NEPAL: INDIAN SECURITY COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001859 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY NSC FOR MILLARD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2013 TAGS: PREL MCAP PTER IN NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: INDIAN SECURITY COOPERATION REF: A. NEW DELHI 5046 ¶B. KATHMANDU 0330 ¶C. KATHMANDU 1638 Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) According to Indian Ambassador Shyam Saran, the Indian government is sending a defense consultation group to Kathmandu the week of September 22 to "institutionalize" bilateral security assistance and support to the Government of Nepal (GON). A few weeks later in New Delhi, the GOI will seek conclusion of a bilateral extradition treaty and mutual legal assistance treaty to that end. Saran said he does not believe that Maoist hints that they might call a ceasefire during the October Dashain holiday are sincere and would recommend against a temporary ceasefire. Although he believes that the security forces have scored some recent successes against the insurgents, he expressed concern that the Army and police might be consolidating their forces within the Kathmandu Valley at the expense of the rest of the country. The GOI's willingness to examine and attempt to accommodate the GON's security needs on a more regularized basis--as well as the Ambassador's readiness to share that information with us--is an encouraging sign of the increasingly helpful role the GOI is adopting in helping its neighbor address the Maoist conflict. End summary. -------------- GOI TO "INSTITUTIONALIZE" SECURITY SUPPORT -------------- ¶2. (C) In a September 19 conversation with the Ambassador, Indian Ambassador Shyam Saran reported that his government had been pleased by the success of the September 10 US-India regional dialogue on Nepal, headed by A/S for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca for the US (Ref A). The GOI regarded A/S Rocca's visit to New Delhi as extremely helpful in advancing mutual understanding of the two countries' respective roles, strategies and perspectives in assisting the Government of Nepal (GON) face down the Maoist insurgency, Saran said. ¶3. (C) Saran told the Ambassador that a defense consultation group composed of Indian military and security personnel would be in Kathmandu the week of September 22 to examine how best to "institutionalize" Indian support and bilateral security assistance to Nepal. (Note: The group, which includes Indian DMI Gen. Richard Khare, is currently in Kathmandu. End note.) Among the topics to be discussed is exchange of information regarding cross-border movements of suspected terrorists. Following the end of the Dashain holiday in mid-October, the GOI plans to move ahead on concluding extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with Nepal in order to address the question of Nepali Maoists purportedly living in India. The GOI is frequently criticized by the Nepalis for being lax in pursuing and/or detaining Maoists believed to be sheltering on its territory, Saran observed. Concluding the treaties will be an effort to "put everything on an objective and transparent plane." If Nepali Maoists in India are found to have broken Indian law, the GOI will try them, Saran said. If they are found to be using Indian territory to plot against the GON, the GOI will hand them over to Nepal upon receiving appropriate requests. -------------- VIEWS ON MAOIST STRATEGY -------------- ¶4. (C) The Nepali security forces have been using intermittent curfews imposed on various parts of the Kathmandu Valley to perform neighborhood sweeps, Saran said, a tactic which he described as successful in netting suspected insurgents. He reported hearing that the Maoist leadership had tasked its cadres with raising more than USD 5 million before the October Dashain holdiay; hence their accelerated extortion efforts. If the Maoists offer a ceasefire during the extended Dashain-Tihar holiday in October (as some of their recently reported statements have hinted),the move would be purely tactical, Saran speculated, and not at all indicative of a sincere desire for negotiations. He would advise the GON against accepting such a spurious offer. Instead, the Maoists want to maintain political and psychological pressure on the GON to "set the stage for talks in four or five months," he predicted. While the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) has scored some recent significant successes against the Maoists, Saran expressed concern at reports of the civil police closing a number of posts, including in the southern industrial city of Hetauda where many Indian businesses are located, and of the RNA concentrating half of its manpower within the capital. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) Saran is correct in his observation that the GOI is frequently blamed by Nepalis for being too lax on suspected Maoists, who are believed able to cross with ease into and shelter on Indian territory. The August 20 arrest in Chennai of Maoist Central Committee member Chandra Gajurel (Ref C) did much to tamp down such criticism. Acting to regularize the exchange of information on cross-border movements by suspected Maoists is another concrete and positive step. Ambassador Saran's willingness to share that development with us is an important measure of the close coordination between our Embassies on our respective bilateral assistance to the GON. We agree with Saran's view that a temporary "ceasefire" over the holidays would not serve the GON's interests, as the Maoists will be expected to use the respite to regroup in the field while continuing to extort funds in the cities. MALINOWSKI