C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001326

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: NEW SECRET POLICE SPECIAL UNITS

REF: RANGOON 1314

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In the last few months, the SPDC created
two new Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI)
special units in Rangoon to focus on monitoring and
responding to political challenges to the new 7-point
roadmap. The offices, Special Unit Number 1 and Special Unit
Number 2, have authority to arrest, interrogate, and detain
suspects without notifying the 26 existing Ward-level OCMI
offices, and may also have a mandate to support the execution
of the seven-point roadmap to democracy. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) U Win Naing, a local political operator briefly
detained in late September by OCMI (see reftel), told Poloff
that a few months ago, OCMI opened two new special units in
northern Rangoon evidently dedicated to handling only the
most sensitive of political cases. As proof of this, Naing
cited how he was arrested and taken not to the local OCMI
office, one of 26 in the Rangoon area, but to a new OCMI
office on the north end of Rangoon. He described it as OCMI
Rangoon Division #2 Special Unit, and explained that this new
unit is much more powerful than Rangoon's 26 local Township
OCMI units. The 26 different township OCMI units and three
special support units are each commanded by a major. The two
new Special Units are each commanded by a lieutenant colonel
and have three majors as deputies. After his release later
that day, U Win Naing was told by his local Township OCMI
office contact that they had been completely unaware of his
arrest, questioning, and release until after the fact.


3. (C) Through his nine-hour questioning by OCMI #2 Special
Unit was quite civil, Win Naing also said that while on a
bathroom break he saw two interrogation rooms where the
prisoners were in handcuffs and blindfolds, and were kept
standing during their interrogation. Win Naing also said
OCMI required him to sign a secrecy agreement regarding his
questioning, which delayed his reporting the arrests to
western diplomats and news media for two weeks. Win Naing
said he believed the new Special Units were designed to be an
upgrade of the OCMI.


3. (C) COMMENT: This is the first time Post has received
information of these new OCMI Special Units. The SPDC is not
tolerating any public opposition regarding the roadmap or any
other political issue. However, the SPDC has less control
over the ethnic leaders, who publicly reject the roadmap and
a Constitutional Convention unless the democratic opposition
is fully involved in the process. It is possible that the
SPDC created the Special Units to assist in pushing forward
the seven-point roadmap, by focusing the Units specifically
on interdicting anti-roadmap activities and by also actively
pressuring opposition politicians to join in the process. It
appears that the new unit was responsible for sounding out U
Win Naing in his willingness to attending a new
Constitutional Convention, despite his publicly stated
opposition of the roadmap in its present form. If this
proves to be true, the new OCMI Special Units will become
very well known to opposition politicians. END COMMENT.
Martinez