RANGOON INCIDENTS/ANOMALIES

S E C R E T RANGOON 001519 SIPDIS DEPT FOR DS/IP/EAP, DS/ICI/CI E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2013 TAGS: ASEC PREL BM SUBJECT: RANGOON INCIDENTS/ANOMALIES Classified By: RONALD K. MCMULLEN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, REASON 1.5( C). ¶1. (U) The following are incidents of hostile intelligence service activity reported by Embassy officers in recent weeks. ¶2. (S/NF) On November 11 the Deputy Chief of Mission hosted an event at his residence for the official Amcit community. Military Intelligence (MI) officers questioned two drivers as they waited outside the DCR compound. According to one driver, MI used intimidation tactics and was more aggressive than in previous encounters. In particular, the MI officers asked about the purpose of the event, who was in attendance, the position and title of the attendees, residential addresses, and phone numbers. ¶3. (S/NF) On November 18 Post learned that MI officers were using a copy of an Embassy in-country travel itinerary to identify and question contacts visited on a domestic orientation trip. MI even questioned an individual listed on the itinerary with whom Emboffs did not meet. We do not know how, or if, MI officers obtained a copy of the actual itinerary or information contained in the itinerary. The document was created on the State Department unclassified email system and forwarded between various sections within the Embassy for revision. The document was also faxed over local telephone lines to Shan State in advance of the trip. It is also possible that MI pieced together the information from phone calls made from Post to Shan State. ¶4. (S/NF) Foreigners and diplomats are regularly surveilled in Burma. The Government of Burma (GOB) aggressively targets western events, hotels, meeting areas, popular restaurants and maintains a heightened state of paranoia. Intelligence collection is the regime's primary mechanism for maintaining internal control and monitoring political opposition. These activities occur throughout the country wherever foreigners are found. ¶5. (SBU) RSO Rangoon has repeatedly cautioned employees about operational security and the aggressive intelligence collection efforts of the GOB. RSO encourages employees to immediately report any incidents of surveillance, questioning, and photographing including harassment of dependents and domestic staff. RSO reviews the required contact reporting policies set forth in 12 FAM 262 with all newly assigned personnel. RSO does not feel that the above-mentioned incidents are the result of heightened hostile intelligence service activity, but are more likely indicative of the GOB's normal targeted efforts against the United States. Martinez