Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
03RANGOON1019 | 2003-08-22 10:34:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Rangoon |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001019 |
1. (C) Summary: The Japanese Embassy in Rangoon is quietly pursuing a proposal, apparently endorsed by a senior GOJ MOFA official who visited Burma on August 20, that would require Aung San Suu Kyi's commitment to turn a blind eye to the violent May 30 attack on her convoy in exchange for her release and a resumption of political dialogue. We can appreciate the GOJ's frustration with the political stalemate in Burma, but we don't believe such a drastic compromise on the part of ASSK or the NLD is in the cards. End summary. 2. (C) According to Japanese Embassy Political Counselor Ichiro Maruyama, an unnamed senior official of MOFA's Asia Pacific Division made a quiet visit to Rangoon on August 20 and met with Brigadier General Kyaw Thein (Chief of Staff for military intelligence) to discuss the current political crisis in Burma. The MOFA official stopped off in Rangoon after a swing through SE Asia, including a meeting in Kuala Lumpur with U.N. Special Envoy Razali (Note: We believe the MOFA official may have been Asia Pacific Division Deputy DG Shinichi or SE Asia Division Director Yamanouchi. End note). 3. (C) Maruyama told the Pol/Econ chief that the Japanese Embassy has developed a proposal for the SPDC, apparently endorsed by the visiting MOFA official, which would involve an agreement between Burma's military regime and detained NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi to make respective compromises aimed at resolving the current stalemate. Under the Japanese proposal, ASSK would agree not to criticize the May 30 attack on her convoy in north central Burma, and in turn the SPDC would agree to release her from detention, resume a political dialogue, and produce a timeline for a transition to democracy. 4. (C) Pol/Econ chief opined that ASSK and the NLD were unlikely to agree to turn a blind eye to a premeditated attack and subsequent crackdown that had resulted in scores of NLD members and supporters killed, for which the SPDC has offered no apology nor admitted any role. Maruyama agreed and said the proposal was a long shot, but responded that the GOJ is eager to undertake any effort that can help resolve the current crisis. Asked if the GOJ had pursued permission from the SPDC to see ASSK, Maruyama said the MOFA official had requested a visit, but military intelligence officials replied with an emphatic "no" and explained that SPDC Chairman Than Shwe alone made all decisions related to ASSK's detention. 5. (C) According to Maruyama, the Japanese Embassy will quietly pursue their proposal with the SPDC and if there is sufficient interest in the "compromise" scenario, PM Koizumi will phone SPDC Chairman Than Shwe to discuss details. Maruyama said that the GOJ believes a credible international mediator is necessary to carry out the proposal, but that Special Envoy Razali, the most likely candidate, is frustrated with the situation in Burma and has been repeatedly denied a visa for a return visit to Rangoon. The GOJ is therefore giving consideration to consulting with the U.S. and ASEAN to identify a special mediator who would complement, or even replace, Razali and his dialogue efforts. 6. (C) Comment: Maruyama, like his Ambassador (reftel), favors engaging the Burmese regime and is displeased with his government's decision to suspend new assistance from Japan to Burma. He and his colleagues have excellent contacts with the Burmese military intelligence who report that the SPDC is looking for a face-saving opportunity to release ASSK. However, the Japanese Embassy does not have close ties to the NLD and we suspect that any effort to pursue such a drastic compromise -- one that would require ASSK to overlook to worst setback to the democracy movement in over a decade -- will fall flat. Martinez |