C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000117

SIPDIS

CINCSOC - FOR POLAD ROBERT FITTS FROM THE AMBASSADOR
CINCPAC FOR ADMIRAL FARGO AND COMSOCPAC
USASFC FOR MG LAMBERT
USASOC FOR LTG KESSINGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2013
TAGS: MASS MCAP PREL PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: AN EXTRAORDINARY TRAINING GROUND FOR U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES


Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).


1. (C) Dear Bob:
I was disappointed to learn that Nepal is not included on
USSOCOM,s High Value Target List. As I understand it, if
Nepal is not on this list, it will be difficult for U.S.
Special Operations Forces to conduct deployments and training
here. I hope I can enlist your support to press for adding
Nepal as a prime potential training ground for U.S. Special
Forces.


2. (C) As you know, Nepal has been combating a violent
Maoist insurgency over the past seven years. The insurgents
seek to topple the legitimate Government of Nepal through
force and set up an old-style Maoist dictatorship. The
conflict has grown increasingly brutal and destructive in the
past year, as the insurgents have intensified their struggle
and widened their scope of targets to include public
infrastructure (schools, roads, power stations),
transportation, and innocent civilians, including children.
In many ways, Nepal's Maoists, who espouse the ideology of
the Sendero Luminoso and the Revolutionary International
Movement (RIM), provide a textbook example of classic,
left-wing domestic insurgencies, while demonstrating violent
tactics on a par with the Khmer Rouge. Also classic is the
Maoists' anti-Americanism, which continues to threaten our
interests and affect the security of our personnel and
facilities in Nepal. In November the Maoist leadership
acknowledged responsibility for the assassinations of two
local Embassy security guards and issued an implicit warning
to our diplomatic mission to cease anti-Maoist activities.
The USG is currently reviewing the possibility of adding the
Maoists to one of its terrorist lists.


3. (C) Obviously, continued instability in Nepal, a
struggling, impoverished new democracy wedged between two
huge nuclear powers, could be a recipe for disaster in what
is already a volatile region. It is plain to most observers
that the Government of Nepal will be unable to counter this
insurgency without significant external assistance. In
January 2002 the US Government thus re-oriented its policy
specifically to support the Government of Nepal in its
efforts to combat the insurgency through a combination of
diplomatic efforts, socio-economic aid and security
assistance, including small arms, force protection equipment,
NVGs, and training. The cornerstone of our security
assistance is a planned Counter-Insurgency center to train a
Royal Nepal Army (RNA) cadre that will act as a mobile
training team in Nepal. These military assistance efforts
rely heavily on our ability to employ Special Operations
Forces (SOF), particularly US Army Special Forces. These
professionals are uniquely suited to train the RNA, a
professional, dedicated and disciplined fighting force that I
believe will benefit substantially from the instruction
provided. In return, our Special Forces would gain
invaluable experience in rugged, challenging terrain ranging
from dense jungle to the highest Himalayan Mountains.


4. (C) If we continue to exert pressure on the Maoists in
Nepal, I am confident that it will increase the likelihood of
a peaceful resolution to this conflict. USSOCOM forces are
key in this strategy, and to helping transform the RNA into a
modern COIN force in the shortest possible time. I would
greatly appreciate your support and assistance.


5. (U) Best regards,
Mike

MALINOWSKI