C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001375

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV; TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL;
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN ENCOURAGES RAZALI TO UNDERTAKE SECRET
SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY


Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: The Japanese Ambassador to Burma, Yuji
Miyamoto, is urging U.N. Special Envoy Razali to conduct his
dialogue efforts "in secret" and to replace his pro-ASSK
liaison officer in Rangoon, two points the Japanese believe
might lead the SPDC to be more cooperative. The Japanese
also want Razali to establish an office in Rangoon in support
of his efforts. Meanwhile, the Japanese Embassy in Rangoon
is keen to smooth feathers of SPDC generals who are miffed
over PM Koizumi's public criticism of Burma at the ASEAN Bali
Summit. End Summary.


2. (C) Japanese Embassy political counselor Ichiro Maruyama
told us on October 29 that his Ambassador, Yuji Miyamoto, had
departed on a brief mission to Kuala Lumpur to meet with U.N.
Special Envoy Razali. According to the political counselor,
Ambassador Miyamoto planned to encourage Razali to continue
his efforts aimed at achieving a political dialogue between
the SPDC and ASSK, but to conduct his dialogue efforts
"quietly, if not secretly." Maruyama said that the SPDC
trusted Razali, but would never respond positively to his
"arrogant" public diplomacy and high-profile visits.


3. (C) Counselor Maruyama also said his Ambassador would tell
Razali that the SPDC has lost total faith in Leon de
Riedmatten, the former ICRC chief who serves as Razali's
liaison in Rangoon. According to the Japanese Embassy, in
the aftermath of the May 30 attack the SPDC believes that de
Riedmatten is too close to ASSK and cannot represent the
neutrality required of a U.N. envoy. The Japanese Ambassador
was also prepared to appeal to Razali to establish an office
in Rangoon that would allow the U.N. envoy to be better
prepared and informed for his infrequent visits to Burma.


4. (C) Maruyama was quick to point out that Ambassador
Miyamoto was not a "messenger" for the SPDC in reaching out
to Razali. However, he acknowledged that regime contacts had
intimated to the Japanese Embassy that it would be "helpful
if Razali was made aware" he needed to dump de Riedmatten and
to be more discreet in his handling of dialogue efforts.
Maruyama added that the idea for Razali to establish a
permanent office in Rangoon was hatched by the Japanese
Embassy, but that the SPDC was receptive to the concept.


5. (C) Counselor Maruyama also noted that Japan would be
hosting an ASEAN Summit in December to commemorate 30 years
of Japan-ASEAN cooperation. He said that his Embassy was
"worried" that Burmese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt would not
attend the summit due to SPDC ire over Japanese PM Koizumi's
public airing in Bali of concerns regarding Burma. As a
result, the Japanese Embassy will advocate to headquarters in
Tokyo that the GOJ refrain from criticizing Burma for the
next month or so and send the Japanese Foreign Minister or
Deputy Foreign Minister to Rangoon in November to
hand-deliver an invitation to PM Khin Nyunt for the December
summit.


6. (C) Comment: The Japanese tell us here that they believe
Razali has little hope of succeeding with his dialogue
efforts. However, they support the U.N. process and want to
keep Razali engaged for lack of better alternatives.
Contrary to assertions that Ambassador Miyamoto is not a
"messenger" for the SPDC, the Japanese here continue to
maintain close contacts with military intelligence and seem
inclined to push Razali in a direction that might elicit
better cooperation from the regime. The Japanese believe
that they played a helpful role in supporting secret talks in
1993 that secured a presence in Rahkine State for the UNHCR
(using their influence with then-High Commissioner Ogata),
and would like Razali to take the same approach. As for
efforts to get PM Khin Nyunt to attend the Japan-ASEAN
Summit, the Japanese Embassy in Rangoon is known for its
pro-engagement stance, often getting ahead of the Japanese
MOFA on Burma policy. Counselor Maruyama did not respond to
our observation that PM Koizumi's remarks in Bali regarding
Burma were right on the mark. End Summary.
Martinez