NEPAL: GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS AGREE TO CODE OF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000472 SIPDIS LONDON FOR POL/REIDEL STATE FOR SA/INS NSC FOR MILLARD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS AGREE TO CODE OF CONDUCT REF: A. KATHMANDU 408 ¶B. KATHMANDU 427 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) At a press conference on March 13, Government of Nepal (GON) and Maoist representatives released a long-awaited code of conduct to govern behavior during the ongoing ceasefire. The 22-point program contains language that is ambiguous in parts, but which defines some clear ground rules for the two sides as they enter negotiations on a political settlement. The code also provides for a monitoring team to resolve disputes. Political parties were generally positive about the code. Omission of several Maoist demands, including their insistence that the army return to its barracks, may indicate that the insurgents are sincerely interested in purusing a peaceful solution. End summary. CODE CALLS FOR END TO EXTORTION AND STRIKES; SOME LANGUAGE AMBIGUOUS -------------- ¶2. (U) After more than a month of negotiations, drafting and debate, the Government of Nepal (GON) and leaders of the Maoist insurgency have agreed on a code of conduct to regulate the behavior of both sides during the ongoing ceasefire. The 22-point code was released at a late-afternoon press conference on March 13, signed by Minister for Physical Planning and Works Narayan Singh Pun, and the Maoists' second-ranking leader Baburam Bhattarai. It will be considered fully in force within three weeks. Though Bhattarai signed the document, he did not appear at the press conference. The Maoists were represented by Krishna Bahadur Mahara, a senior spokesman. ¶3. (U) The code of conduct reaffirms the commitment of both parties to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict, and calls on both sides to "try to find a consensus... while remaining sensitive to the country's interest." Several points promise relief to Nepal's beleaguered populace, calling for an end to extortion; forbidding restrictions on the transportation of food, medicines and other consumer goods; and promising that both parties to the agreement will help displaced people to return to their homes to be resettled peacefully. The code also stipulates there can be no "bandhs" (general or targeted strikes that close businesses and schools for a specified timeframe) during peace talks. ¶4. (U) Two points seek to prevent statements in the media from derailing the peace process. In support of the code's stated goal to "create a conducive environment for dialogue," the code requires that government-owned media outlets must carry views of both parties objectively and neutrally. A second clause calls for representatives from both parties to take care to express their political views "in a courteous and ethical manner" when dealing with the media. ¶5. (SBU) On several of the issues, the language of the code is ambiguous. One point calls for a cessation of "provocative activities" in "sensitive areas," phrases which are open to interpretation. Another point requires both parties to stop "unnecessary searches, arrests and kidnappings," vague language likely to spark debate about which arrests are necessary, and what sort of kidnappings could be so considered. The spokesman for the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP),for example, interpreted the clause as evidence that the GON had given Maoists legal authority to search, arrest and kidnap in some circumstances. Disagreements about interpretation of the code and adherence to its provisions will be monitored by a team of observers to be established by both sides. MAOISTS COMPROMISE ON ISSUES OF RNA DEPLOYMENT AND IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF PRISONERS -------------- -------------- ¶6. (U) The code of conduct does not set any time schedule for the release of prisoners, one of the Maoists' key pre-conditions to talks (ref A). The relevant provision merely specifies that both parties will "gradually release" their captives. (Note: At the March 13 press conference, Maoist spokesman Mahara stated that to the best of his knowledge, the Maoists do not currently have any prisoners. However, the Maoist leadership reportedly had instructed their local commanders to release immediately any prisoners unknown to the leadership. End note.) ¶7. (C) Language addressing the movement of security forces is imprecise, but clearly indicates that the Maoists have backed down on their prior demand that Royal Nepal Army (RNA) forces be confined to their barracks for the duration of the talks. The demand was wholly unacceptable to the Palace, and the issue had proved to be a stumbling block for at least one prior draft of the code (ref B). According to the watered-down language released on the 13th: "Both sides will stop violence and the use of force. Both sides will stop mobilization and the use of armed force which might terrorize the common people." ¶8. (C) What this means in terms of RNA operations is not immediately clear. A local brigade commander in Kathmandu told DATT on March 14 that he is still conducting normal patrols, and is planning to put up checkpoints in the city as usual after dark. His troops will continue to carry their weapons and will continue to safeguard law and order in the city. He has not received any new orders relating to the conditions of the code of conduct. However, the commander also stated that a meeting was in progress to determine if any changes would have to be made in order to meet the requirements of the code. POLITICAL PARTIES REACT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Though entreating "both sides" to "stop the use of force" is a far cry from requiring the RNA to sit idle in its barracks, not all observers see the clause as a victory for the GON. Spokesmen from the Nepali Congress (NC) and Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) told PolOff that by calling on both parties to stop mobilization of their armed forces, the GON has accepted the legitimacy of the Maoist insurgents. The term "mobilization" is also a matter of some confusion. According to the NSP, the term "implies that the armies of both sides have control over certain areas, and both armies should not cross over into one another's territory." A spokesman for the United Marxist Leninists (UML) said that the language was unclear and that his party would have to ask coordinators Pun and Mahara for clarification. ¶10. (SBU) Other responses from the major parties have been mixed. The most positive initial reaction comes from the Nepali Congress, whose spokesman told PolOff that "points mentioned in the code of conduct are ambiguous and unclear, but the party takes it positively, as a beginning to the peace process." A spokesman for the UML was less satisfied. "We are not happy that the government has undermined the major political parties," he told PolOff. "We take the code of conduct positively, but with certain reservations. Lasting peace can only be achieved if a responsible and accountable government is put in place with the support of the people and the international community." COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) While some points in the code of conduct are unclear, the sincerity of the GON and the Maoists in adhering to its terms will determine its usefulness. The most ambiguous points are those that deal with the most contentious issues, and the diluted language is likely the only form weak enough to make it to consensus. While the vague language might represent a possible "trap door" for any party looking for a way out of peace talks, the requirement that both sides work toward a solution of any disputes within the framework of the code of conduct will make it more difficult for either side to walk away unilaterally. Including a restriction on negative commentary in the media might make it harder for the Maoists to play the game of flagging GON "failures" in the media as possible reasons for a breakdown in talks. ¶12. (C) It is highly significant that several Maoist demands have been omitted from the final text. Previously "non-negotiable" pre-conditions for talks, including the repeal of anti-terrorism legislation, the immediate release of all Maoist prisoners with weapons, and the return of the RNA to its barracks are conspicuously absent in the agreed-upon version of the code. The Maoists clearly have backed down on several key issues in order to achieve consensus on the code and to move ahead toward peace negotiations. This willingness to compromise may be a signal that the Maoists are concerned about their inability to combat increasing RNA capabilities, it may be a sign of fatigue among their cadre after seven years of jungle warfare, or it may be simply the best indication yet that the Maoists are more serious about getting to the dialogue table. MALINOWSKI