Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KATHMANDU1424
2003-07-30 10:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
NEPAL: DELIVERING USG MESSAGE TO MAOIST FACILITATOR
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001424
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SA, SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2013
TAGS: PREL PINR PTER ASEC PINS NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: DELIVERING USG MESSAGE TO MAOIST FACILITATOR
REF: SECSTATE 219519
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1 (C) On July 30, DCM Robert Boggs met with Padma Ratna
Tuladhar, one of two Maoist facilitators to peace
negotiations with the Nepal Government (GON). Post could not
meet with Babarum Bhattarai as suggested reftel since all of
the Maoist leadership reportedly has moved to India. RSO and
PolOff also attended the meeting, which was held in a secure
area within the Embassy guard house.
2. (C) The DCM opened the meeting by emphasizing that the
message to be conveyed had come directly from Washington and
that the U.S. Government takes very seriously the looming
break in the cease-fire. He urged the Maoists to return to
the negotiating table as the only means to resolving the
conflict. The DCM expressed concern over Maoist
anti-American rhetoric and refuted Maoist claims that the
U.S. has "hundreds of military advisors" in the country
unduly influencing the Government of Nepal in the peace
process. "It is simply not true," he said. The DCM stressed
that any act of violence towards Americans or American
interests in Nepal by the Maoists would have serious and
unavoidable consequences. He mentioned that the Maoists had
been put on the U.S. terrorist watch list as a result of the
killings of two Embassy security personnel as well as for
other actions taken against U.S. interests. The DCM warned
Tuladhar that if the Maoists were to continue to act against
U.S. interests in Nepal, they could be re-designated onto
other terrorist lists, which would lead to the imposition of
sanctions and other serious repercussions for the Maoist
organization.
3. (C) Tuladhar did not respond directly to these points and
suggested disingenuously that he did not have direct access
to Bhattarai. The DCM replied that the Embassy was aware
that Tuladhar is a member of the Maoist organization despite
his role as facilitator and expected him to deliver this
message immediately. Tuladhar then agreed to convey the
message as soon as possible to the Maoist leadership, which
he confirmed is now based in India. He then asked whether
the USG would send someone to meet with Babarum Bhattarai in
India, "perhaps in New Delhi or Calcutta," if the Maoist
leader agreed to such a meeting.
4. (C) Tuladhar attempted to suggest that the Maoists were,
in fact, fighting for democracy. Citing U.S. criticism of
human rights abuses by the Government of Nepal during the
1990-1991 period of democratization and agitation and support
for Nepal's democratic forces, Tuladhar seemed to suggest
that the U.S. should support the Maoist cause. He added that
the Maoist leadership's perception was that the USG did not
desire peace and was influencing the GON to pursue a military
strategy. The DCM refuted these points, explaining that U.S.
policy has been and continues to be supportive of the peace
process. The DCM added that the U.S. believes that only a
negotiated settlement, not a military solution, will resolve
this conflict. However, the U.S. could not support the
Maoists because they have not shown themselves to be a
positive, democratic force that supports human rights and the
rule of law.
5. (C) Biographic Note. Tuladhar is a putative human rights
activist and an independent communist leader. He was elected
to the House of Representatives as an independent candidate
supported by the CPN (UML) in the 1991 general election.
Tuladhar is an ambitious political player and reportedly
would seek a cabinet-level position within a
Maoist-influenced government. End Biographic Note.
6. (C) Comment. Tuladhar is a slippery interlocutor.
Although the tone of the demarche was stern, Tuladhar
appeared totally unruffled. Despite his protestations to the
contrary, Post considers Tuladhar an influential and
well-connected spokesman of the Maoists. Tuladhar has proven
to be an effective channel of communication to the Maoists in
the past, although on this occasion he did not write down a
single note during the demarche. Embassy will pursue other
third party interlocutors to convey reftel points. End
Comment.
MALINOWSKI
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SA, SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2013
TAGS: PREL PINR PTER ASEC PINS NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: DELIVERING USG MESSAGE TO MAOIST FACILITATOR
REF: SECSTATE 219519
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1 (C) On July 30, DCM Robert Boggs met with Padma Ratna
Tuladhar, one of two Maoist facilitators to peace
negotiations with the Nepal Government (GON). Post could not
meet with Babarum Bhattarai as suggested reftel since all of
the Maoist leadership reportedly has moved to India. RSO and
PolOff also attended the meeting, which was held in a secure
area within the Embassy guard house.
2. (C) The DCM opened the meeting by emphasizing that the
message to be conveyed had come directly from Washington and
that the U.S. Government takes very seriously the looming
break in the cease-fire. He urged the Maoists to return to
the negotiating table as the only means to resolving the
conflict. The DCM expressed concern over Maoist
anti-American rhetoric and refuted Maoist claims that the
U.S. has "hundreds of military advisors" in the country
unduly influencing the Government of Nepal in the peace
process. "It is simply not true," he said. The DCM stressed
that any act of violence towards Americans or American
interests in Nepal by the Maoists would have serious and
unavoidable consequences. He mentioned that the Maoists had
been put on the U.S. terrorist watch list as a result of the
killings of two Embassy security personnel as well as for
other actions taken against U.S. interests. The DCM warned
Tuladhar that if the Maoists were to continue to act against
U.S. interests in Nepal, they could be re-designated onto
other terrorist lists, which would lead to the imposition of
sanctions and other serious repercussions for the Maoist
organization.
3. (C) Tuladhar did not respond directly to these points and
suggested disingenuously that he did not have direct access
to Bhattarai. The DCM replied that the Embassy was aware
that Tuladhar is a member of the Maoist organization despite
his role as facilitator and expected him to deliver this
message immediately. Tuladhar then agreed to convey the
message as soon as possible to the Maoist leadership, which
he confirmed is now based in India. He then asked whether
the USG would send someone to meet with Babarum Bhattarai in
India, "perhaps in New Delhi or Calcutta," if the Maoist
leader agreed to such a meeting.
4. (C) Tuladhar attempted to suggest that the Maoists were,
in fact, fighting for democracy. Citing U.S. criticism of
human rights abuses by the Government of Nepal during the
1990-1991 period of democratization and agitation and support
for Nepal's democratic forces, Tuladhar seemed to suggest
that the U.S. should support the Maoist cause. He added that
the Maoist leadership's perception was that the USG did not
desire peace and was influencing the GON to pursue a military
strategy. The DCM refuted these points, explaining that U.S.
policy has been and continues to be supportive of the peace
process. The DCM added that the U.S. believes that only a
negotiated settlement, not a military solution, will resolve
this conflict. However, the U.S. could not support the
Maoists because they have not shown themselves to be a
positive, democratic force that supports human rights and the
rule of law.
5. (C) Biographic Note. Tuladhar is a putative human rights
activist and an independent communist leader. He was elected
to the House of Representatives as an independent candidate
supported by the CPN (UML) in the 1991 general election.
Tuladhar is an ambitious political player and reportedly
would seek a cabinet-level position within a
Maoist-influenced government. End Biographic Note.
6. (C) Comment. Tuladhar is a slippery interlocutor.
Although the tone of the demarche was stern, Tuladhar
appeared totally unruffled. Despite his protestations to the
contrary, Post considers Tuladhar an influential and
well-connected spokesman of the Maoists. Tuladhar has proven
to be an effective channel of communication to the Maoists in
the past, although on this occasion he did not write down a
single note during the demarche. Embassy will pursue other
third party interlocutors to convey reftel points. End
Comment.
MALINOWSKI