Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KATHMANDU2040
2003-10-21 10:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: MAOISTS ABDUCT AND RELEASE BRITISH ARMY

Tags:  PTER PREL UK NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002040 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL UK NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS ABDUCT AND RELEASE BRITISH ARMY
OFFICERS

REF: (A) KATHMANDU 2022 (B) MALINOWSKI/DAS CAMP

10/20/03 TELCON

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002040

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL UK NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS ABDUCT AND RELEASE BRITISH ARMY
OFFICERS

REF: (A) KATHMANDU 2022 (B) MALINOWSKI/DAS CAMP

10/20/03 TELCON

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. On October 19, a group of armed Maoists
seized four British Army Gurkha officers or employees,
including one active duty British Lieutenant Colonel and two
Nepali Gurkha retired officers, in Baglung District in
mid-western Nepal. The insurgents reportedly harangued the
group for "imperialist exploitation" of Nepali youth and
forced the group to accompany them to Maoist district
headquarters. The British Government decided not to inform
or involve the Government of Nepal and launched its own
search and rescue operation. On October 21, one of the
Nepali abductees reportedly called the British recruitment
office in Pokhara, saying that all four had been released and
would be returning to Pokhara that same evening. The British
Embassy is confident that the group will return safely to
Kathmandu by October 22. The incident follows an upsurge in
Maoist rhetoric and activity against British and Indian Army
recruitment programs in Nepal, but marks the first time the
Maoists have abducted a foreign government official. End
Summary.


2. (C) According to British Charge D'Affaires John Chick, on
October 19 at approximately 1800 hours in Baglung District in
mid-western Nepal, one active duty British Lieutenant
Colonel, two retired Nepali British Gurkha officers and one
Nepali recruitment officer were accosted by a group of armed
Maoist insurgents. (Note. The highest ranking abductee, Lt
Col Adrian Griffith, is listed on the UK Embassy's diplomatic
roster as Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, HQ, BGN. This is
at least the third time Maoists have targeted British Gurkha
officials. The first incident occurred in September 2002
when insurgents kidnapped a Nepali employee of the British
Welfare Office in Taplejung District in eastern Nepal.
Another British Gurkha employee apparently was grabbed by the
Maoists, but quickly released unharmed, about two or three
weeks ago. End Note.) According to a BBC documentary film

crew present at the site, the insurgents began to berate them
ideologically, calling the group "imperialist exploiters" of
Nepali youth. After the verbal confrontation, the Maoists
forced the four officers to accompany them to the Maoist
district headquarters, saying the group could expect to be
released within seven hours. However, the insurgents allowed
the BBC crew to depart. After reaching Baglung District
headquarters by foot at approximately 1200 hours on October
20, the BBC crew contacted the British Embassy in Kathmandu
to report the abduction.


3. (C) The British Embassy, in consultation with London,
decided not to involve the Government of Nepal and requested
that the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) and National Police to
refrain from launching search and rescue operations.
Claiming they could handle the incident themselves, the
British Embassy sent two teams from the Gurkha pension and
recruitment offices in Pokhara (roughly 50 km east of
Baglung) to locate and extract the victims. One team was
sent to the designated rendezvous point where the British
Army officers were to arrive on October 21, while the second
team was sent to retrace the group's steps, ascertain their
whereabouts and attempt to bring them out. Neither team was
successful in making contact with the abductees. We expect
that the GON and particularly the RNA will not be at all
pleased that the British did not deem to formally inform the
host government of this important incident.


4. (C) At approximately 1300 hours on October 21, the British
Embassy received a telephone call from the British Army's
recruitment office in Pokhara. The recruitment office had
received a call just moments earlier from one of the Nepali
victims, who said the group had been released and was on its
way to Pokhara. John Chick said he was "99 -percent"
confident that the group was safe and expects they will
arrive in Pokhara this evening and return to Kathmandu for a
debrief on October 22. Chick did not know where the group
was or how the group had contacted the Pokhara recruitment
center, although the Lieutenant Colonel did have in his
possession a satellite telephone. Chick said they were not
certain whether the abduction constituted a warning to
British Army recruitment programs in Nepal or whether it was
perhaps a mistake by local Maoist commanders, unsanctioned by
central leadership.


5. (C) Comment. Since early October, we have witnessed an
upsurge in Maoist rhetoric and activity against British and
Indian army recruitment programs. Last week, Maoists in Ilam
District in eastern Nepal forced the closure of one British
recruitment center after attacking two Nepali men seeking
recruitment into the U.K.'s Gurkha Battalion (reftel). As
such, it would not be surprising if the insurgents, even if
only at a local level, had decided to interfere in the
British recruitment effort by harassing and abducting
recruitment officers.


6. (C/NF) Comment Continued: In addition, only last week
British courts rejected a long-standing claim that Nepalese
citizen British Gurkhas were discriminated against in pension
benefits. While the British Government may have won the case
on its merits, the decision stoked a round of complaints from
the chatter classes, some Nepalese nationalists, and the
predictable left. The British position was not helped by
some of the local British rationalization on the case. For
example, an argument that a retired Nepalese Gurkha captain
receives more in pension benefits than the Nepalese Prime
Minister does in salary.


7. (C) Comment Continued: Thankfully, it appears the
abductees were released quickly and without harm. That said,
the incident marks the first time the Maoists have abducted
an foreign official. At this stage, it is unclear whether
the incident was merely an aberration, perhaps perpetrated by
an overzealous local commander, or indicates a change in
Maoist policy at the central level. In either case, the
incident poses a serious challenge to continued British
recruitment efforts outside their main recruitment centers.
End Comment.
MALINOWSKI