Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KATHMANDU1044
2003-06-06 00:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

(U) TIBETAN REFUGEE DEPORTATION: POST-MORTEM

Tags:  PREF PREL NP CH 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001044 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA, SA/INS, EAP/CM, DRL-A/S CRANER, PRM
LONDON FOR SOUTH ASIA WATCH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2013
TAGS: PREF PREL NP CH
SUBJECT: (U) TIBETAN REFUGEE DEPORTATION: POST-MORTEM

REF: (A) SECSTATE 144931 (B) KATHMANDU 715 (C)

KATHMANDU 753 (D) KATHMANDU 984 (E)
KATHMANDU 997 (F) KATHMANDU 998 (G)
KATHMANDU 1018

Classified By: Classified Confidential by CDA Robert Boggs for Reasons
1.5 (b,d).

--------------
Summary
---------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001044

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA, SA/INS, EAP/CM, DRL-A/S CRANER, PRM
LONDON FOR SOUTH ASIA WATCH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2013
TAGS: PREF PREL NEPAL'>NP CH
SUBJECT: (U) TIBETAN REFUGEE DEPORTATION: POST-MORTEM

REF: (A) SECSTATE 144931 (B) KATHMANDU 715 (C)

KATHMANDU 753 (D) KATHMANDU 984 (E)
KATHMANDU 997 (F) KATHMANDU 998 (G)
KATHMANDU 1018

Classified By: Classified Confidential by CDA Robert Boggs for Reasons
1.5 (b,d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Despite strenous efforts by the Embassy to dissuade it
from doing so, the Government of NEPAL on May 31 deported 18
Tibetan refugees to China. Th Mission began working this
issue in late April shortly after the refugees were first
detained. Post pressed for the refugees' release at all
levels of the Government of NEPAL (GON),from the King down
to officials within the Home and Foreign Ministries, the
National Police and the Immigration Office. On June 4, Home
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Mandal as well as Foreign
Ministry Secretary Acharya gave strong assurances that the
deportation was a one-time occurrence and did not signify a
change in NEPAL's official policy of allowing Tibetan
refugees to transit the country. Acharya also confided that
the Chinese had exerted unusual pressure in this specific
case, confirmed our suspicion that the decision was made at
the highest level of government, and repeated with
resignation that the decision was one of the last made by the
outgoing government. Post conveyed that the release of the
one remaining Tibetan refugee, who had arrived just days
after the group of 21 refugees, to UNHCR would go far to show
the West of NEPAL's commitment to allow future Tibetans to
transit the country. End Summary.

--------------
Overview of Events
--------------


2. (C) After the April 15 detention of 21 Tibetan refugees
(the 18 deported refugees plus 3 young children who were
later released to UNHCR) (Ref B),Ambassador Malinowski met
April 25 with Home Secretary Tikka Datta Niraula (Ref C) and
May 9 with King Gyanendra to press for the their release and
to convey the importance the U.S. places on the plight of the
Tibetan refugees.


3. (C) On May 29, the Embassy learned that the Department of
Immigration was preparing to hand over to Chinese Embassy
representatives 18 Tibetans detained on immigration

violations. Upon receipt of this information, Emboffs
contacted Home Ministry Joint Secretary Niranjan Baral to
stress the importance of abiding by internationally respected
norms and established practice. Emboffs also contacted
Immigration Director Subarna Lal Shrestha, who suggested that
the deportation to China was "per our regulation," referred
Emboffs back to the Home Ministry. EmbOffs, in a follow-up
call to Home Ministry Joint Secretary Baral, learned that the
international community's intervention, including that of the
U.S., had made the Ministry reconsider the matter (Ref D).


4. (C) On May 30, Charge delivered Ref A demarche to Foreign
Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya, who denied that there had been

SIPDIS
a change in GON policy toward Tibetans transiting NEPAL (Ref
E). Efforts to contact the Home Secretary throughout the day
proved futile. At 0600 on Saturday May 31, EmbOffs learned
that the police were preparing to hand over the Tibetan
detainees to the Chinese Embassy. EmbOff immediately called
Home Ministry Secretary Tika Datta Niraula at his residence,
but was hung-up on after identifying herself as a U.S.
diplomat. Repeated attempts to call back were unsuccessful.
After attempts to call Ministry Joint Secretary Baral proved
in vain, Charge drove to Hanuman Dhoka jail to meet the
police and attempt to avert the detainees' deportation.
Unfortunately, by the time he arrived (8:00am),the detainees
were gone (Ref F) and senior police officers made themselves
unavailable. The following workday (June 2),the U.S.
Mission released a press statement deploring the GON decision
to deport the 18 Tibetans. EmbOffs' repeated calls to the
Home Ministry went unanswered.

-------------- --------------
GON Assurances: No Change in Policy Toward Tibetans
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In a June 4 meeting with Home Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister Badri Prasad Mandal, Charge received
assurances that GON humanitarian policy toward Tibetan
refugees in NEPAL had not changed and that future Tibetan
refugees will be processed as before the deportation. Mandal
confirmed that the Chinese Embassy had made a specific
request for this particular group of Tibetans, but had few
additional details as the decision was made, he claimed,
prior to his appointment as Home Minister. (Note. Mandal was
appointed Home Minister on April 11, 2003 -- three days
before the refugees were detained. End Note.) Mandal
asserted that "this type of case will not occur again," as it
is in NEPAL's interests to "keep cordial relations with the
U.S." He said he recognized the importance of USG assistance
in combating the Maoist insurgency, adding, "we are serious
about" preventing another such incident. In spite of NEPAL's
two large neighbors, Mandal asserted that NEPAL "can stand on
its own legs" in order to ensure positive and productive
relationships with the West, particularly the United States.


6. (SBU) In a second meeting on June 4, Foreign Secretary
Mahdu Raman Acharya described both the official and
nonofficial version of events surrounding the deportation.
(Foreign Minister Shah has been ill and unavailable for
official meetings.) According to Acharya, the MFA directed
its Embassies on June 4 to issue an official press release
explaining the May 31 incident. The text he presented
follows below.

Begin Text:

NEPAL is home to more than 135,000 refugees, including
several thousand Tibetan refugees. It is not the policy of
the HMGN to extradite refugees. HMGN understands and gives
full consideration to humanitarian and human rights issues of
the asylum seekers. Last year alone some 3,000 Tibetan
refugees were allowed to be processed from NEPAL. There is no
change in policy of HMGN with regard to the refugees.

We have learnt that the reported case of Tibetans were sent
back after the Immigration Authority of HMGN were fully
convinced from the investigation that they were not seeking
asylum, but were a rare case of illegal immigrants. They
were allowed to go back after the fines were paid.

HMGN is convinced that the Tibetans sent back do not have
anything which could be a cause of concern regarding their
human rights abuses.

End Text.


7. (C) Acharya reported that immigration officials discovered
the group of 21 Tibetans in a town in Eastern NEPAL, adding
that it was not known when the group crossed the border. He
said that Immigration officials believed the Tibetans were
intending to reside in NEPAL, and consequently were
categorized as illegal immigrants. (Note: The Office of
Tibet had told us the refugees were arrested just outside
Kathmandu, had just crossed into the country, and were on
their way to India (Ref B). End Note.)


8. (C) In confidence, Acharya admitted that the Chinese
Government had a specific interest in the case of the 18
Tibetan refugees. "It is difficult to go against strong
Chinese interests," he said, adding, "not that we like it,
but we could not resist it." Acharya acknowledged that the
GON was perfectly aware of the USG position, but had "no
choice in this case," adding, "the Americans more than anyone
else know how difficult the Chinese can be." He also
confirmed that this decision was made at the highest
political level within the GON. He repeated with resignation
that the decision to go ahead with the deportation was the
last act of the outgoing government.


9. (C) Charge showed Acharya copies of the Embassy and State
Department press releases, as well as Chairman Leach's
statement before the U.S. House of Representatives, adding
that several Congressmen had indicated an interest in cutting
U.S. aid to NEPAL. Charge then stressed to Acharya the
importance of processing remaining refugees in detention as
evidence of GON commitment to allow Tibetan refugees to
transit NEPAL. (Note: Post learned from UNHCR contacts June 4
that one Tibetan man who arrived only a few days after the
group of 21 Tibetans remained in GON custody. Earlier this
week, UNHCR was granted access for an interview, after which
he was declared "of concern" to the U.N. and a formal letter
of request for his release was made. End Note.) Acharya
replied that there are "standing instructions" to process
Tibetan refugees as previously done before this incident.


10. (C) Acharya said that usually the Chinese are quiet about
the flow of Tibetan refugees through NEPAL. (Note. In a later
June 4 conversation former PM Sher Bahadur Deuba told
PolCouns that the Chinese frequently pressure the GON to hand
over detained Tibetan refugees. End Note.) Acharya added
that his government has conveyed to the Chinese that NEPAL
will not deport future refugees back to China. In fact,
Acharya suggested that the GON would try to shorten the
detention period required to hold Tibetan "illegal
immigrants" before their release to UNHCR.


11. (C) In a June 4 telephone conversation, Prabakhar Rana, a
close confidant of the Palace, confirmed that a letter on the
refugees from an influential private American had been
delivered on June 2 to King Gyanendra. Prabakhar also
confided that he is seeking an audience with the King
specifically to discuss the Tibetan refugee issue and
requested information on possible USG action in order to arm
him for his conversation with King Gyanendra.

--------------
International Response
--------------


12. (U) The international response to this incident has been
strong. Acharya mentioned that the German Foreign Minister
called the NEPALi Foreign Minister to protest that week. In
addition to the United States, the UK, UNHCR and Amnesty
International have issued press releases condemning the
incident while the EU intends to follow suit as soon as
possible. The Foreign Secretary indicated that he has been
inundated with international messages of protest.


13. (U) However, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu also issued
a June 3 press release defending the GON,s decision to
deport the 18 Tibetans, claiming it fell "within NEPAL's
sovereign jurisdiction and a common international practice."
The press release also states that "China attaches great
importance to combating illegal immigrants, and is actively
involved in various international and regional cooperation in
this field. We hold the view that politicizing or adopting
double standards will not be conducive for the proper
settlement of the issue of illegal immigrants."

--------------
Comment
--------------


14. (C) The consensus among diplomats, the press and the
political elite, is that the primary reason for the
deportation was the unusual pressure put on the GON by the
Chinese Government. Our meetings made it clear that despite
the GON's clear understanding of the US position regarding
the detained refugees, the GON made a calculated decision --
most likely at the level of the King himself -- to deport the
refugees in order to appease their northern neighbor.


15. (C) Comment Continued: The international outcry provoked
by this incident should make the GON weigh carefully any
future request to deport detained refugees. We note with
concern Acharya's assertion that the GON now plans to detain
undocumented Tibetans as a matter of standard procedure -- a
significant departure from past practice, in which they were
directly transferred to the UNHCR. Unfortunately, if their
detention becomes an issue of income generation, it may be
hard to stop. Post is also concerned that despite Acharya's
and the Deputy Prime Minister's assurances that this incident
will not recur, any detention period could put the refugees
in jeopardy of deportation. We hope that Acharya's assertion
that the GON desired to shorten the period of detention
indicates an interest in keeping the refugees below China's
radar screen. End Comment.
BOGGS