"COME BACK TO REALITY"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001433 SIPDIS USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2013 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL BM SUBJECT: "COME BACK TO REALITY" REF: A. RANGOON 1431 ¶B. RANGOON 1432 ¶C. BANGKOK 7280 Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Former ICRC Head and assistant to UN Special Envoy Razali, Leon de Reidmatten, briefed COM on his November 7 Bangkok meeting with Thai Foreign Minister Surakiat. De Reidmatten said that from the discussion that took place between SE Razali and FM Surakiat, it is clear the SPDC aim is to have an elected government in place by 2006, the year of the ASEAN summit in Rangoon. SE Razali's position is that sanctions don't work, engagement doesn't work, so now it is time for the UN to be more active by putting forward a "plan" similar to the SPDC road map. It is becoming ever more clear that the SPDC had an end state, and an end date, in mind when they announced the road map back in August - the end state is a sitting "elected" government, and the end date is the ASEAN Summit 2006. De Reidmatten expressed alarm at ASSK's continued isolation - coupled with the regime's increasing confidence in the aftermath of the Bali summit. Observations from both de Reidmatten and UNSR Pinheiro (Ref A) underscore the need for more pressure on the regime to include the opposition in the road map - pressure that must be exerted by ASEAN countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Malysia),India, China, and Japan, in conjunction with ongoing UN efforts. END SUMMARY. Special Envoy Razali meets with FM Surakiat ¶2. (C) Leon de Reidmatten, former ICRC Head of Delegation to Burma and currently the Assistant to UN Special Envoy Razali, told the COM that in the November 7 meeting with SE Razali and the Thai Foreign Minister, SE Razali was told that the Thais are concerned that Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD will be left out of the whole political process now unfolding in Burma. De Reidmatten said the Thais have discussed the Burmese roadmap with Khin Nyunt, but that the Thais are not very clear on "what the road map really means," that Than Shwe wants to pursue the road map without any detours, and that PM Khin Nyunt and General Maung Aye think it is important to include the opposition in the process, but "not at any cost." De Reidmatten said that from the discussion that took place between SE Razali and FM Surakiat, it is clear the SPDC aim is to have an elected government in place by 2006, the year of the ASEAN summit in Rangoon. De Reidmatten said that SE Razali's position is that sanctions don't work, engagement doesn't work, so now it is time for the UN to be more active by putting forward a "plan" similar to the SPDC road map. ¶3. (C) Reidmatten said that Thai DepPermSec Virasakdi Futakul told him during the meeting (and later at dinner on November 7) that at the December 10-11 ASEAN summit in Tokyo, PM Khin Nyunt will answer ASEAN's questions on the SPDC's road map and will explain the implementation plan. De Reidmatten said Futrakul thinks the SPDC will then relax their restrictions on the NLD and will release Aung San Suu Kyi from confinement. Pinheiro Visit to Rangoon ¶4. (C) De Reidmatten described Pinheiro's latest visit to Rangoon (Nov. 3-8) as a chance for the SPDC to test the waters and find out how much it can get away with by not improving human rights and keeping the NLD locked up and out of the political process. In de Reidmatten's opinion, the SPDC didn't give Pinheiro anything on this visit (refs A and B),and the SPDC is waiting for the world's reaction to Pinheiro's speech to the UN on November 12 to see if it can keep plowing straight ahead with their road map. De Reidmatten thinks the SPDC hasn't quite decided how to go about taking the next step in the road map, but it is definitely getting bolder about moving forward without the NLD. ASSK in Isolation ¶5. (C) Echoing SR Pinheiro's observations (see ref A) Reidmatten expressed great concern at how ASSK is being "isolated" and increasingly left out of the political process in Burma. Reidmatten commented that "the NLD has to come back to reality" and realize the SPDC is moving ahead without it. He was concerned, just like SR Pinheiro, that ASSK and the NLD "uncles" were being unrealistic in thinking that their refusal to accept the possibility of participating in a road map developed by the SPDC was a show of strength that would be supported by UNSC action. De Reidmatten pointed out to COM that in order to have an elected government in place in 2006, the SPDC will have to hold elections in 2005. That requires a referendum on the constitution in 2004. So there will have to be a constitutional convention in early 2004, probably January. De Reidmatten said he was so worried about the momentum the SPDC was gathering that he would try to convince ASSK to write a letter directly to Gen. Than Shwe stating that the NLD was willing, and should be allowed to participate in the road map. De Reidmatten said that unless ASSK and the NLD are more realistic re the need for participation in the political process NOW, he feared ASSK and the "uncles" would be released to face an new constitution and an elected government that excluded them completely. ¶6. C) COMMENT: It is becoming ever more clear that the SPDC had an end state, and an end date, in mind when they announced the road map back in August - the end state is a sitting "elected" government, and the end date is the ASEAN Summit 2006. Pinheiro and de Reidmatten's emphasis on ASSK and the NLD's increasing isolation, coupled with the regime's increasing confidence in the aftermath of the Bali summit, underscores the need for continuing pressure on the regime to include the opposition - pressure that must be exerted by ASEAN countries (Thailand, Indonesia) and India, China, and Japan in conjunction with ongoing UN efforts. Martinez