NEPAL: MAOISTS OFFER TEN-DAY HOLIDAY TRUCE;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001888 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/IP/SA NSC FOR MILLARD LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2013 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP GON SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS OFFER TEN-DAY HOLIDAY TRUCE; GOVERNMENT NONCOMMITTAL REF: KATHMANDU 1836 Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D). ¶1. (U) On September 26 the Maoist leadership issued a press statement declaring a ceasefire from October 2-9 in honor of the Hindu festival of Dashain. In announcing the truce, Maoist leader Prachanda cited the "feeling of the masses and appeals from different political and human rights organizations and civil society." (The Maoist website on which the statement is posted notes that "it is quite ironic that a revolutionary movement aimed at total . . . transformation of the society has to consider . . . some traditional festivals would take a long time to fade out of the consciousness of the masses.") ¶2. (U) Prachanda's statement went on to allege that "we want a genuine ceasefire, peace and progress in this country." He attempts to shift the blame for breaking the January 29 ceasefire onto the "regressive old feudal state, playing into the hands of foreign power centers, particularly US imperialism, (which) has falsely and deliberately charged us with having broken the ceasefire and peace talks . . . . (but) who compelled our Party and the masses to go for resistance by openly violating the ceasefire since the beginning. . . ." He cautions that the unilateral ceasefire may give "the old state" and its security forces "undue opportunity," and thus calls on "all the democratic political forces, human rights organizations, civil society and the general masses of the people in the country to focus pressure on the old state . . ." ¶3. (U) So far, however, public reaction to the announcement has been fairly muted. Only one of Nepal's numerous human rights organizations was quoted in the local press as welcoming the truce. Response from mainstream political parties has been similarly restrained, although Madhav Kumar Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML),commended the move on September 27 and is quoted in the local press as calling on the Government of Nepal (GON) to reciprocate. The GON so far has been noncommittal in its response to the declaration. Cabinet Ministers Kamal Thapa and Sarbendra Nath Shukla were both quoted in the local press as welcoming the ceasefire--while adroitly sidestepping the question of whether the GON would reciprocate. ¶4. (C) Comment: Since unilaterally breaking the ceasefire on August 27, the Maoists have earned much condemnation from "civil society" without being able to demonstrate many tactical successes. Most important, the Maoists have thus far proven unable to mount the kind of large-scale attacks against GON security forces that stunned the RNA in November 2001 or the systematic urban guerrilla warfare that many observers feared they had been planning during the seven-month moratorium on fighting. With the exception of the assassination of an RNA colonel the first day after the ceasefire ended, in the one month since the resumption of hostilities, the Maoists have little more to point to as successes than the killings of village-level leaders, lower-ranking policemen, and a three-day imposition of the ever-unpopular general strike, or "bandh." Under such circumstances, the Maoists may have decided that extending an olive branch, however short, will deflect public scrutiny of their unimpressive performance so far. The RNA is aggressively pursuing the Maoists their mid-western heartland, while security authorities in Kathmandu have made a number of significant arrests, which forestalled or disrupted Maoist plans. ¶5. (C) Comment Continued: The RNA, bolstered by its apparent victory in Rolpa (Reftel),feels more confident than before of its ability and is unlikely to advocate accepting a ceasefire, however limited. The security authorities clearly believe that they are putting considerable pressure on the Maoists and want this pressure to continue. The less-than-overwhelming public reception of Prachanda's statement probably has more to do with the Nepali public's wariness--and weariness-of the Maoists' pretensions to peace than with any real appetite for a protracted conflict. The insurgents have demonstrated their lack of credibility too many times already for either the GON, the security forces, or even the general public to believe that this offer is much more than a cynical attempt to divert public criticism of their tactics and forestall further RNA successes for the near future. MALINOWSKI