SHEPHERDING HUMANITARIAN FUEL FOR BASRA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 003775 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD EAID ENRG EPET MOPS PREL PGOV PTER KU IZ SUBJECT: SHEPHERDING HUMANITARIAN FUEL FOR BASRA ¶1. Summary. Apparently frustrated that the Coalition was not heeding Kuwait's requests to tighten controls on the Iraq-Kuwait border to limit smuggling, the GOK slammed shut to civilian traffic its northern border with Iraq on 12 August. Convoys of vehicles supplying the contracted-out logistics that feed, fuel and house much of the Coalition Forces in Iraq were stranded at the border for over a day in temperatures that exceeded 130 degrees Fahrenheit; the more hazardous cargo, e.g., LPG and gasoline tankers, returned to staging areas in Kuwait City. Critical generator power and emergency fuel supplies for Basra, the scene of recent riots, could not move north. Embassy brokered a temporary arrangement under which Ministry of the Interior officers would permit the passage of trucks vetted by Emboffs at the border as properly manifested and indeed carrying humanitarian fuel assistance under USG contract. Embassy is coordinating with MFA an interagency, multi-lateral meeting among the concerned parties to work out a more durable and standardized procedure. Our objective is to keep the trucks rolling north expeditiously while ensuring that they return to Kuwait free of contraband or potentially hazardous materials. End Summary. ¶2. On Tuesday, 12 August, the GOK stopped virtually all Coalition support to Iraq at the Abdaly/Safwan (aka: Major Supply Route (MSR) "Tampa") crossing point without prior notice. This action reportedly was prompted by Ministry of the Interior (MOI) suspicions about smuggling (of persons and goods) from Iraq into Kuwait on board U.S. contractors' and other vehicles deadheading back to Kuwait. ¶3. Embassy received first word of the border bottleneck from our Office of Military Cooperation - Kuwait (OMC-K) on the morning of Wednesday, 13 August, as we headed into the local Thursday/Friday weekend. To drive home their desire to get Coalition attention, the two agencies most responsible for the border closing, the MOI and Ministry of Defense (MOD), made themselves unavailable for several hours. CDA, however, did reach the MFA Americas Department Director Ambassador Khaled Al-Babtain to express USG concerns, and once energized, he succeeded in getting the message that we needed the border open directly to the newly appointed Minister of the Interior. ¶4. Working the issue within the GOK, Amb Al-Babtain conveyed our argument, that: a) USG understands and appreciates that increased security concerns dictate a general tightening of controls at the border, and given the heightened tensions in Iraq we share those concerns; b) recent press reports have unfairly portrayed Kuwait as uncooperative in the shipment of humanitarian fuel to Iraq; c) we are concerned that whatever the source of the current misunderstanding regarding the border, its closing might be portrayed as Kuwaiti obstructionism and we must avoid that; d) that it would be helpful to return temporarily to the pre-Wednesday border control regime of self-regulation by USG and its contractors while together we resolve the border issues in a calm atmosphere. ¶5. Our immediate concern, given the fuel riots in Basra the previous weekend, was that emergency LPG and gasoline shipments not be delayed another day. The border problems had forced the return to Kuwait City of LPG and gasoline tankers destined for Basra on Tuesday and Wednesday. During the second day of the blockage, we learned that 26 military generators (providing 20 megawatts of power) for use in Basra, had been delayed as well. Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) and U.S. military personnel reported that these generators were needed urgently to supplement the Basra electrical grid and to revive critical refinery operations there as well. ¶6. Late on 13 August, Amb Al-Babtain called CDA to report that his interlocutors concurred in our para 4 logic. He offered that it might be possible to operate for a few days under a temporary, albeit somewhat tighter, variation of the earlier self-policing by the U.S. military and civilian contractors. Al-Babtain accepted our proposal that Embassy officers accompany the humanitarian fuel shipments to the border the next morning to vet for MOI which vehicles were indeed humanitarian-related; to ensure that those vehicles had military escort; and to establish an ad hoc procedure to meet GOK concerns for clear identification of vehicles and passengers. Al-Babtain offered no special exemption for anything other than the humanitarian fuel shipments. ¶7. Early on 14 August, Econ Chief and US Customs Advisor to the GOK arrived at MSR Tampa, staged the LPG and gasoline trucks on Highway 80 approximately five miles below the Navstar assembly point, and then met at Navstar with military and civilian representatives of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE),U.K. military escorts, KBR's LPG and gasoline site managers and personnel of the contracted service providers. They briefed on the "deal" worked out with MFA the evening before. Unable at the border to reach the MFA-designated MOI contact, Emboffs spoke with the MOI OIC present and then visited both checkpoints on the military access route into Iraq to ensure that all understood and accepted the agreement to return to a modified business as usual. By mid-morning, the 3 LPG tankers, 25 gasoline tankers and -- stretching the MFA deal to accommodate the Basra generators as "energy-related" -- 26 trucks carrying Basra's emergency power supply were in train and on the road with a military escort. ¶8. Later in the morning, and in keeping with the MOI manifesting and identification agreement, two additional 25-vehicle gasoline convoys headed north for the South-Central Iraq cities of Al Latifiya and Ad Diwaniya. That afternoon, the U.K. escort reported back to Emboffs by cell phone that the first fuel convoy had arrived in Basra without incident and downloaded its fuel successfully. Other convoys had agreed to report to Emboffs and COE civilian personnel as they reached their destinations. No negative incidents were reported throughout the afternoon. On 15 August, COE personnel informed Emboffs that the revived manifesting process continued to work and that several more convoys had passed north on the military road without undue delay. ¶9. On 17 August, CDA and Econ Chief met with Amb Al-Babtain at the MFA to discuss a regularization of border procedures and controls. On Amb Al-Babtain's recommendation, Embassy has requested by diplomatic note the convening of a multilateral and interministerial meeting to address border concerns. We propose to bring members of the Coalition Forces as well as representatives of the U.K. Embassy in Kuwait to this meeting. We would hope to work directly with appropriate officials from the Kuwaiti Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs as well as other agencies or departments the GOK might wish to include. ¶10. Comment: Embassy shares the concerns of the GOK on the importance of getting a handle on border security issues immediately. Hundreds of now-uninspected trucks with the potential to conceal lethal or dangerous contraband return to Kuwait from the neighboring war zone each day. Given the unsettled conditions in Iraq and the potential for those disturbances to migrate here, we and the GOK should exercise as strict a vigilance as possible at the border. We also are concerned about the potential force protection implications of this issue, with smuggling of weapons or explosives a real possibility. British Embassy here in Kuwait has asked to be part of the process since much of their support in the south comes directly from Kuwait. We have been open to these British queries and will continue to include them in our discussions with the GOK. Kuwait Immigration Chief told CDA on 18 August that he is receiving increasingly serious charges of abuses at the border. We have passed these allegations on to OMC-K for U.S. military consideration. The good news is that the Kuwaiti closure last week has had the desired effect. Now that the GOK is convinced the U.S. is taking their concerns seriously, the border is fully open to Coalition traffic. We intend to keep the lines of communication open between the Coalition and the GOK, and we anticipate no further misunderstandings at the Iraq-Kuwait border. End Comment. ¶11. Minimize considered. URBANCIC