AFRICAN PRESIDENTIAL MEDIATION IMPORTANT - BUT NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000860 SIPDIS NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER LONDON FOR C. GURNEY PARIS FOR C. NEARY NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2013 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ASEC ZI SUBJECT: AFRICAN PRESIDENTIAL MEDIATION IMPORTANT - BUT NO QUICK-FIX REF: A. HARARE 843 ¶B. HARARE 780 Classified By: Political Officer Audu Besmer for reasons 1.5 b/d Summary: -------------- ¶1. (C) The presidents of South Africa, Nigeria and Malawi attempted to restart talks between the GOZ and MDC in separate meetings with both sides in Harare on May 5. However, both sides stuck to their original positions - Mugabe demanding that the MDC recognize his presidency, and the MDC refusing any preconditions to talks - essentially precluding the dialogue for now. While not yet particularly fruitful, this effort should not be discounted since it signals increasing African frustration with the threat of a Zimbabwean meltdown and could produce important pressure on the Mugabe regime if it is sustained. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Bakili Muluzi of Malawi and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria met with President Mugabe in Harare on May 5 in a mediation effort to discuss the resumption of talks with the MDC. The delegation also met MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube, MDC Deputy Secretary General Gift Chimanikire, and MDC special assistant to the president Gandi Mudzingwa in a separate meeting. Muluzi Sympathetic, Mbeki's Sentiments Improving -------------- --- ¶3. (C) The delegation met first with Mugabe and later with MDC officials. Mudzingwa reported that both sides essentially stuck to their original positions, i.e. Mugabe demanded that the MDC drop its court challenge of the March 2002 presidential election and recognize his legitimacy; and the MDC maintained they would do no such thing and would enter talks only with no preconditions. Mudzingwa reported that Muluzi was sympathetic to the MDC's position that they had a constitutional right to bring a dispute to court. While Mbeki spoke in very roundabout terms, he ultimately seemed frustrated and acknowledged that the essential crisis was of governance and nothing else. Mudzingwa noted that Mbeki seemed more sympathetic to the MDC than on previous occasions and could possibly be convinced further. De Facto Recognition? -------------- ¶4. (C) Ncube explained the rationale behind the MDC's court challenge, as a constitutional right, as a matter of principle, and as a bargaining chip. Ncube also acknowledged that Mugabe was the de facto president, that he was sworn-in, and was performing the functions of president, but that the MDC had the right to challenge his de jure credentials. Mbeki seized on this as a potential MDC "recognition" or "acknowledgment" of Mugabe's presidency, but the MDC officials were loathe to have these statements construed as recognition of Mugabe's presidency. They strongly disagree with any preconditions to resuming talks, do not want to engage in any capitulation, and believe that Mugabe's demand is a smokescreen designed to obstruct talks and in the end ensure his and his party's political future rather than a resolution to Zimbabwe's political crisis. The MDC officials feel strongly about the principles they stand for and are not willing to jeopardize those, and potentially Zimbabwe's future, by rushing into talks with Mugabe, who they perceive to be insincere. The MDC officials believe the political tide is turning in their direction and they have no reason to capitulate now. ¶5. (U) Upon departure, President Obasanjo gave the press an artfully constructed formulation about mutual recognition that the election was conducted according to the constitution. Government media claimed that the MDC had recognized Mugabe's legitimacy. We do not yet have an inside GOZ read on the talks. Tsvangirai to Go to Malawi SIPDIS -------------- ¶6. (C) As a follow-up, Muluzi has invited Tsvangirai to Blantyre for further consultations. According to Mudzingwa, even though Tsvangirai's passport was confiscated pending the outcome of the treason trial against him, Mugabe has agreed to allow Tsvangirai to travel to Malawi for this purpose. Comment: -------------- ¶7. (C) Two successful stayaways in as many months, and two March by-election wins have bolstered the MDC's confidence that the political tide is moving in their direction. The same stayaways, as well as African leaders' increasing frustration with Zimbabwe's economic crisis and political violence appear to be putting succession strategizing near the forefront of Mugabe's thinking. Unfortunately, neither side has yet been willing to make any significant concessions to ensure that talks begin. Mugabe in particular seems unwilling to publicly admit recent political setbacks, and the MDC correctly feels it would gain no advantage by capitulating to Mugabe's preconditions (especially with another mass action of indefinite duration to begin May 13). While not yet particularly fruitful, this effort should not be discounted since it signals increasing African frustration with the threat of a Zimbabwean meltdown and could produce important pressure on the Mugabe regime if it is sustained. End Comment. SULLIVAN