Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03JERUSALEM2819
2003-09-08 17:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Jerusalem
Cable title:
THE TALE OF PM ABBAS'S RESIGNATION
O 081710Z SEP 03 FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5049 INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 002819
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2013
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG PGOV IS
SUBJECT: THE TALE OF PM ABBAS'S RESIGNATION
REF: A. JERUSALEM 2771
B. JERUSALEM 2772
Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Jeffrey Feltman, Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 002819
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2013
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG PGOV IS
SUBJECT: THE TALE OF PM ABBAS'S RESIGNATION
REF: A. JERUSALEM 2771
B. JERUSALEM 2772
Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Jeffrey Feltman, Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, disappointed
and embittered after losing a power struggle with Arafat that
left him publicly branded as a traitor, sent his letter of
resignation to the PA President on September 6, then vented
his frustrations to the Legislative Council in a closed
session the same day. Abbas criticized Arafat for impeding
his ability to govern, Israel for continuing its policy of
targeted killings, and the U.S for failing to press Israel to
implement its roadmap commitments. Upon receiving Abbas's
resignation letter, Arafat discussed his PM's fate among the
Fatah, PLO and PLC leadership, and -- with most in favor of
Abbas's departure -- scribbled on the letter, "Accepted, with
God's blessing." On September 7, Arafat, after further
consultations with the Fatah leadership, announced his
decision to tap PLC Speaker, Ahmed Qure'i (Abu Ala'a),to
form a new government. Assuming Qure'i accepts the
appointment, he will have five weeks to form a government.
Even as the next phase of political machinations began,
several Fatah and PLC members in this weekend's drama looked
back with wonder and not a little remorse. End summary.
The PM Says Goodbye
--------------
2. (C) According to several ConGen sources in Ramallah, Abbas
had already sent his resignation letter -- via Cabinet
Affairs Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo and Cabinet Secretary (and
FCC member) Hakim Balawi -- to the Muqatta'a hours before he
addressed the PLC in closed session at noon on September 6.
(Abed-Rabbo told A/PO that he had expected Arafat to refuse
to accept the letter except from Abbas himself. To
Abed-Rabbo's surprise, Arafat appeared "eager," nearly
grabbing the letter from Abed-Rabbo's hands.) The PM was
reportedly deeply disturbed by Fatah-organized demonstrations
against him in Ramallah and Gaza the previous week (ref A),
and graffiti on buildings in both cities branding him and his
Security Affairs Minister Mohammed Dahlan collaborators with
Israel and the U.S. One story has it that he was
particularly upset after hearing that his grandson's
classmates taunted him by shouting that his grandfather was a
traitor. To avoid the crowd that was assembling outside the
PLC building, Abbas entered through the rear door and,
without revealing that he had already submitted his
resignation, proceeded to enumerate his grievances.
3. (C) Israel and the U.S., Abbas lamented, had "misled" him
with their professions of support for his government and the
roadmap. Most seriously, Israel, by killing several Hamas
and PIJ activists in Nablus and Hebron in early August, had
effectively torpedoed the hudna, ignited a new cycle of
violence, and halted or revoked implementation of Israel's
other roadmap commitments. He faulted the U.S. for not
taking action to restrain Israel.
4. (C) But Abbas directed most of his ire at Arafat. Arafat,
he told the legislators, had interfered with his power of
appointment as guaranteed in the amended Basic Law,
describing incidents in which Arafat improperly re-instated
the head of the dismissed Personnel Bureau head in Gaza and
revoked the appointment of Abdel Fattah Hemayel as Minister
of Sports and Youth. Similarly, Abbas complained about
Arafat's interference in Abbas's decision to designate his
Foreign Minister, Nabeel Sha'ath, as the PA's delegate at
Arab League and UN meetings. Abbas said he had obtained
Arafat's acquiescence, but then the Chairman reversed his
position, embarrassing the PM and throwing PA diplomatic
representation into confusion.
5. (C) Finally, with regard to the central issue of
consolidating the security forces under the Prime Minister,
Abbas argued that he had not been trying to challenge
Arafat's constitutional role as supreme commander of the
armed forces, but rather to bring the PA into compliance with
the roadmap. Nevertheless, he said, Arafat fought the move,
even though it was clearly against an agreed PLO/PA policy to
implement the roadmap fully. Abbas ended his speech by
observing that his political position had deteriorated so
badly, he had been labeled a "Karzai" by the public. PLC
Speaker Abu Ala'a then announced that Abbas had submitted his
resignation earlier in the morning.
Arafat Says OK
--------------
6. (C) Following the PLC session, Arafat convened the Fatah
Central Council (FCC) to discuss how to react to Abbas's
resignation. In the FCC, Nabeel Sha'ath and Tayib Abdel
Rahim reportedly argued against accepting Abbas's resignation
or, alternatively, accepting it and then re-appointing him.
But they were in the minority, and the FCC eventually agreed
by consensus that Abbas should go. This view was reinforced
by reports that Abbas had informed the press that his
decision was final. Arafat then reportedly made the decision
to accept Abbas's resignation, writing on the PM's letter,
"Accepted, with God's grace."
7. (C) That evening, Arafat next summoned PLO leaders and
about 50 PLC members to the Muqatta'a to discuss the matter
further, even though he had already reached his decision.
Some argued for giving Abbas another chance -- PLC member
Mohammed Hourani, in particular, argued that Abbas had been
treated unfairly and complained that he had been compared to
"Karzai." "Don't ever utter Abbas's name and Karzai's in the
same sentence again," warned Arafat, as he announced his
decision to the group and declared the matter at an end.
(Abu Mazen later mused to A/PO that he didn't understand the
complaints -- "would they rather have the warlords or Taliban
leading Afghanistan? It should be a compliment to be called
'Karzai'!")
Abu Ala'a Is Tapped
--------------
8. (C) The next day, September 7, Arafat turned his attention
to choosing Abbas's successor. Once again, he convened the
FCC, whose members (including four who reside abroad who
participated by phone) unanimously supported their FCC
colleague, Abu Ala'a. The FCC members also reportedly
discussed a security strategy to satisfy U.S. demands that
the PA unify its security services under the PM and take
action on the ground.
The Weekend's Players Look Back with Remorse
--------------
9. (C) A tone of remorse prevailed as several Fatah and PLC
members today looked back over the weekend's events in
conversations with Poloff. A tired Mufid abd Rabbo, a
Tulkarm PLC and Fatah Higher Committee member, stayed in
Ramallah all weekend for what he described as a "series of
meetings filled with tension, anger, and blood-loss." Still,
he argued, "you can't steal authorities (from Arafat) in our
government, and that is what Abu Mazen was trying to do."
Amin Maqbul, acting head of the Fatah Higher Committee,
struck a defensive note in recounting the weekend's events to
Poloff. "We met over and over again and didn't reach an
understanding (with Abu Mazen)," he said. But, he insisted,
"we didn't push him to leave." Jamal ash-Shobaki, now
Minister of Local Government in a caretaker cabinet, was
inconsolable. "Abu Mazen sincerely wanted to reform this
government," he lamented. "He had some successes, but
outside problems kept strengthening the people who were being
hurt by the changes. So they had an excuse to start calling
him a traitor. Israel caused the collapse of Abu Mazen by
never complying with the roadmap." Nablus PLC member Dalal
Salameh summed up the weekend without Shobaki's rancor
(probably because she is not in danger of losing a
ministership) but with possibly greater poignancy. Her
comment was an epitaph: "You lost a moderate current in
Palestine," she said, "and we lost an important leader."
Comment
--------------
10. (C) The alacrity with which Abbas resigned and Arafat
accepted his resignation and tapped PLC Speaker Abu Ala'a for
the job surprised many observers here, but Arafat and the 14
members of Fatah's Central Committee were unlikely among them
(ref B). Irked by Abbas's penchant for acting alone and
failing to consult traditional Palestinian leadership bodies
(i.e., foremost among them the FCC, of course),Arafat and a
determined group within the FCC, reportedly led by Hani
al-Hassan and Abbas Zaki, have worked steadily, mostly behind
the scenes, to undermine Abbas since the day he returned from
the summits at Aqaba and Sharm al-Sheikh last June. Abbas's
efforts to wrest control of the security forces after the
August 19 bus bombing went a step too far for Arafat. The
questions now are whether and to what extent Arafat and the
FCC will back Abbas's successor. These issues are now under
negotiation, as Abu Ala'a works out his terms with the PA
President for accepting the appointment.
FELTMAN
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2013
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG PGOV IS
SUBJECT: THE TALE OF PM ABBAS'S RESIGNATION
REF: A. JERUSALEM 2771
B. JERUSALEM 2772
Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Jeffrey Feltman, Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, disappointed
and embittered after losing a power struggle with Arafat that
left him publicly branded as a traitor, sent his letter of
resignation to the PA President on September 6, then vented
his frustrations to the Legislative Council in a closed
session the same day. Abbas criticized Arafat for impeding
his ability to govern, Israel for continuing its policy of
targeted killings, and the U.S for failing to press Israel to
implement its roadmap commitments. Upon receiving Abbas's
resignation letter, Arafat discussed his PM's fate among the
Fatah, PLO and PLC leadership, and -- with most in favor of
Abbas's departure -- scribbled on the letter, "Accepted, with
God's blessing." On September 7, Arafat, after further
consultations with the Fatah leadership, announced his
decision to tap PLC Speaker, Ahmed Qure'i (Abu Ala'a),to
form a new government. Assuming Qure'i accepts the
appointment, he will have five weeks to form a government.
Even as the next phase of political machinations began,
several Fatah and PLC members in this weekend's drama looked
back with wonder and not a little remorse. End summary.
The PM Says Goodbye
--------------
2. (C) According to several ConGen sources in Ramallah, Abbas
had already sent his resignation letter -- via Cabinet
Affairs Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo and Cabinet Secretary (and
FCC member) Hakim Balawi -- to the Muqatta'a hours before he
addressed the PLC in closed session at noon on September 6.
(Abed-Rabbo told A/PO that he had expected Arafat to refuse
to accept the letter except from Abbas himself. To
Abed-Rabbo's surprise, Arafat appeared "eager," nearly
grabbing the letter from Abed-Rabbo's hands.) The PM was
reportedly deeply disturbed by Fatah-organized demonstrations
against him in Ramallah and Gaza the previous week (ref A),
and graffiti on buildings in both cities branding him and his
Security Affairs Minister Mohammed Dahlan collaborators with
Israel and the U.S. One story has it that he was
particularly upset after hearing that his grandson's
classmates taunted him by shouting that his grandfather was a
traitor. To avoid the crowd that was assembling outside the
PLC building, Abbas entered through the rear door and,
without revealing that he had already submitted his
resignation, proceeded to enumerate his grievances.
3. (C) Israel and the U.S., Abbas lamented, had "misled" him
with their professions of support for his government and the
roadmap. Most seriously, Israel, by killing several Hamas
and PIJ activists in Nablus and Hebron in early August, had
effectively torpedoed the hudna, ignited a new cycle of
violence, and halted or revoked implementation of Israel's
other roadmap commitments. He faulted the U.S. for not
taking action to restrain Israel.
4. (C) But Abbas directed most of his ire at Arafat. Arafat,
he told the legislators, had interfered with his power of
appointment as guaranteed in the amended Basic Law,
describing incidents in which Arafat improperly re-instated
the head of the dismissed Personnel Bureau head in Gaza and
revoked the appointment of Abdel Fattah Hemayel as Minister
of Sports and Youth. Similarly, Abbas complained about
Arafat's interference in Abbas's decision to designate his
Foreign Minister, Nabeel Sha'ath, as the PA's delegate at
Arab League and UN meetings. Abbas said he had obtained
Arafat's acquiescence, but then the Chairman reversed his
position, embarrassing the PM and throwing PA diplomatic
representation into confusion.
5. (C) Finally, with regard to the central issue of
consolidating the security forces under the Prime Minister,
Abbas argued that he had not been trying to challenge
Arafat's constitutional role as supreme commander of the
armed forces, but rather to bring the PA into compliance with
the roadmap. Nevertheless, he said, Arafat fought the move,
even though it was clearly against an agreed PLO/PA policy to
implement the roadmap fully. Abbas ended his speech by
observing that his political position had deteriorated so
badly, he had been labeled a "Karzai" by the public. PLC
Speaker Abu Ala'a then announced that Abbas had submitted his
resignation earlier in the morning.
Arafat Says OK
--------------
6. (C) Following the PLC session, Arafat convened the Fatah
Central Council (FCC) to discuss how to react to Abbas's
resignation. In the FCC, Nabeel Sha'ath and Tayib Abdel
Rahim reportedly argued against accepting Abbas's resignation
or, alternatively, accepting it and then re-appointing him.
But they were in the minority, and the FCC eventually agreed
by consensus that Abbas should go. This view was reinforced
by reports that Abbas had informed the press that his
decision was final. Arafat then reportedly made the decision
to accept Abbas's resignation, writing on the PM's letter,
"Accepted, with God's grace."
7. (C) That evening, Arafat next summoned PLO leaders and
about 50 PLC members to the Muqatta'a to discuss the matter
further, even though he had already reached his decision.
Some argued for giving Abbas another chance -- PLC member
Mohammed Hourani, in particular, argued that Abbas had been
treated unfairly and complained that he had been compared to
"Karzai." "Don't ever utter Abbas's name and Karzai's in the
same sentence again," warned Arafat, as he announced his
decision to the group and declared the matter at an end.
(Abu Mazen later mused to A/PO that he didn't understand the
complaints -- "would they rather have the warlords or Taliban
leading Afghanistan? It should be a compliment to be called
'Karzai'!")
Abu Ala'a Is Tapped
--------------
8. (C) The next day, September 7, Arafat turned his attention
to choosing Abbas's successor. Once again, he convened the
FCC, whose members (including four who reside abroad who
participated by phone) unanimously supported their FCC
colleague, Abu Ala'a. The FCC members also reportedly
discussed a security strategy to satisfy U.S. demands that
the PA unify its security services under the PM and take
action on the ground.
The Weekend's Players Look Back with Remorse
--------------
9. (C) A tone of remorse prevailed as several Fatah and PLC
members today looked back over the weekend's events in
conversations with Poloff. A tired Mufid abd Rabbo, a
Tulkarm PLC and Fatah Higher Committee member, stayed in
Ramallah all weekend for what he described as a "series of
meetings filled with tension, anger, and blood-loss." Still,
he argued, "you can't steal authorities (from Arafat) in our
government, and that is what Abu Mazen was trying to do."
Amin Maqbul, acting head of the Fatah Higher Committee,
struck a defensive note in recounting the weekend's events to
Poloff. "We met over and over again and didn't reach an
understanding (with Abu Mazen)," he said. But, he insisted,
"we didn't push him to leave." Jamal ash-Shobaki, now
Minister of Local Government in a caretaker cabinet, was
inconsolable. "Abu Mazen sincerely wanted to reform this
government," he lamented. "He had some successes, but
outside problems kept strengthening the people who were being
hurt by the changes. So they had an excuse to start calling
him a traitor. Israel caused the collapse of Abu Mazen by
never complying with the roadmap." Nablus PLC member Dalal
Salameh summed up the weekend without Shobaki's rancor
(probably because she is not in danger of losing a
ministership) but with possibly greater poignancy. Her
comment was an epitaph: "You lost a moderate current in
Palestine," she said, "and we lost an important leader."
Comment
--------------
10. (C) The alacrity with which Abbas resigned and Arafat
accepted his resignation and tapped PLC Speaker Abu Ala'a for
the job surprised many observers here, but Arafat and the 14
members of Fatah's Central Committee were unlikely among them
(ref B). Irked by Abbas's penchant for acting alone and
failing to consult traditional Palestinian leadership bodies
(i.e., foremost among them the FCC, of course),Arafat and a
determined group within the FCC, reportedly led by Hani
al-Hassan and Abbas Zaki, have worked steadily, mostly behind
the scenes, to undermine Abbas since the day he returned from
the summits at Aqaba and Sharm al-Sheikh last June. Abbas's
efforts to wrest control of the security forces after the
August 19 bus bombing went a step too far for Arafat. The
questions now are whether and to what extent Arafat and the
FCC will back Abbas's successor. These issues are now under
negotiation, as Abu Ala'a works out his terms with the PA
President for accepting the appointment.
FELTMAN