NEPAL: MAOIST WEBSITE, LEADERSHIP ELABORATE ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 002163 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR SA/INS LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY NSC FOR MILLARD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PREL NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOIST WEBSITE, LEADERSHIP ELABORATE ON NEW POLITBURO DIRECTIVES REF: KATHMANDU 2048 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Recent public announcements by Nepal's Maoist leaders indicate an awareness of the movement's dwindling popular support and a continuing attempt to explain ideologically their failure to win power. For example, following the recent Maoist Politburo meeting (Reftel),the Maoists have posted a lengthy, turgid exposition on the Nepali version of their website (cpnm.org) that purports to provide a doctrinal framework for the policy shifts announced at the meeting. Highlights include an assessment of the U.S. as a declining global power; an assertion that constitutional monarchy is incompatible with the 21st century; a discussion of a three-phase military strategy; an acknowledgement that Maoist abuses in the field have cost them popular sympathy; a commitment not to undermine NGO projects run by countries "not hostile to the People's War"; and a decision to seek broader international support, including from the United Nations. The site also carries a separate interview with Maoist leader Prachanda explaining the rationale for the policy changes and reiterating that the Maoists will not harm US citizens. Consistency between rhetoric and behavior has never been a Maoist strength, but we believe that this recent bombast signals a shift in the leadership's thinking away from rural warfare in favor of greater emphasis on propaganda and public relations. Part of this public relations strategy appears to be a continued effort to drive a wedge between the US, which is consistently portrayed as "hostile" to the Maoists and supportive of "royal fascism," and other donors . End summary. -------------- MAOIST VIEW OF THE WORLD -------------- ¶2. (U) The Nepali language version of the Maoist website cpnm.org has posted an elaboration of the policy decisions referred to in Maoist leader Prachanda's October 21 press statement following a recent Politburo meeting (Reftel). Not surprisingly, the self-congratulatory text, entitled "Supplementary Resolution on the Current Situation and Our Historic Task," asserts the rapid decline of the Maoists' enemies (principally, the U.S. and the Palace) and predicts the certain victory of the People's War. U.S. strategy, the resolution claimed, has been to divert attention from its diplomatic and military failures in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan by "tightening its hegemony in South Asia." The Maoists' success in exposing true U.S. aims has won them sympathy not only with "anti-imperialist masses the world over" but also with unnamed "reactionary forces" purportedly troubled by U.S. policy. -------------- DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION -------------- ¶3. (U) The text charges the Palace with perpetuating a system of "military fascism," dismissing as "insane" the Prime Minister's call for parliamentary elections in mid-2004. (Note: The statement conveniently does not explain that Maoist threats and terror have forced the indefinite postponement of both local and national elections. End note.) The democratic political parties, according to the Maoists, are contributing to the situation through their passivity, thus "gradually causing their own extinction." In an astounding leap of logic, the statement asserts that because constitutional monarchy is inappropriate for the 21st century, "the development of civil war in the country is quite natural" and attacks on "military fascism" justifiable. -------------- THREE NEW PHASES IN STRATEGY -------------- ¶4. (U) The web statement reveals a certain amount of Maoist sensitivity to speculation that the insurgents' failure to mount successful large-scale attacks against Government security forcs since the end of the ceasefire could indicate that Maoist strength is declining or its command structure compromised. On the contrary, the statement claims; the Politburo decision to plan and execute the "strategic offensive" in three phases (small-scale, decentralized attacks; medium-sized, somewhat centralized attacks; large-scale, centralized actions) has been successful so far. Since the offensive is still in the first stage, the failure to mount large-scale attacks thus far is all part of the plan. "A section of the masses, particularly urban middle class intellectuals, appear to be in some confusion . . . Even some revolutionary cadres seem to be disappointed in the absence of big shock attacks," the statement acknowledges. Perhaps in an effort to reassure these disappointed cadres, the statement promises that once the first phase is completed at some unspecified date in the future, "stress should be placed on organizing centralized large-scale actions." -------------- REFORMS TO WIN HEARTS AND MINDS -------------- ¶5. (U) Much of the statement addresses reforms that seem intended to curb the excesses and arbitrary cruelty that have cost the Maoists much of their popular base, even among their purported constituency in rural areas. The text acknowledges that in "areas that have come under the leadership and influence of the Party" the Maoists have not done enough to win hearts and minds. In particular, three abuses--the destruction of key rural infrastructure, the arbitrary, often savage murders of local residents, and extortion--are cited. First, the statement attempts to answer recent criticism in the local press that the Maoist "jana sarkar" ("people's governments") supposedly established in areas under insurgent control provide to local residents little or no development services, security, or institutional structure analogous to a government. While the aim of a revolutionary power is to tear down the apparatus of the old regime, not enough has been done to reconstruct or develop such infrastructure in areas under Maoist influence. (Or, as the text so eloquently puts it, "the dialectical relationship between destruction and construction has not been properly expressed.") Instead, in many areas some local commanders seem bent on destroying all vestiges of the old regime--even important infrastructure on which the local population depends. Continued destruction "raises the danger of increasing people's grievances against us and the enemy's ability to capitalize on that." Instead, the Maoists should "mobilize the masses" to "carry forward construction and development activities" in those areas under their control. ¶6. (U) Second, indiscriminate killing of "class enemies" and spies without proper analysis of the perpetrator's class, the nature of the crime and due process is detrimental to the cause as well, the statement continues. "In the past some of the killings have taken place on flimsy grounds" such as not heeding "donation" demands, not having provided food and shelter, or even on the basis of a personal vendetta with local comanders or members of the "people's government." To safeguard against such excesses, when killing class enemies, "a certain minimum legal method (must be) adhered to. . . . Red terror does not mean anarchy." ¶7. (U) Third, because "enemy" propaganda about Maoist extortion is spreading "illusion" among the middle class, "our donations policy (must be) more systematic and refined. In the past, while collecting donations there have been some lapses in making adequate class analysis of persons and organizations, in studying their background and dealing with them accordingly." To avert future lapses, "concrete criteria" for assessing "donations" on a class basis must be developed, and Party Regional Bureaus should control the collection of all "donations" and taxes. -------------- INTERNATIONAL APPEAL -------------- ¶8. (U) The text announces a revised policy toward NGOs and INGOs "not linked politically with the old regime" and not "directly financed by US imperialism, which has been most hostile towards the People's War at the international level." From now on, "we should not carry out any physical action or coercion against the INGOs associated with neutral countries or those not hostile to the People's War, like the European Union." The statement calls on the Party to "appeal to the United Nations and other international fora" for recognition as the legitimate government of Nepal and for the support and cooperation of all nations against the old regime. -------------- PRACHANDA ON THE NEW POLICY . . . -------------- ¶9. (U) An interview with Maoist leader Prachanda posted on the same website on November 3 offers further explication of the reforms. The policy changes are based on "lessons from various shortcomings and weaknesses of the Party," Prachanda admitted, including the need to "organize the people's state power" in areas under putative Maoist control. When asked to explain the "legal" process under which class "enemies" would now be tried, Prachanda said that the People's Liberation Army or militia henceforth will hand over all suspects "to the Justice Department of the People's State Power for prosecution through the judicial process." Further clarification will be available in an interim draft Constitution and "other necessary directives" soon to be announced, he promised. While the Maoists have not "closed the door" on future negotiations, "there is no possibility of talks immediately," he cautions. -------------- . . . AND THE FOREIGN HAND -------------- ¶10. (U) The Prachanda interview echoes recent rhetoriocal efforts by the Maoists to depict U.S. policy in Nepal as "interference" and "imperialism," aimed at destabilizing the region and threatening the national interests of India and China. The Maoists, Prachanda asserts, "have been maintaining correspondence with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan" and welcome the interest the UN has shown in "peacefully resolving the problem by establishing the sovereign right of the great Nepali people to self-determination." The Politburo has decided to request international organizations, including the UN, to recognize the Maoists as the legitimate representatives of the Nepali people, instead of the "representatives of the old regime which has fully lost the people's trust and which functions under the direction of US imperialism." That said, "we would like to make it clear that it has been our Party policy not to take physical action against any US citizen, tourist or personnel except the US soldiers who come with the so-called Royal Army to fight in direct encounters." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The Politburo decisions--at least as characterized on the website--clearly indicate Maoist sensitivity to their deteriorating public image. The insurgents' unbridled campaign of murder, destruction, and perhaps most important, extortion in the countryside has decimated their popular following and created serious doubts about their ability to control their cadres. While the policy "reforms" seem an obvious effort to address these concerns, we have observed little practical effect so far, as wanton killing, destruction of infrastructure, and "donation" demands by Maoist cadres continue undiminished. The website apologia also attemps to respond to other recent criticisms that question the Maoists' longevity as an insurgent movement, i.e., their failure so far to provide any kind of quasi-governmental services or structures in areas they claim are under their control and their inability since the end of the ceasefire to mount large-scale attacks on government forces. ¶12. (SBU) Comment Continued: In an effort to deflect negative attention from themselves, the Maoist leadership continues to try to externalize the conflict, attempting to depict USG policy as "intervention" that directly threatens both India and China and that differs significantly from the purportedly more tolerant and sympathetic attitudes of other donors. The Maoists are plainly trying to practice the same technique of divide-and-conquer--which they have employed to such advantage in pitting the Palace/Government and political parties against one another--to the international community. The Politburo ramblings, followed closely by Prachanda's long-distance exegesis, signals to us a movement under increasing pressure, both from its own excesses and consequently tarnished public image, as well as from our support and assistance to the Government of Nepal. BOGGS