NEPAL ARMY CLAIMS HEARTS-AND-MINDS CAMPAIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000945 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS LONDON FOR POL - GURLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2013 TAGS: MOPS MCAP PTER PGOV NP SUBJECT: NEPAL ARMY CLAIMS HEARTS-AND-MINDS CAMPAIGN SUCCEEDING IN INSURGENTS' HEARTLAND REF: A. KATHMANDU 0860 ¶B. KATHMANDU 0469 ¶C. KATHMANDU 0480 ¶D. KATHMANDU 0657 ¶E. KATHMANDU 0670 Classified By: CDA ROBERT K. BOGGS. REASON: 1.5 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Over the past month, the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) has been conducting a series of one-week civil affairs programs in 25 Maoist-affected districts in the east and mid-west of the country. While most of the programs so far feature mobile medical clinics, in some areas the RNA has carried out limited infrastructure development as well. Local civilian government authorities are participating in the programs, according to the RNA. The RNA has also begun conducting its own "cultural" programs, focusing on themes of peace and development, to counter the Maoists' extensive rural propaganda network. The purpose of the campaign, says the RNA's Director of Military Intelligence, is to reassert a government presence in areas where civil authority has been eroded by the Maoist presence. The RNA reports that the programs have so far been well received by the local population--and even, in some areas, by local Maoist cadres--and hopes to expand them to cover all 75 districts. The apparent success may have been ONE factor underlying the Maoist negotiators' May 9 demand that the RNA not venture farther than 5 km from their bases. End summary. -------------- -- CEASEFIRE BRINGS RENEWED HEARTS-AND-MINDS PUSH -------------- -- ¶2. (SBU) Since the January 29 announcement of a ceasefire between the Government of Nepal (GON) and Maoist insurgents, the Maoists have mounted a vigorous campaign to recapture some of the initial public good will and support they squandered by breaking off negotiations and increasing violence in late 2001. Reports from the field--including from emboffs who have traveled recently to outlying districts (Refs B-E)--indicate that the Maoists are attempting to rebuild their diminished popular support by holding round-table meetings with local mainstream party officials, staging "cultural" programs that feature revolutionary song-and-dance spectacles, helping local farmers with the harvest and even undertaking some minor development work, such as repairing roads and footpaths. While the Maoists are actively and openly campaigning for hearts and minds in areas where they have an established presence, they reportedly are denying the same freedom of movement to representatives of mainstream political parties and to GON officials. According to an official at the Ministry of Local Development, in several districts the Maoists continue to interdict any and all local government activities from taking place outside of the district headquarters (septel). ¶3. (C) According to Brig. Gen. Dilip Rayamajhi, Director of Military Intelligence (DMI),the leadership in the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) saw the ceasefire as an opportunity for a civil affairs campaign to regain public confidence in the GON's ability to provide services in Maoist-affected areas. Despite the ceasefire, he noted, GON officials are constrained by the lack of security and fiscal resources from restoring disrupted services. In the initial phases of the program, the RNA can fill this gap by (a) providing scarce manpower and even scarcer materials and (b) by providing a security shield. Rayamajhi said the RNA developed the plan internally and then disseminated it to local commanders, ordering them to coordinate its operation with local civilian government authorities. (Note: He said that a copy of the plan has been forwarded to the National Planning Commission, with no response to date. End note.) ¶4. (SBU) The campaign, which began in April, has so far been conducted in communities in 25 districts (15 in the east and 10 in the Maoist heartland in the mid-west). Company-sized units are deployed into target communities for ONE week at a time. According to Rayamajhi, the local commander chooses the community in consultation with local government authorities, who accompany the RNA unit on its one-week expedition to the field. So far, the programs have generally focused on providing medical care, but other services, such as infrastructure development or distribution of educational materials, have also been performed. Col. Victor Rana of the Department of Military Operations provided the following break-down of services given under the program so far: --Medical assistance to 25,103 patients; --Medical evacuation of 7 patients; --One family planning camp established; --Distribution of educational/recreational materials to 28 schools; --Distribution of food to 25 schools; --Repair of 6 educational facilities; --Distribution of construction materials to 6 communities; --Seeds distributed to 1,586 families; --Veterinary care provided to 5,583 animals; --Citizenship services provided in 20 districts (through the Chief District Officer); --15 "Cultural" programs conducted; --Two water pipes repaired; --One bridge built; --One small dam built. -------------- - RESOURCES, WORK SHARED WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT -------------- - ¶5. (C) The RNA has no special budget to conduct these programs, Rayamajhi said, but is using existing resources, supplies and manpower, supplemented by donations from the local business community, NGOs, and/or occasional materials or funding from the local government. Rayamajhi depicted the effort as a joint endeavor between the military and the civilian authorities, stressing that district HEALTH posts contribute medicines and doctors to the mobile medical clinics, and that Local Development Officers and Chief District Officers have assisted in other programs. The civilian police and Armed Police Force also participate. The RNA hires members of the local community to provide the labor for their infrastructure development programs. In some districts, such as Baitadi and Darchula, Maoist cadres have also turned out to assist in the RNA-sponsored development work, while in other locations insurgents have turned up as patients at the medical clinics. Rayamajhi said the RNA accepts all comers to these projects--even Maoists. Rana said the Maoists have not prevented the RNA from conducting programs in any area. (Note: According to local news reports, however, in some locations, like the eastern district of Panchthaar, the Maoists have prevented local residents from participating. End note.) ¶6. (SBU) As a companion piece to its civil affairs operation, the RNA has also begun launching its own "cultural" programs to counter the Maoists' propaganda campaign. Featuring song and dance, the material is apolitical, Rayamajhi said, focusing primarily on the themes of "peace and development." He reported an enthusiastic local response to the programs. -------------- BENEFITS/DISADVANTAGES -------------- ¶7. (C) Rana said the RNA hopes eventually to expand its civil affairs programs to all 75 districts. He cited positive media coverage and high local attendance rates--despite Maoist threats--as key measures of the successs of the campaign. The program has enhanced good relations between the security forces and their civilian counterparts at the local level, improved the Army's image, and promoted popular confidence in the GON's ability to provide service and security, while increasing the RNA's ability to gather intelligence in certain areas. The major drawback, in Rayamajhi's view, is the GON's inability to continue the programs. At the conclusion of each one-week program, the local development officials typically retire to the relative safety of the district headquarters, unable and unwilling to venture into Maoist-dominated territory without the security provided by the RNA, leaving the communities to lapse back into neglect and isolation. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) The ceasefire offers an opportunity, at least temporarily, for the GON to resume basic services in areas long neglected as a result of the insurgency. In some areas, however, the Maoists continue to deny GON officials entry and to threaten and intimidate them (septel),making it virtually impossible to re-establish a civilian goverment presence. The effectiveness of the program in countering the Maoists' appeal may be indicated by local guerrillas warning (unsuccessfully) the roving medical teams away from some villages and by the persistent efforts of Maoist negotiators to gain GON agreement to restrict the movement of army personnel in the countryside (Ref A). While some RNA officers in the past have expressed disdain for the GON's inability to provide services in outlying areas, Rayamajhi and Rana seemed genuinely sympathetic to the financial, security and staffing constraints their civilian counterparts face in the field. In the short term, we see little likelihood that either civilian staffing or budgets will be beefed up as long as security--and the outcome of the peace talks--remain uncertain. The RNA's civil affairs campaign offers no permanent solution, but as long as it continues to incorporate elements of the civilian government, it seems a good interim first step. BOGGS