CHINESE TIES TO ZIMBABWE

S E C R E T HARARE 000048 SIPDIS LONDON FOR CGURNEY PARIS FOR CNEARY NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2012 TAGS: PREL ZI CI SUBJECT: CHINESE TIES TO ZIMBABWE REF: 02 STATE 219948 Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF MATT HARRINGTON. REASONS: 1.5 ( B) AND (D). ¶1. (S) The ruling ZANU-PF party has long maintained a close diplomatic and military relationship with China, dating back to the liberation war in the 1970's. Since independence in 1980, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) has purchased a range of military hardware from China, including aircraft, armaments, air defense radars, and medical equipment. The two countries frequently exchange senior-level visits by military delegations, and China regularly sends technical military advisors to work with their Zimbabwean counterparts. Zimbabwe sends significant numbers of military officers to Chinese training courses each year. We understand that China was considering the possibility of establishing a facility in Harare to refurbish Chinese military equipment in the region, but it is unclear whether these discussions have moved beyond the exploratory stage. China has also provided cellular telephone intercept equipment to Zimbabwe's Central Intelligence Organization, a move that will significantly increase the ruling party's capacity to monitor those who oppose it. ¶2. (U) China maintains one of the largest embassies in Harare, with eighteen diplomats on the diplomatic list, including seven officers in the economic/commercial section alone. In addition, three military officers serve in the Defense Attache's office. Two correspondents with China Radio International -- a bureau chief and one other journalist -- are assigned to Harare, along with one or two correspondents with the Chinese news network. ¶3. (C) The private Chinese community in Zimbabwe is, by comparison, relatively small, comprising only several hundred citizens who run restaurants, foreign exchange bureaus, and small-scale import-export businesses. Chinese DCM Zheng Zhuqiang told us private trade between China and Zimbabwe is fluorishing, and reported that China imports significantly more from Zimbabwe than it exports (Note: about three times more, according to GOZ trade statistics. End Note.) In 2002, approximately 30 percent of Zimbababwe's tobacco exports went to China. At the same time, Zheng lamented the deteriorating macroeconomic environment in Zimbabwe and predicted that the situation would only worsen. The GOZ, he said, was currently unable to repay large loans from Beijing. Regarding government-supported investment, the picture was not encouraging, either. For instance, the GOZ's imposition of price controls recently forced the closure of a profitable joint venture cement production company formed only in 2000. Zheng also implied that a Chinese parastatal construction company -- which in the past has built major infrastructure projects such as roads and dams -- is struggling. In a gesture of goodwill, the PRC recently donated 4,500 tons of yellow maize directly to the Government of Zimbabwe and provided some cash assistance to the GOZ for food purchases. ¶4. (C) The PRC is beginning to reach out to the opposition MDC, in an apparent sign of growing realization that the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe are unsustainable. The Chinese Ambassador recently hosted several senior MDC leaders for dinner. According to one of the MDC attendees, the Ambassador expressed serious concern about the deterioriating political crisis in Zimbabwe and took his guests by surprise with his outspoken criticism of Mugabe's unwillingness to relinquish power. He reportedly offered to arrange a visit to China by a senior MDC delegation. SULLIVAN