. A health
and logistics advance team visited Burma in December to
establish medevac and other logistical procedures. The team
to scout out potential recovery sites, the Investigative
Element (IE),is scheduled to arrive in Rangoon January 12.


3. (SBU) THE IMPORTANCE OF HELICOPTERS: Most of the
probable crash sites are located in Kachin State in the far
north of Burma. Dense jungles, high mountains (up to 19,000
ft.),and poor roads make travel by land difficult.
Poisonous snakes, bandits, drug traffickers, thousands of
armed members of the Kachin Independence Army, and rugged
terrain make off-road travel in this area difficult.
Helicopter medevac capability would be important for any
sustained trek to a crash site by a recovery team. Normally
both the scouting team, the IE, and the actual recovery team
(the Recovery Element, RE) would use helicopters extensively.



4. (C) THE LACK OF HELICOPTERS: The Burmese air force has a
fleet of Soviet-era helicopters and a small number of
helicopters given by the USG to the GOB two decades ago for
drug eradication purposes. Given maintenance and repair
practices, the reliability of these aircraft is unknown.
Further, during the October technical talks the Burmese air
force's opening rental price was $16,000 per blade hour,
which they quickly dropped to $8,000/hr. after the loud,
unison guffaw from the U.S. side. This is still two to three
times the going commercial rate. Rather than be fleeced to
rent helicopters of uncertain reliability, the COM and DATT
strongly recommended that commercial helicopters be used to
augment GOB helicopters in the recovery efforts.
Unfortunately, it appears that the DoD-certified helicopter
lease companies in the region are booked up until mid to late
February. This means the January IE will be restricted to
land transport.


5. (C) LIMITATIONS OF A LAND-BASED IE: Locating and
excavating promising recovery sites is no mean feat.
Normally an IE would helicopter to a potential site
identified by a combination of aerial reconnaissance and
local human information. If the site looked promising to the
IE after its helicopter-borne visit, a landing zone would be
cut and larger helicopters would ferry in the RE to work the
site. If the January IE were restricted to Kachin State's
road network, a general impression of the topography of the
possible crash site would be about all an IE could glean in
the field. The IE also will interview inhabitants who claim
to know of crash sites. It seems likely that CILHI will need
to conduct further investigations in late February just prior
to the beginning of the recovery effort when commercial
helicopters are available. This compressed and restricted
scouting phase will make it more difficult, but not
impossible, to achieve a major recovery success this year.


6. (C) POLITICS, SENSITIVITIES, AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: Post
is keenly aware of the sensitivities of working (on any
issue) in Burma. The remains recovery operation in Kachin
State is a particularly complex, sensitive, and difficult
case.

-- The 1.2 million Kachin have a particular affinity for
Americans; over 10,000 fought alongside U.S. troops in WWII
and U.S. Baptist missionaries have converted many Kachin to
Christianity. A long-running Kachin separatist movement,
spearheaded by the 20,000-strong Kachin Independence Army,
has signed a cease-fire with Rangoon's military government
but retains its weapons and controls much of Kachin State.
As one observer bluntly put it, "Kachins like Americans but
distrust (ethnic) Burmese." The investigative and recovery
teams will likely pass back and forth between territory
controlled by Burmese soldiers and armed KIA members.
Interviewing Kachins who claim knowledge of crash sites in
front of ethnic Burmese members of Military Intelligence also
poses some challenges.

-- While S1 General Khin Nyunt, who heads Burma's military
intelligence, is the point man for the GOB on the recovery
efforts, it will be the regional military commander in Kachin
State (who doesn't report to Khin Nyunt) who controls the
military resources on the ground. Just as there appeared to
be a different approach on helicopter rental between MI and
the Burmese air force, we could possibly see independent
action in Kachin State not in keeping with the outline agreed
to with MI. However, the DATT held coordination discussions
27 DEC 02 with military commander Maung Aye and S1 Khin Nyunt
to help head off any such difficulties.

-- Post personnel are aware of standard procedures routinely
employed by MI in Burma. For example, MI apparently
attempted to dragoon an English-speaking local to translate
for the December logistics visit. A member of the DAO took
note, and asked that the man be released from his translating
duties, which he was. This same officer saw MI brusquely
interrogating a Kachin interlocutor just after his discussion
with the American. The officer approached his MI minders and
told them to stop harassing the man, which they did. Post,
DPMO, and CILHI have discussed in detail with the GOB the
serious negative ramifications of any forced labor or forced
contributions being used to support this project. The main
concern is that some local Burmese commander might not get
the word from on high.


7. (C) COMMENT: We are optimistic that the remains recovery
effort will be successful. It is important that the Embassy
- State and DAO - play an active leading role in the
operation to help avoid potential local pitfalls. Perhaps
the most promising sites (some of which are extremely remote)
can only be investigated and excavated next dry season, after
thorough analysis of local knowledge and a
helicopter-assisted IE. Nevertheless, the recovery of even a
few remains this year is important, both in itself and to
establish procedures for an ongoing recovery effort. End
Comment.
Martinez